Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham became an autocrat, dictator, whatever description suits you, under our 1966 independence constitution, with its non-executive governor/president titular head of the government and armed forces; prime minister directly answerable to the national assembly; Westminster-type separation of powers; right to prorogation, etc. In other words, Burnham was already an autocrat when the 1980 constitution was promulgated, and it was because he was more or less absolute ruler that he was able to devise that constitution to entrench the powers he thought befitted his presidency.
Using rigged elections to perennially keep himself in government, the PNC ‘founder leader’, with his Westminster type control of the executive and the legislature, easily brushed aside the judiciary and other institutions such as the titular head of state. The arguments for and against the PNC’s rigging of elections are not of importance here; what matters is that at the time of the promulgation of the much berated 1980 constitution the PNC autocracy was about a dozen years old!
More than three decades later, something similar to what occurred under the PNC happened to the PPP/C. The latter came to office in 1992 with high hopes of transforming Guyana into a modern democratic nation, but structural and political factors led it to taking a similar autocratic road to that of the PNC.
The structural factor is our ethnic voting pattern, which gave the PPP/C a similar advantage to what rigged elections gave the PNC: longevity in government. The political factors were the numerous protests that the PNC led after every election, the interweaving of politics and crime and the general ethnic tensions that existed. We have only recently lived through this period, so I need not restate the impact of these factors on the entire society.
Avoiding PNC and later PPP/C-type autocracies and constructing a constitution that encourages national unity and development are, therefore, the primary reasons for wanting constitutional reform.
This being so, it is vital that we understand the above mentioned historical relationships and not be sidetracked by a reform agenda that focuses on what I consider secondary matters mainly related to the 1980/2001 constitutions and other related laws, such as presidential immunities; post elections coalitions; prorogation; titular presidency; a stronger local democratic system; closed or open list parliamentary system; more and stronger constituency representation; MPs’ capacity to cross the floor; making presidential term limits stronger; tie breakers to make appointments of top judicial officials possible; one man constitutional court; government’s capacity to change its own salaries; parliament’s capacity to change the budget, etc.
Our tendency to focus on these types of secondary issues and not to get to the root of the historic problem of power in Guyana is everywhere. For example, explaining why National Communications Network did not appropriately bill the PPP/C for the use of its services, Monday’s Stabroek News editorial, claimed, ‘Which board of NCN or any other entity sized up by the PPP/C could resist the demands of the then ruling party without directors having to tender resignations and be forever worried about job security. The PPP/C – buoyed by the accoutrements of executive power – wouldn’t take no for an answer.’
To a considerable degree the reason why the public service, business, civil society and the general populace were cowed by the PPP/C was not because it had ‘the accoutrements of executive power’ but because it had proven over many years that it was not going to soon lose and become accountable for the use of that power.
As I have argued in this column before, longevity in government undermines most social institutions. Had the populace and the PPP/C believed that there was a real possibility of regime turnover and that the latter would, for example, have to answer for all the questions that have been raised by the present forensic audits, it is highly improbable that either would have behaved in the way they did.
Regular regime change is very important. However, after presenting some very innovative ideas about executive power sharing (EPS) and the path towards it, my fellow columnist, Dr Tarron Khemraj concluded that, ‘If the population can be taken to a proportionality that allows for regular democratic turnover under a superior constitution, there is no need for EPS’ (Should there be executive power-sharing between PNC and PPP? SN 01/06/2016). Again, although I agree with Tarron that regime turnover is important in multiple ways – it is for example perhaps the most potent anti-corruption tool – can we go so far as to say that once it occurs in Guyana, EPS is no longer required?
I wonder if Dr. Khemraj would agree that what is necessary in our context is, what I call, inclusive regime turnover; a turnover that does not exclude large, specific, sections of the population. In my view, regime turnover such as occurred in the 2015 elections does not bring with it the necessary level of political stability and national unity that would allow timely development and the flowering of a national identity.
What we have today is a democracy (meaning merely majority rule) without the important political virtue of inclusiveness (“Democracy without political virtue:” SN: April 30, 2014). Thus, while regime turnover is most important, it is not in itself sufficient to allow us to build this country into a nation.
Furthermore, what the political elites on all sides and the population must also come to appreciate is that the ethnic balance is such that even if the PPP/C wins the 2020 national election, in terms of ethnic inclusiveness the most likely outcome will be something similar to what we have today, and the ethnic/political bickering will continue to divide and distract us from the seminal task of national development.
The secondary issues mentioned above will have to be considered, but in my view they will have only consequential impact on the need for us to try to constitutionally entrench the central virtues of the democratic process – the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers and the entrenchment of arrangements to ensure periodic inclusive regime turnover. This is a major challenge to those who set out to establish democratic constitutions.
Our recent history has shown that without these, relatively free speech and press, open political competition, etc., have not prevented our decline into bad governance and autocracy. The question to which all of us should be now directing our thoughts is can this be accomplished in our social context and if it can how should it to be done (Tarron gave some ideas for consideration)? On the other hand, if it cannot be achieved, what is to be done?
