A letter appeared in this newspaper on Thursday which relayed an account of conversations between lawyers and former senior GDF officers in the diaspora about the need to seek a modification in the role of the army and a change in the law so it could “assist in investigations and other crime-solving activities.” This, it would appear, took place in a context of what was perceived to be an escalation in crime, and the need for more law enforcement officers.
The problem with the diaspora, of course, is that it often lags behind the local public in terms of its feel for immediate events, and such is the case in this instance. Apart from the fact that the police have claimed that the incidence of bandit-type offences has decreased in recent times – which has a certain ring of truth about it at an anecdotal level, although the figure is still far too high – one has to wonder what ex-military officers think they can bring to an investigation for which their training has ill equipped them. One cannot imagine they believe they could do any better than Crime Chief Wendell Blanhum and the CID officers, who for the first time in many years are apprehending suspects on a regular basis.
What one wants is a police force which functions effectively, not army personnel on the streets who know less about police work than their counterparts in the Guyana Police Force. And what about corruption in the force? Would the military personnel working with the police have a beneficial effect on the latter, or would the police corrupt the army? But all of this is pointless rumination; what the reported diaspora conversation does reflect, however, is an attitude that is mirrored by some locally-based persons who have, or have had, connections to the GDF: namely a sense that military people have the discipline and proficiency to make this malfunctioning society of ours work.
One can understand how this sentiment arose in the first instance. For obvious reasons the army is a rigidly hierarchical institution, not given to long-winded discussions, and except in limited, clearly defined circumstances, consultations either. Democratic norms have no place in the everyday operations of the GDF; that is a world which functions on fast decision-making and resolutions conveyed in the form of orders from above. The legal framework is clear and straightforward, and indiscipline has immediate consequences.
Officers and former officers must look at the muddle that is the civilian world in which the rest of us function, and feel that if they were placed in strategic positions they could make things work. And now they do occupy a variety of positions, as well as chairing various commissions, which is perhaps reinforcing the sentiment that they can make a difference, particularly in view of their numbers. In the case of the former officers in the diaspora referred to above, that takes the form of helping with police investigations.
The problem is the civilian world is not like the military; decision-making is often a slow, painful process, and full consultation with competing or even hostile interests is sometimes necessary if not mandated by statute. Furthermore, all ministries and government agencies are hedged around by laws, rules and conventions; for the most part, there is no such thing as handing down an order, although this can be done by an official who is so empowered in defined circumstances. Added to this, of course, there is the unhealthy political environment in which we live, and the human predilection in various situations for procrastination, obstruction and ignoring the rules.
One might have thought that military and former military personnel would by now be becoming disabused, of their earlier conviction that they could cut through all the red tape standing in the way of efficiency. However, there is evidence to believe that they still hang on to the illusion that army habits can be transplanted to the civilian universe. President David Granger aside, the most senior of them is Minister of State Joe Harmon, who despite his long and distinguished career in the GDF, has had difficulty demonstrating a full grasp of what accountability and transparency entail, and how he should adjust his style to civilian norms.
The most blatant example of inappropriate military behaviour was the instance of the Walter Roth Museum, where it has been reported that GDF personnel appeared and told the officials that the museum would have to move by the end of the year. In the first place, if any such decision were taken, it would have to have been done through the proper channels – in this case, the Ministry of Education – and it is ministry officials who would have had to communicate that decision. One has to ask the question, therefore, whether ministry officials were involved in the decision-making process at all (the Walter Roth and professionals connected with it clearly were not consulted), or was it a case of them being told of what had been decided at another level. Whether it is relevant to note that the Junior Minister in the Ministry of Education, Ms Nicolette Henry, is a former GDF officer is perhaps a moot point.
The other strange feature of this case was the fact that the personnel who went to the museum were recognized as being members of the GDF, from which one must infer that they were serving personnel. If so, then some explanation of this is required. How did serving officers come to relay the instructions about removal, and by whom and from where were they sent? Not Camp Ayanganna surely. Are we to conclude, therefore, that there are serving military personnel based in the Ministry of the Presidency, and if that is indeed so, perhaps the public could be given an explanation as to what they are doing there.
It is not part of the training of military officers to be receptive to feedback from the public; they don’t need it because in addition to other things, they normally operate under instructions from the civilian authorities. There is, however, a public perception that perhaps some members among the former army personnel now serving in government have overstepped strict civilian boundaries. Certainly the opposition in a high-decibel tone has sought to convey the impression that we are going in a direction where civilian government could become subordinate to the military – and PNC, it might be added. While nobody else would express themselves in these kinds of terms or take that particular slant, there have been comments from outside the opposition about the numbers of GDF or ex-GDF officers installed in government or appointed to head inquiries.
For his part President Granger has said he didn’t see “that anything could be wrong” with these appointments; “The question is, are they [army officers] competent.” He referred to ten officers or ex-officers appointed by the previous administration, although it might be said the complement under this government exceeds that figure. Perhaps the Minister of State needs to be more sensitive to the number and high profile of former GDF personnel, and how their role is being perceived in the public arena.
One cannot help but feel too, that particularly in the Ministry of the Presidency there is an insufficient number of high-level civilian officials to give the kind of advice which would moderate the normal army instinct for short cuts through all the civilian complexities. Some appointees with GDF connections need to grasp that where civilian matters are concerned, they have to take the long way round.
