Dear Editor,
Is the APNU+AFC government becoming a merger more than a partnership?
Coalition governance in Guyana, in its re-emergence since the 1960s, is now in its seventh month. APNU, a coalition of parties in itself, and the AFC, signed the Cummingburg coalition agreement in the run-up to the May 2015 elections amidst concerns over electoral arithmetic (would the sum of the parts get more votes than the parts acting separately?) and over longevity in government (can the parties achieve trust, compromise, and consensus?). As matters have turned out, the coalition did win the election and appears stable in the initial stages of governing.
From what one can, however, see from the outside, this is not a classic coalition government. By this, one means that most of the expected structures, procedures and practices that are common to coalition governance worldwide are absent or undeveloped. What are some of these common features in the classic coalition model? The first is the existence and content of the coalition agreement. For the APNU+AFC, this includes both the Cummingsburg Accord and the joint election manifesto. Taken together, in terms of size (word count is the measure used in academic studies), conciseness (as measured by whether the pledges in the documents are lofty rhetoric or concrete promises), and comprehensiveness (the number of policy areas covered), the coalition agreement would rank very high on any world list.
The missing element, however, is that while the agreement covers philosophies, policies and programmes, we have seen no accord prior to or since the election on the structures, procedures and rules for collective decision-making, information-sharing, and conflict resolution. The common practice for coalition governments worldwide is for these matters to be specified and publicized to bring stability and predictability to the power-sharing arrangement and to increase public understanding and confidence. The New Zealand cabinet manuals are a fine example of this practice.
To be fair, the APNU+AFC manifesto promises the establishment of a dispute resolution commission to adjudicate complaints from participating parties. One is not sure if such a body now exists or what are the other structures and systems in place.
Relatedly, the second feature we expect to see in coalition governance are cabinet committees, purposely composed of members of all participating parties. To the extent that a participating party does not have enough cabinet members (and such is the case for the parties in the current government other than APNU and the AFC), senior party officials or MPs could serve as representatives. Cabinet committees are the backbone of coalition decision-making and coordination. They ensure all sides get ample opportunity at shaping decisions before matters arrive on the cramped agenda of the full cabinet. An effective cabinet committee system also prevents the development of the destabilizing ‘silo effect’ within the coalition, whereby particular portfolios could become the sole and guarded preserve of one minister and his party.
The third missing feature in our coalition governance is the system of so-called watchdog junior or associate ministers. The worldwide practice is to appoint under each portfolio a junior minister from a party different from that of the senior minister. The role of the junior appointee is to ensure the views of his party can be immediately considered in each policy arena and to ensure his party gets first-hand access to information and documents. Here, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Amerin-dian Affairs and Ministry of Public Infrastructure are among the few entities with superficial resemblance to this arrangement.
A fifth missing element concerns the coalition’s silence on key governing principles such as on collective responsibility (can a party opt out of a decision it does not like?); on the ‘good faith and no surprises’ rule (to what extent and in what circumstances could a party make unilateral decisions within its portfolio without warning to the others); on the agree-to-disagree principle; and on the power of a coalition member to invoke delaying or absolute veto powers on matters of fundamental party interests (which commonly encompass controversial ethnic and moral issues). One advantage of working out and publicizing such principles is to remove public uncertainty, such as that expressed in the November 16th editorial of the Stabroek News (‘Baishanlin and Minister Trotman’) over whether Minister Trotman’s announcement to grant the company an extension was his personal view and/or that of the government.
A last missing element is the absence of actions of the coalition members to maintain party distinctiveness (known as the unity-distinctiveness dilemma). If we use the number and focus of each individual party’s post-election media releases and conferences, we can conclude that maintaining distinctiveness is not a driving concern. Indeed, some had hoped that the recent decision to increase the salary of ministers was solely an APNU decision (given that Minister Joe Harmon first came to front on it), and that the AFC and the WPA would show their higher party principles by distancing themselves from the decision. Later public statements showed that all parties embraced the decision.
The absence or weakness of these typical elements of coalition governance in Guyana could be explained by the immaturity of the arrangement or by the inexperience and unpreparedness of the participants. I, however, lean towards an explanation that suggests the coalition is developing a single-party governing mentality in which the normal structures, procedures and rules of power-sharing are considered unnecessary. To save space, I highlight without elaboration the several factors that may be driving the merger of the parties into a single political entity. These factors include the personal chemistry or friendships among the main leaders and ministers across party lines; the consequential high trust among parties; the similarities of ideology and policy outlooks of the parties; and the strong desire that the coalition must stay together in the fight against a powerful political opposition.
Yours faithfully,
Sherwood Lowe
