Severe verbal attacks against an “obviously nervous” Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, the protest pullout of a key diplomat confidant and mounting tensions with the aggrieved Americans led to the Government of Guyana (GOG) rejecting a Cheddi Jagan-proposed “strong anti-U.S resolution” on the 1976 Cubana Plane bombing, in the country’s Parliament.
Confidential documents released by the United States (US) Office of the Historian reveal that the State Department (SD) so piled on the pressure that by November 23, Burnham’s ruling People’s National Congress (PNC) quickly “squashed a strong anti-US resolution introduced by Opposition Leader, Dr. Jagan in Parliament” on the crash and “substituted a mild resolution which in no way implicated the US Government (USG) and contained no mention of ‘destabilization.’ ”
During the Parliamentary debate next day, as gears clearly shifted, Guyana’s Foreign Minister Fred Wills “commented favorably – deliberately – on the U.S. Federal Grand Jury investigation of Cuban exiles in Miami” one memo states. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Harry Shlaudeman, affirmed in a detailed brief to Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger that this was among many “mixed” but “generally conciliatory” measures following the recall of American Charge d’Affaires, John D. Blacken.
After delivering “a strong protest” on October 19, Blacken was immediately ordered home for “consultations” by Kissinger incensed by Burnham’s remarks at a public assembly two days before, where the PNC leader accused CIA-trained Cuban operatives of being behind the twin-bombing and consequent plane crash into the Caribbean Sea, killing 73 including 11 Guyanese.
At the October 17 mass rally, Burnham proclaimed: “I do not know and cannot tell whether the CIA is involved in this murder. But this I know – the friends of the CIA, the people who have been harboured by the CIA, the people who have been encouraged by the CIA, the people who went to invade Cuba in April 1961, at the battle of the Bay of Pigs – are responsible.”
The statements made Kissinger so angry, that Blacken suggested an approach to the Guyanese Chargé d’Affaires Peter Holder “to explore the possibility of a retraction of Burnham’s accusations” as relations plummeted to a then nadir.
Minister Wills, too, appeared quite stressed and he confessed to Blacken during a meeting a day after the Cubana assault that “the crash of the airliner and the visits he and the PM had been receiving from victim’s relatives, pressures from the PNC and a clamour from Jagan’s PPP (People’s Progressive Party) were driving him crazy.” Convinced that the Cubans were “seeking to sow suspicion” the GOG had ignored their urging for “an official protest over the alleged sabotage by Cuban exiles.”
Burnham and his Foreign Minister agreed that the Cubans’ request for “coordinated propaganda, intelligence and retaliatory action” would “make Guyana even more of a target for terrorists than it was now.” The deaths of the Guyanese had caused “extremely strong domestic emotional reaction” and led to constant calls for appropriate “statements and action” from the Government, but Burnham desisted from ordering protests, diplomatic cables show.
In his assessment, Shlaudeman cited the State-controlled press front page article that the arrested Venezuelan bomber suspects, Freddy Lugo and Ricardo Lozano were not members of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and he alluded to Minister Wills, on November 23 having “sent us an oral message through the Guyanese Chargé here, asserting that the GOG now realizes that the USG had nothing to do with the Cubana crash.”
In an overseas news story published on October 21, the State Department had gone on the immediate offensive charging Burnham as guilty of “bold-faced lies” when “he said that the United States (U.S) was partially to blame for the crash of a Cuban passenger plane two weeks ago.” The “unusually harsh language was used by Spokesman Frederick Brown as the State Department escalated its efforts to discredit Mr. Burnham’s allegations made at a mass rally in the Guyanese capital” the report, carried in American publications, divulged.
“Since we withdrew our Chargé on October 20 we have had several indications that Burnham wants to ‘normalize’ his relations with us. He is obviously nervous and unsure as to what to do next about the US. Although most of the signals from Georgetown are conciliatory, there are also continued public references to ‘destabilization’” Shlaudeman expressed in his dispatch.
One placatory gesture was the abstention of Guyana at a UN conference, “in contrast to most other Non-Aligned nations,” on “votes on occupied territories, Jerusalem (Israel) and mass media issues. They requested that we look upon this as evidence of their cooperation.” However “not all Guyanese actions have been so positive” the Secretary noted, pointing to Burnham’s continued claims of “destabilization in two recent public speeches” and the country’s “co-sponsoring a United Nations resolution on non-interference in internal affairs of states.”
At the UN’s General Assembly on December 6, “the Guyanese, along with Trinidad and Tobago, voted against us on the Guam issue,” the Assistant Secretary reminded Kissinger, about a resolution advocating the Pacific Ocean island’s right to independence and self-determination.
“Burnham is apparently convinced that the US is opposed to Guyana’s Socialist orientation. He also seems to have concluded that he can get little assistance from the Soviets or Cuba. Facing a very serious Balance of Payments (BOP) problem, he feels cornered and his paranoia is growing. The absence of Blacken deprives him of anyone from our side with whom he can discuss the problem of restoring relations.”
Listing the option “to take no action at this time”, and leave it to the incoming Jimmy Carter administration “to decide how best to handle the problem” he argued this “keeps Burnham under maximum pressure” to recant and “makes it crystal clear that we will not tolerate such irresponsible actions.”
However this “deprives us of any effective influence on Burnham, in the absence of an American official who can talk to him on a regular basis” the shrewd Shlaudeman maintained in his incisive analysis, warning it “risks increasing Burnham’s paranoia to the point where he may go on to further excesses” and “undermines the efforts of (Foreign Minister) Wills and other Guyanese moderates to influence Burnham constructively.”
By sending Blacken back to Georgetown after Christmas “with instructions to express again our displeasure over Burnham’s (October 17 rally) speech and to keep a cool distance making clear that the burden for improving relations still lies with the GOG” will allow the new US Administration “to begin with the Guyanese on more or less a normal basis.”
This would give Burnham “a chance to thrash out his problem with us if he wants to” Shlaudeman reasoned, while strengthening “moderates who advocate reconciliation with the US.” But such a move “may be interpreted as a backing down by the US Government” and “leaves Burnham’s charges still on the public record, essentially unmodified” which could encourage him “to think he can make such accusations with little cost.”
Chargé Blacken could resume if the GOG ended its “destabilization theme” and if by some public utterance it renounced the charge of US responsibility for the Cubana crash, he mused. “If the Guyanese meet our conditions, it sets the public record straight” and such a change in “attitudes would not pass unnoticed in the rest of the Caribbean” the diplomat remarked, submitting “Burnham has already almost certainly gone as far as he is prepared to go publicly in repudiating his accusations against us.”
Cautioning that “given Burnham’s paranoia, frustration, and immense ego, he might misinterpret this signal, and lash out at us anew” the Assistant Secretary deduced, “I favor returning Blacken to Georgetown. Our point is now firmly made and Burnham has the message. But there seems to me a better chance that the lesson will take if we leave normalization for the new (Carter) Administration. I would like to avoid the situation in which Burnham sees Blacken’s return under the new Administration as a signal of fundamental change in which all is forgiven.”
The options, he advised Kissinger were “that you authorize Blacken to return to Georgetown, with the message of our continuing coolness in the absence of adequate GOG gestures” or “(we) inform the Guyanese Chargé here that ‘normalization’ will require a halt in destabilization propaganda and a clarification of Burnham’s October 17 speech, indicating that the GOG does not hold us responsible for the Cubana crash.”
In a previous November 8 1976 missive to Kissinger, Shlaudeman admitted that the rally speech has “brought our relations to an all-time low” but Burnham’s “accusations probably reflect a Cuban effort to influence him as well as his own keen memory of past US interventions in Guyanese affairs.”
“The Guyanese seem to recognize that they have gone too far in their confrontation politics. We have received numerous signals that they would like to forget both Burnham’s speech and our sharp public rejoinder.” and are “eager” to regain Chargé Blacken. He enjoyed “singular success in establishing rapport with Burnham and Wills, and they apparently believe he can help them get their relationship with us back to at least pre-Cubana crash norms.”
“Clearly Burnham is not going to be persuaded that he should abandon his Socialist course. But we are also not certain he knows what his Socialist course is. Probably he will remain on good terms with (Cuban leader Fidel) Castro no matter what we do. But it is not too late to improve our relations to the point where we can at least cooperate in some areas and avoid systematic ideological hostility,” the representative surmised. In telegram 16801 to Georgetown, January 25, 1977, the State Department decided Blacken would return to Georgetown.
In his November memo Shlaudeman caustically observed: “Guyana represents what we do not want to happen in the rest of the Commonwealth Caribbean” and wryly conceded “we were trying to avoid the installation of a Communist regime under Cheddi Jagan – now we have Burnham.”
ID marvels that Paranoia became the title of a dystopian science-fiction game from the 1980s, while Diplomacy was the name of an even older board activity invented by an American mail carrier
