Commentary in some of the international press indicates surprise at the apparent effusiveness with which President Xi Jinping of China was welcomed in Britain last week by the government of Prime Minister David Cameron, including the extensive participation of Queen Elizabeth in the proceedings.
Information suggests that the nature of the treatment accorded to the President was intended to indicate to the Government of China that Britain, while as one of the leading NATO powers, is concerned to follow developments in Asia in particular, where the Chinese government has been staking out new policies, his government would not let such concerns come in the way of the development of new economic relationships with China, including substantial investment in Britain.
For this purpose, the welcome by Prime Minister Cameron’s government seemed intent on assuring the president that Britain recognises that China is now truly one of the great powers in today’s geopolitical landscape, and as such cannot be publicly lectured, solely for what it would consider political effect, by its other great power colleagues.
To some commentators, Britain’s stance indicates recognition of the fact that the post-World War Two order has now been substantially changed, that change suggesting that the ideological division of the post World War Two environment has now come to an end, and that countries recognised as, or seeking to be recognised as, having a legitimate role in responding to the new geopolitics, now need to be treated as equals, particularly by the Western powers. And what goes for politics must go for economics.
Britain’s now so visible recognition of China’s status would appear to also take into account that that country’s autonomous behaviour in seeking to normalise relationships particularly in Asia has a certain legitimacy, even as other countries in that area, whether Japan, India or Indonesia, have their own concerns about how the inevitable balance of power will emerge, and what policies will influence their emergence. But there are hints that this virtually autonomous diplomacy would appear to be going further than Britain’s number one NATO ally, the United States, is prepared to go at this stage.
For naturally, the United States continues to recognise the substantial significance that it must continue to accord to a country like Japan, an ally since the end of World War Two, and which, over the last few years has seemed to be wanting to work out a new posture towards the developing geopolitical situation in Asia that is the result of China’s own emerging posture. And thus, it can be observed that Japan is itself seeking, in this new situation, to work itself out of the constraints imposed on it after World War Two, while not giving, certainly China, the occasion to suggest that it is seeking to achieve the kind of geopolitical status that it had before that war.
It would appear that the United States, in observing China’s emerging strategic postures, is conscious of Japanese concerns, particularly as it indicates policy relevant to China’s own asserted role in the South China Sea area. But the US is also concerned that part of the orientation of Japan, a strategic American ally, is to indicate that it now has a right to a legitimate presence in the Asian environment. And that, in turn, suggests that the limitations which Japan believes still exist as far as the South China Sea is concerned, no longer exist.
The significance of these emerging competing postures in Asia, when linked to the welcome given to China’s president by the British this week, would appear to be an emerging American concern about the solidity of NATO policy in respect of that part of the world. Prime Minister Cameron now appears to accept the view that NATO itself, and thus its individual members must be able to respond to current developments.
This perspective, in turn, would appear to give cognisance to a belief in British policy circles that the country must not be left out of the emerging economic developments, and economic policy directions in Asia, obviously now being virtually dominated by China’s economic activities. And in that connection, the British government was prepared to ignore the concerns of the United States about supporting China’s proposal to establish an Asian Investment Bank.
Cameron’s policy it seems, has been to deliberately draw Chinese investment into Britain on a substantial scale (which seems to have occurred last week), an assumption being that it should be recognised that a substantial and successful Chinese economic presence in various parts of the world, gives that country a stake in global peace and stability.
Observers favourable to this view will also assert that Cameron’s initiative this week asserts a degree of autonomy from some of the stringencies of American foreign policy, so linked to, or dependent on, the twists and turns of domestic politics in that country. And he will of course, be well aware, that whatever the ideological emanations of current geopolitical thinking in the United States, there can be no doubt that the relationship between Chinese economic policymakers and American business, will flourish.
Cameron’s initiative virtually coincides with another, his proposed referendum on leaving or staying in the European Union, which somewhat similar to his Chinese initiative of last week, suggests a working out of foreign policy orientations that take account of a certain dynamism in global geopolitics, whether in Europe itself, or in the Far East.
But he also is well aware that if the results of the Chinese investment initiatives, directly blessed by the Chinese leadership, are successful, these will continue to give his country a presence in emerging global configurations, which he and his party have always been favourable to, even if it continues to remain within the confines of the European Union.
