Tomorrow, the electorate of the United Kingdom votes on the issue of whether to remain or leave the European Union (EU). The issue has been in public discussion for some years, and Prime Minister David Cameron seems to have decided to seek a definitive answer to it, rather than have a continuing public discussion on the matter, and therefore allowing further public uncertainty about Britain’s medium-term future.
Of course, apart from domestic considerations, Cameron’s decision in favour of a referendum must be the result of an awareness that many of the other member states of the EU were becoming seriously concerned about what they had come to consider as an unnecessary dragging on of the issue, with, in their view the unsatisfactory perpetuation of uncertainty in the EU system as a whole. And in addition, he would have become very conscious of the fact that factions in his own Conservative Party itself were trying to force a perception among the British people that the government was itself uncertain as to what to do, and they were therefore forcing a decision on him through public pressure.
Cameron was, of course, also aware that the uncertainly and therefore division within the Conservative ranks has been mirrored in the ranks of the Labour party, and tha, that party (with a relatively new leader) would probably be hesitant to take an opposing position to continued participation in the EU, given that some of the members favourable to retaining membership were prominent within that party.
The result has been a unity of view between the two parties on continued EU membership, and in addition, strong support among the Liberals, as well from the Scottish and Northern Ireland administrations, in addition to a similar position being taken by the government of the Irish Republic. But in the course of the campaign the opposition within the Conservative Party to maintaining membership has really led the No campaign, and much of Prime Minister Cameron’s effort has therefore been directed at trying to diminish its strength.
In that context, he has been forced not only to cope with widespread opposition among the British people, but also with the strongly organized position from within the Conservatives that has been directed to the voting population as a whole, with an anti-immigration stance, perceived as having a racial tinge, being dominant in some arguments. But there is a possibility that, with the murder of a pro-EU Labour Member of Parliament, that element will now be diminishing as the campaign draws to an end.
It has, of course, been obvious that Britain’s strategic situation in international affairs will have been of concern to the other members of the EU, in particular France and Germany, in terms not only of Britain’s position as a significant economic actor in the system, but also of the implications for the EU’s standing or status as a significant actor in wider global affairs. This has been a concern not only within the EU but within the United States, as has been evident in the remarks in favour of the country’s continued membership by President Obama during his recent visit to the UK.
For both the EU membership and the United States are well aware that the European continent has been going through a process of substantial diplomatic change as the EU has sought to consolidate the implications of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Communist international system and the Warsaw Pact, through a policy of increasing integration of the former European members of the Soviet-dominated bloc into the EU.
In that regard, Britain’s membership has been seen as strategic from both an economic and security perspective, to the extent that a departure of Britain from the EU would be deemed as diminishing the country’s diplomatic and strategic influence in the Europeans’ regional decision-making. In consequence, it would be perceived as making substantially more complex, the North Atlantic countries’ ability to come to terms with decision-making vis-à-vis developments in what used to be referred to as Eastern Europe, in relation to the consequences and implications of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and of COMECON, the structure created by the then Soviet Union for managing the economic relations of Russia and those countries.
Countries in the Caribbean, while needing to be cognizant of these areas of big-power decision-making, will, of course be necessarily more concerned with the implications of a No Vote – currently referred to as Brexit – on the arrangements made for sustaining our arena’s economic relations with the European Union following Britain’s entry into that system. A vote against continued British membership would obviously diminish the strategic influence of Britain’s influence in Europe in the context of Caricom’s agreement with the EU (within the wider framework of ACP-EU relations) agreed after the UK joined that system.
We must assume that our governments will have already mandated the Caricom Secretariat to survey the implications of a Brexit for our relations, in particular trading relations, with the EU; and that our heads of government will be able to give us an early indication of proposed responses in our collective decision-making, designed to maintain present arrangements that we have. And while it must be the case that the British government has been substantially concerned with its present preoccupation, it would be good to be assured that our diplomats in the United Kingdom and in Brussels have been updated, to the extent possible, as to how influential individual EU members have been contemplating on the matter.
And it would certainly do no harm if, within the near future, our governments find it possible to provide our Caricom country populations with, at least, a preliminary perspective on the issue. We await tomorrow’s decision.
