Dear Editor,
In an earlier letter we briefly surveyed the pernicious problems that racial discrimination continues to pose for Guyana’s social, political and economic development. We outlined an approach for overcoming discrimination in which aggrieved citizens defend their rights to fair treatment before the law by recourse to the courts and legal system. Though such an approach to dealing with discrimination is now routine in many nations we reminded readers how unusual the use of the law in this context is in Guyana. Part of the problem is the relatively poor understanding by the population at large of what actions constitute racial discrimination. It is to this important, practical question that we now turn.
Neither the Constitution of Guyana nor the Racial Hostilities Act 1996 offers a definition of racism or racial discrimination. The Prevention of Discrimination Act 1997, even though it deals with all forms of discrimination, come closest in speaking of “any characteristic which appertains generally or is generally imputed to a particular persons or a particular race…colour…ethnic origin, indigenous population…national extraction”. In its classic 19th and 20th century meanings racism was the belief that humanity was divided into races that were distinct in appearance and qualities. Anyone who belonged to a particular race looked like and possessed the qualities of that race. The proof by geneticists that humanity shares almost all the same genes and that those not shared have nothing to do with qualities or abilities has made some headway against the false belief in race. Individuals therefore will object vigorously to being labelled racist or being accused of racial discrimination, that is, disadvantaging persons due to their supposed membership of a supposed race even if they have racist beliefs.
While proving that someone has racist beliefs and that their actions are influenced by these beliefs may be difficult, it is less difficult to prove that their actions have had racist effects. These racist effects (and sexist effects too) can usually be demonstrated by simple surveys that monitor for discrimination. Two examples with which most readers would be familiar are the still ongoing Kissoon-Jagdeo libel case in the proceedings of which the ethnic structure of Guyana’s Foreign Service was examined and the more recent, post-election controversy over the composition of state boards. To avoid comment on the ongoing court case let us deal with the second. Here both racism and sexism were alleged in the selection of board members. Indeed the sexist effects of the appointments were more dramatic in that only 18% of the board members were women whereas they constitute 50% of the population. The reasons for these selections remain a mystery; there might be a belief in the inferiority of women, choosing people one knows well and not knowing women well, choosing friends from one’s school days if one attended same-sex schools etc. Only the first of these possible reasons would mean that those making the choice are sexist but all produce a sexist effect. So if one is interested in detecting sexism, as in the example, or racism then focusing on the effects of actions rather than assumed or imputed biases is likely to be more effective.
Now let us take a hypothetical example of four bosses each of whom wants to employ an engineer. If all of these four only advertised in particular places, only interviewed persons belonging to a particular group and only employed people belonging to a particular group the racist effects of their practices would be apparent. Let us forgo further consideration of the first two bosses whose motives it turns out were indeed racist. Turning to the second pair we discover that one wanted to know more about Bollywood films and the other wanted to know more about the teachings of Marcus Garvey. In Guyana we might assume that the bosses and the people they wish to employ belong to different ethnic groups because the common belief is that an interest in either would more likely be found in one main ethnic group rather than the other. However, in large parts of West Africa Bollywood films are popular and in India there is considerable interest in African American Studies. So neither in West Africa nor in India would such interests in an engineer suggest an ethnic identity. Would it be fair or legal to treat these four bosses in the same way? This is the sort of question that the courts in Guyana should be used to settle. Amongst the issues to be clarified would be whether it is legally permitted by the constitution to redress racist effects without examining the motives of the authors of those effects and whether monitoring for discrimination as the means to establish the existence of those racist effects is legal.
The Prevention of Discrimination Act does list exceptions where the Act does not apply. These seem quite sound but should also be tested in the courts to ensure that people are quite clear about them. That it also encompasses discrimination based on gender and disability, and covers public and private institutions, makes it an important piece of legislation. Our belief is that the body of case law based on the provisions of the Act generally could become a force for building a fairer, less discriminatory society. On the specific issue of racism the Ethnic Relations Commission might then be revitalised in the light of legal rulings (whatever the judgment of the courts) to function as a body that has the legal power to contribute to social change rather than the less helpful role it has played thus far.
Yours faithfully,
David Pollard
Peter Fraser