When told that the Venezuelans were likely to seriously press their territorial claim to Guyana, Cheddi Jagan is said to have brushed the possibility aside, claiming that, ‘the Venezuelans are our friends’. Apparently, main sections of Venezuela’s political elite had assured him in 1958 that they would neither renounce nor raise their territorial claim. ‘However, Dr. Jagan’s subsequently argued that when it appeared that the PPP would lead British Guiana to independence, the Romulo Betancourt government, under pressure from the United States, raised the claim.’ It would not be the last time that a PPP led government would fail to properly grasp the extremely tentative nature of “friendship” in international political relations! (Joseph, Cedric l (2008) Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Reopening of the Guyana-Venezuela Boundary Controversy 1961-1966. Trafford, International).
In November 1962, upon the Venezuelans’ assertion that a ‘deal’ had been done which had deprived them of the Essequibo territory, Great Britain said that she was ready to arrange with the governments of Venezuela and the colony of Guiana a tripartite examination of the historical documents (London Times, 14.11.1962). The day before this statement was made, the Venezuelan foreign minister had claimed that ‘the disputed area has never ceased to belong to us’ (Ibid.). The British Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations made it clear that Britain’s offer to examine the records was ‘in no sense an offer to engage in substantive talks about revision of the frontier’. He insisted that if it was possible to open a case that was closed for so many years on the evidence put forward by the Venezuelans, ‘there will be no frontier agreement that cannot be questioned’. He was certain that when the Venezuelans had examined the British papers, they would come to the conclusion that there was no need to reopen the case (Guyanal/Venezuela Relations, -1968- Ministry of External Affairs, Georgetown).
Venezuelan experts visited British archives and British experts visited Caracas. From the British standpoint the experts did not find a shred of evidence in support of the Venezuelan contention. But with independence for Guiana nearing, in 1964, the British government announced its willingness to engage in discussions with the Venezuelan government at a ministerial level on the findings of the experts. These talks commenced in London with the participation of the British Guiana government, but were inconclusive.
At the end of 1965, the three governments agreed that another meeting should take place in Geneva in the early months of 1966.
This time arrangements were made for the signing of the Geneva Agreement, which provided for the setting up of a Guyana/Venezuela Mixed Commission. The commission sought a ‘satisfactory solution for the practical settlement of the controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom which has arisen over the Venezuelan contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 is null and void.’ (Documents on the Territorial Integrity of Guyana. (1981) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Georgetown).
The PPP and Cheddi Jagan immediately deemed the agreement a ‘sell out’ of the Guiana government’s position that the country would not cede an inch of her territory. Hubert Hubbard, a leader of the PPP, argued that the Geneva Agreement made an important concession to the Venezuelans by raising their ‘spurious claim’ to the status of a ‘controversy’ and that this was a prima facie recognition of the non-existent claim (Hubbard, HJM. (1967) The Venezuelan Border Issue. People’s Progressive Party, Georgetown).
The Guianese and British governments’ contention was that the agreement merely sought to establish a mechanism to determine whether evidence existed to support Mallet-Prevost’s contention and to bring the controversy to a peaceful end. In Forbes Burnham’s view, given the anarchic nature of international society, there was little choice. From his standpoint, one had to decide to ‘Survive sensibly or to Court Heroic Death’.
As Tyrone Ferguson claimed, ‘A convincing argument could be made that absent the Geneva Agreement, Guyana faced the prospect of either, at best, a further postponement of independence or, at worst, a move by Venezuela to take over the claimed territory in a context of Guyana’s unpreparedness, both military and diplomatically to deal with the situation’ (Ferguson, Tyrone (1999) To Survive Sensibly or to Court Heroic Death. Political Affairs Consulting Enterprise, Georgetown).
The PPP position was that a choice did exist and that Guyana should have sought a guarantee of the country’s borders from the ruling world powers – the United Kingdom, United States and the Soviet Union. But in the political era of the containment of communism, to interject the Soviet Union as a guarantor in what the US considered its sphere of interest was pure utopianism, if not ideological adventurism. Indeed, in 1962 the world came the nearest it had ever come to nuclear holocaust when the US and Soviet Union confronted each other in what became known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. Furthermore, the PPP’s suggestion must have been founded upon the PNC adhering to the very pro-Western outlook that the PPP was so virulently criticising.
The terms of the Mixed Commission expired in 1970 without resolving the controversy. Its work was hamstrung over the correct interpretation to be placed upon its terms of reference. The British and Guyanese held that the controversy concerned the Venezuelan contention that the 1899 Award was null and void while the Venezuelans wished to proceed as if the illegality of the 1899 award was already established.
After further consultation between the governments of Venezuela and Guyana, the Protocol of Port-of-Spain was signed on 18 June 1970 in Trinidad and Tobago. The Protocol put the dispute in abeyance for a period of twelve years, during which Venezuela and Guyana undertook not to make any claim on the other’s territory. It was automatically renewable after the twelve years, but could be terminated if either side wished it to be. (Documents, 1981) The first twelve-year period of the Protocol was due to end 18 June 1982 and would be automatically renewed unless either party notified the other of its intention not to renew before that date. In April 1981, the Venezuelan government informed the Guyana government that it did not intend to renew the Protocol.
The Geneva Agreement provided other peaceful means by which the quarrel might be settled. These are specified in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, which provides for negotiations, enquiry, mediation and conciliation. Venezuela and Guyana were deadlocked on the means to be employed to settle the controversy. Guyana was and still is in favour of a legal resolution, while Venezuela supported and still appears to support some kind of negotiated settlement.
In keeping with the Geneva Agreement, it was finally agreed that the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his role as international peacemaker be asked to identify the means by which peace should be maintained and the controversy brought to an end. The United Nations ‘good offices’ process was finally chosen and in 1989, with the agreement of the parties, the former Caribbean Community Secretary Mr. Alister McIntyre was appointed by the UN Secretary-General as his ‘good officer’ to reach agreement on the means to be used in solving the problem. Since then two other ‘good officers’ have been appointed: the late Mr. Oliver Jackman, a former Barbadian ambassador (he died in 2007) and the late Professor Norman Girvan (he died in 2014).
The Venezuelan government has recently requested that the Secretary General appoint another ‘good officer’ but in the view of the Guyanese government that process has not served Guyana well as it has not prevented Venezuela from making various types of interventions into Guyana’s affairs that have been detrimental to the latter’s national development.
