An appeal by Guyanese attorney Rabi Sukul in the UK High Court against a decision by the Bar Standards Council to disbar him was dismissed last year, according to the decision seen by Stabroek News.
Sukul’s disbarring stemmed from his drawing up of grounds of appeal in a criminal case which he knew had no basis.
Sukul’s disbarring by the UK Bar Standards Council in February, 2014 had created embarrassment here as at the time he had been serving as a Justice of Appeal having been appointed on July 26, 2013. Questions had been raised as to what screening had been done of Sukul before his appointment to the Appeal Court as it should have been known that he was facing disbarment. By the time he had taken up his appointment in July 2013, a complaint against him had been lodged with the Bar Standards Council in the UK on October 31st, 2012.
The decision to disbar him was delivered on February 3rd 2014 by a tribunal presided over by Michael Baker QC and led to Acting Chancellor of the Judiciary here, Justice Carl Singh asking for Sukul’s resignation which was duly handed in. The disbarment sentence was later quashed by the High Court to permit a second tribunal so that Sukul could make representation as to the sanctions.
The second panel made similar findings to the first. It said that Charge one had been proved in that “Sukul had engaged in conduct likely to bring the legal profession into disrepute contrary to paragraph 301(a) of the Code of Conduct. He had knowingly created a false document with the intention of misleading Mr Lindsey (L), his client, into believing that he had grounds of appeal in relation to a drugs matter. Mr Sukul knew that there were no grounds of appeal”.
The second Tribunal said that it had heard wide-ranging submissions and had taken into account all matters including Sukul’s statement, the 2013 Sentencing Guidance and other matters. It said that no lesser sanction than disbarment would meet the need to protect the public.
Though the tribunal acknowledged that Sukul was of hitherto impeccable character and the complaint was an isolated matter, it said it was not isolated in time as the impugned documents had been produced in January and March of 2012.
The second tribunal added: “There was an indirect motive of financial benefit for which [the appellant] was prepared to falsify documents. The circumstances were so serious and there was an element of dishonesty such that only disbarment could maintain the public’s trust in the profession.”
Sukul then appealed this decision in the UK High Court. The appeal was heard by Lord Justice Beatson and Justice Nicol. Lord Beatson delivering the decision said:
“I reject the submission that there was no or insufficient evidence to support the finding of dishonesty to the standard indicated in Bryant v The Law Society. The real issue in this case is not the first Bryant question, whether the appellant acted dishonestly by ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people or with the gloss put on this by Longmore LJ in Hossain [2014] EWCA Civ 2246, reasonable and honest barristers. The real issue is the second question, whether the appellant was aware that by those standards he was acting dishonestly. I have concluded that the first and second tribunals were perfectly entitled to come to the conclusion that, on the evidence before them, the appellant was aware that by the standards of reasonable and honest barristers, he was acting dishonestly. They were entitled to do so in particular in the light of the emails between the appellant and Mr Italia, his instructing solicitor, on 11 October and 26 November 2012. In the first email he stated:
`You asked me as a favour to draft some grounds of appeal because you wanted to ingratiate yourself with Lindsay [the lay client] for him not to sack DL [Duncan Lewis] on his murder case. You promised me a case in return after you sacked me on the murder. You never gave me a thought, let alone a case.’
In the second email, after the hearing before the Registrar, he stated:
`You know full well that you asked me to those grounds of appeal so that you could appease Cory Lindsay so that he does not sack Duncan Lewis for his murder at the Bailey… The grounds are dated March 2012… Cory Lindsay was convicted in November 2011. Those dates show clearly that there were no prospect of an appeal. If not, I would have formulated the grounds within the statutory 28 days of conviction.’”
He added later in his decision: “In this case, two experienced five person tribunals, chaired by experienced retired Circuit Judges, have concluded that the appropriate sanction for this appellant’s admittedly isolated act of dishonest conduct was disbarment. That sentence may have been severe. Undoubtedly its effects are severe and have affected the appellant very seriously. Another tribunal may have come to a different conclusion, although the fact that in this case two tribunals came to the same conclusion suggests that is unlikely. But whatever the position, the function of this court is not to substitute its own view on penalty for that of the professional tribunal (see Bolton’s case at paragraph 19). Its role (see CPR 52.11) is to review the decision of the tribunal, not to rehear it. Within the context of review, the professional expertise of the tribunal below means that review should be particularly circumspect where these is no clear error of law or procedural unfairness. For these reasons I would dismiss this appeal”.
