Against the backdrop of Venezuela’s worsening political and economic crisis, the country’s opposition coalition, the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD is the Spanish acronym), declared on Wednesday that it would pursue all constitutional mechanisms, accompanied by mass peaceful street demonstrations starting in Caracas this weekend, to force President Nicolás Maduro and the chavista United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) out of power.
Announcing the opposition’s strategy, MUD secretary-general Jesús ‘Chúo’ Torrealba said that Venezuela did not have “a functional democracy but an arbitrary autocracy” which necessitated Mr Maduro’s legal removal from office. Assuming that Mr Maduro does not feel pressured into offering his resignation, the options are a recall referendum, a constitutional amendment to shorten the president’s term and a constituent assembly.
The recall referendum has been the subject of most discussion amongst the opposition, as the constitution allows for the recall of the president halfway into his term. In Mr Maduro’s case, this would fall on April 19, 2016. The challenge for the opposition would be to collect, within three days, the signatures of 20 per cent of registered voters (some 3.9 million) to call a plebiscite and then hope that the votes in favour of Mr Maduro’s departure are equal to or greater than those cast to elect him in 2013, that is, 7.5 million. Given the level of popular discontent in Venezuela, this may well be one of the most feasible options for the opposition, although there are fears that the process could be subverted by the chavista-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE).
For a constitutional amendment to shorten the presidential term from six to four years, this would have to be requested by 15 per cent of registered voters (2.9 million) or by 30 per cent of the members of the National Assembly, where the proposal would ultimately be debated and voted upon. It would then have to be approved by the electorate in a referendum by a simple majority. A draft amendment was tabled in mid-February and, if the process is successful, presidential elections could be called by December this year.
To convene a constituent assembly with the aim of rewriting the constitution and effecting the transformation of the state, the opposition would need a two-thirds majority vote in the parliament or the petition of 15 per cent of registered voters. A significant sector of the MUD favours this path as it would make the president’s executive powers subordinate to the decisions of the constituent assembly.
But the chavista-dominated Supreme Court (TSJ) is almost certain to derail the latter two options and rule against any constitutional action by the MUD. While the opposition won two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly in the December 6, 2015 legislative elections, it has been thwarted in its efforts to change laws and to change the TSJ’s composition, by the court itself, which has deprived the MUD of its ‘super majority’ by debarring three deputies from assuming their seats.
Nevertheless, Mr Torrealba has explained that the multi-pronged strategy for legal regime change was adopted in order to maximise the chances of success. He has, moreover, asserted that the opposition is united in its intent, as it makes “no sense” to focus on a single mechanism. There are, however, other caveats.
The MUD is notoriously fractious and some analysts believe that the all-inclusive approach, rather than reflecting strong unanimous support, is more indicative of disunity and differences over the strategy to be adopted. Moderates oppose mass protests, as the potential for violence would give the government an excuse to accuse the opposition of plotting a coup and to adopt even more repressive measures. Radical elements, on the other hand, believe that they are the only option left for bringing popular pressure to bear on Mr Maduro to force his resignation, with the vice-president replacing him until the next scheduled elections in January 2018.
Meanwhile, Mr Maduro and his colleagues are battening down the hatches and the powerful number two, Diosdado Cabello, and the rest of the PSUV leadership are closing ranks behind the President – at least for now – even as they seem to be relying on the TSJ and the CNE to frustrate the opposition’s strategy and cause them to fall apart yet again.
The outlook in Venezuela is uncertain, to put it mildly. The MUD is upping the ante. How successful it will be in mobilising people remains to be seen. How much the government will heed the street protests is also anyone’s guess. The role of the military, which sees itself as the guardian of the constitution, is also the subject of much speculation. All the while, the government continues to ignore international opinion and concern. Only one thing appears sure: the potential for unrest is growing and the situation is becoming increasingly volatile.
