Negotiation is quite a unique process: it is well known that calling for, engaging in and even completing negotiations does not mean that one or both parties wants them to be successful. In this regard, what is said about states can be generally applied: ‘It should never be forgotten that states sometimes engage in prenegotiations, and even in substantive negotiation, merely in order to buy time or obtain a good press for being considered accommodating’ (Berridge, G R. (2010) Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. Palgrave, Macmillan).
Furthermore, no one following the political process in Guyana should have to be reminded that, under political pressure, the PPP/C negotiated many agreements with the opposition that it failed to implement. A successful negotiation requires the gradual generation of commitment and trust if is not to degenerate and become very messy.
For developmental purposes, we must not allow the present effort to form a government of national unity to fail. But that aside, the very nature of the governing alliance and whether it would be able to broaden its appeal, particularly among traditional PPP supporters, will partly depend upon the kind of messages it sends when trying to establish a national unity government.
I am well aware that a formula for arriving at a negotiated agreement needs to be vague but it should not be so unclear as to be unable to garner empathy and commitment. It should certainly not encourage negative assessments of the intention of those involved in the process.
Out of office, the alliance made a great deal of this commitment and the PPP has driven it into the heads of its supporters that the alliance demand was merely a deception by the PNC morphed into various guises, the latest being the APNU+AFC alliance, to get their hands on power.
To his credit, Moses Nagamootoo has been one of the chief proponents of the formation of a government of national unity. So much so that Vincent Alexander thought it necessary to jump to the defence of both his party and the PM with the following summation of what was essentially the classical PPP position.
“Dr [Prem] Misir attempts to dismiss Mr Nagamootoo’s portrayal of the alliance to Dr Cheddi Jagan’s previous call for a coalition, as opportunistic and deceptive. His main contention is that the PNC of 1964 rejected such an opportunity and that having morphed into APNU, it is now joining with the opportunistic AFC to deceive the populace about unity while its only objective is to acquire power and to perpetuate the politics the PNC.” (SN 3/4/2015)
Out of office, Mr Nagamootoo’s national unity government could have more-or-less been equated with shared executive governance, but after his presentation at Whim on 1/9/2015, I am no longer certain. True, together with telling his audience that he was to lead a committee to hold discussions with the PPP, he claimed, “We are prepared to open the doors to the PPP if they want to enter this government because we want to have an all-inclusive government.” (SN 6/9/2015)
But the emphasis of his presentation appeared somewhat different and very much in the minimalist ‘inclusive governance’ vein I pointed to last week. “[The] PPP …are a creditable opposition and we would like them to join the process of governance and engage in talks with us … so that we can cooperate on things we have to do for Guyana. … We want to enter into a fruitful relationship… not a picketing party but a party that comes to the table to hold talks. …. We engage in issues that require solutions. We want to sit with the PPP and thrash out differences. We want to move forward and need all hands on deck.” (Ibid.)
We must also note that this came only about five days after President Granger met Mr Jagdeo and his invitation to the latter’s party to join with the government in forming a committee on national unity was rejected on 3/9/2015. During their meeting, which was less than a week before the PM’s address at Whim, the president did not mention to Mr Jagdeo that the committee would be led by Mr Nagamootoo. This, added to Mr Nagamootoo’s hazy formulation above and the general impression that the AFC is being marginalised in the alliance, suggests it was at best a hastily cobbled together strategy to give the PM something politically sensible to say when he faced his home constituency for the first time after the election.
The choice of Mr Nagamootoo to lead the discourse with the PPP also gives the impression that the government does not seriously want to negotiate, and this cannot be good.
Which of us, having had the idiom ‘red rag to a bull’ driven into us, would choose to send the most implacable enemy of someone to convince them of anything? All the talk about our needing to put personality and historic feeling aside cannot overcome the fact that it is known to negotiators that when rancour permeates any negotiations, the parties will not be able to negotiate properly and that the effort will most likely fail. Furthermore, in these early stages, when no one has yet invested much political capital in the process, provocative proposals can easily make a call for negotiation a nonstarter.
But the regime also needs to be careful that the PPP’s disgust with the process does not lead it to attempt to utilise the negotiations negatively. For example, as the process now stands the door is wide open for the PPP to either humiliate or force the PM from the leadership of the negotiation process by choosing a relatively low level person to lead its delegation.
Secondly, the government should not for one moment believe that it is beyond the PPP to devise
a strategy to ensure that the negotiations fail and that Mr Nagamootoo is blamed and labelled self-serving and incompetent. With an eye to the future, APNU itself might not be inclined to expend valuable political capital to bolster Mr Nagamootoo, for it can form a more meaningful coalition with the PPP. And after all, there is the quite credible argument that an all-party government is dangerous and that the AFC is well-positioned for the role of official opposition.
Assuming the regime is serious about establishing a national unity government, it needs to wisely manage the process to avoid this kind of messiness. Guyana’s development, and to an extent the alliance’s own political future, depends upon its so doing. The attempt will certainly fail if in these early days efforts are not made to provide and sustain a vision of cordiality and trust towards a prosperous, equitable, future.
