In what is a period of relative global stability, different kinds of events still appear to portray areas of instability and uncertainty, and as such, draw the attention of the major powers. The present tensions do not really reflect recent difficulties between the major powers per se, given that the most central area of contention between Russia and the United States – that relating to the Ukraine ‒ has tendered to simmer down, even as the Nato powers continue to indicate concern about the future of that former constituent part of the now disappeared Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
In fact in the European part of the globe, though President Putin still appears to be seeking a way of regaining influence over the future of Ukraine, which has been a major concern of the European Union, tensions have simmered down, as clearly, neither side of this now non-conflictual battle feels that the status quo before the contention commenced, can be regained. Instead, in terms of the relationship between the European Union on the one hand, and Russia on the other, there appears to a mutually accepted inclination to maintain the new status quo, with a determination on the part of the EU, that the now autonomous status of the other ex-Soviet republics or former members of the of the deceased Warsaw Pact community should remain as is.
In addition, the effect of the response of the Nato countries to the Ukraine issue, would appear to have induced President Putin to concentrate on reconstructing the economy of Russia in the face of present Nato sanctions, and on trying to maximize the relationships with China as it emerges as a global power; and with the countries of the Far East (the other boundary of Russia, as China itself seeks to construct new relations with that area, and to expand markets for its own economy). So we might say that in respect of these developments, the nexus between China and Russia would appear to be a preoccupation of both powers, as the Russian leadership seeks to find new markets for its products as the certainty of a tied Eastern Europe with the old Comecom and Warsaw Pact loses is salience.
In effect, while Russia still seeks to maximize, in particular, economic relations with the old Comecom states, most of which the EU would seem to wish to see as full members of their institution, President Putin would appear to be seeking a new relationship with the European Union designed to assist the reorganization and growth of the Russia economy, even while he feels that he cannot presently concede to removing the major source of tension between them, the Ukraine issue.
Indeed, the surprise of the relationships, in terms of their potential instability, of the European Union, initially evident at present, relates to two sets of circumstances, really concerning its own ability to sustain its unity and homogeneity. The initial challenge to its unity has been the almost forced determination of British government, really brought on by elements of the ruling Conservative Party, to hold a referendum on whether the United Kingdom should maintain its membership, or its current form membership, of the European Union. And this, at a time when the issue of the structure of the UK itself has only relatively recently been decided by the referendum held in Scotland.
The British decision is, of course, of major concern for the EU as a whole, at a time when it has been faced with a new, though constructive, challenge to its homogeneity by the entry of members of the old Warsaw Pact-Comecon arrangement with Russia into the EU. For it now finds itself concerned with a reverse problem, the possibility of a secession from within its own ranks, by one of its chief members, the United Kingdom, defined as a global power within the Western fraternity.
Britain, and indeed the EU as a whole, now find themselves confronted with an internal challenge, as Prime Minister David Cameron having conceded to the pressure for a referendum, seeks to find a constitutional arrangement acceptable to the majority of the voters of his country, as well as to the members of the EU. And he has found that to do this, he has to persuade his country’s voters that remaining in the EU will not affect their major concerns – in particular the possibility of wholesale freedom of movement into Britain, and the opening of social security, and other work-related benefits to new immigrants.
But the leaders of member-states of the EU, however, while concerning themselves with the possibility of a secession of the United Kingdom from their ranks, have also now suddenly found themselves with an internal political challenge even more significant than that of Britain’s referendum. This has been the mass inflow of Middle Eastern and North African migrants into their states.
The Western Europeans, and the Germans in particular, as major recipients of migrating Syrians, have now had to face the concerns of their own constituents. In that context, it would seem to appear to the German population that Chancellor Merkel has been excessively generous, and indications are that fears are rising within her own political party and governing coalition, that as a result, her security of political tenure could well come under challenge. A British concern about immigration could well become a substantial political concern of Germany and Chancellor Merkel, soon scheduled to face the polls.
What this suggests is an increasing uncertainty as to Germany and Western European countries’ attitude to what has now become a central Nato and global concern, the continuing civil war in Syria, affecting the wider Middle East and parts of North Africa, and resulting in the unanticipated major migration to Europe. This issue has upset Nato planning vis-à-vis the Middle East as a whole.
The political strategy of Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis Syria, obviously played out autonomously, has also tended to upset Nato strategy, particularly in relation to the latter’s, and especially the United States’, desire to come to terms with Iran, in respect of its possession of a nuclear weapons capability; but also in terms of the United States’ strategy towards the wider Middle East, in particular the Syrian civil war issue.
It can probably be argued that the Middle East is now the central concern of the US, and therefore the Nato powers. Unexpectedly too, they have had to face a Russian diplomatic and military intervention vis-à-vis the Syrian civil war which appears to have been unexpected. Few can predict the outcome of what appears to be an opportunistic alliance between the Nato powers and Russia, in respect of Syria, and in effect, the wider Middle East.
This uncertainty is perhaps the most challenging of all. For not since the era of Nasser and Krushchev’s de facto Egypt-Moscow alliance in the mid-1950s and thereafter, have the Western powers seen Nato’s longstanding opponent in respect of the European arena, openly stretching its wings in their Middle Eastern preserve.