Venezuela is at a dangerous political juncture. One possibility is that President Nicolás Maduro could finally retreat from what is an untenable position, and allow the return of genuine democracy. Conversely, there is also the possibility that violence on the streets of Caracas and a host of other cities will escalate, and with or without some trigger, Venezuela will descend into a form of anarchy. No one – certainly not anyone outside the country – could predict exactly how events are going to evolve. While all nations in the region have a vested interest in what transpires, none of them has a greater interest than does Guyana.
The latest round of protests which erupted near the beginning of this month took even President Maduro by surprise. For a few years now there have been major shortages of food, medicines, medical equipment and a variety of essential items, but while this has produced sporadic food riots characterised by looting, it has not metamorphosed into continuous protests. Neither, must it be said, has everyone linked politics to the food crisis, particularly in the case of the residents of the barríos among whom the bedrock of government support is to be found.
People had appeared to give up on demonstrations after the sustained protests of 2014 had produced no results, in addition to which, by 2017 they were reluctant to participate in daily action because it would prevent them from hunting for food for their families. While they have been coming out in impressive numbers on the streets now and again, these protests were quite ineffectual in terms of putting pressure on the government, and Miraflores could safely disregard them.
In the meantime, President Maduro moved further along the autocratic continuum, without having to pay consequences locally, although not internationally. The government for instance had managed by an unconstitutional and none too subtle stratagem to avoid a presidential recall referendum, and by virtue of another dubious ploy had succeeded in emasculating the opposition-dominated National Assembly.
Furthermore, what passes for an electoral commission, placed unrealistic requirements on political parties to enable them to register. True to form, these favoured government disposed parties, not those associated at any level with the opposition. In addition, it should not be forgotten that one of the two most prominent opposition leaders, Leopoldo López, has been incarcerated for the last three years on trumped up charges, and others have since joined him.
Last year, of course, there were talks between the Venezuelan government and the opposition, facilitated by two former presidents of the region and a former prime minister of Spain, that were mediated by the Vatican. Some elements of the opposition were opposed to these negotiations, because they claimed Mr Maduro would not act in good faith. They were not mistaken, since he failed to follow through on even the minimal commitments he did make.
Venezuela entered 2017, therefore, facing the same humanitarian conditions as before and the same political situation as before. The opposition was in total disarray except for the fact that they were generally agreed that a return to the negotiating table was a waste of time. However, there was a total lack of agreement about how to proceed. As it was, as long as President Maduro was not prepared to make democratic concessions, then the country was stuck in a cul-de-sac with no apparent exit route. In such circumstances, there was always the possibility that sooner or later there would be the risk of an untoward occurrence precipitating some form of eruption.
So this month seemingly without warning Venezuela found itself in a different dimension, with protestors out on the streets almost every day, confronted at this stage by the police and the National Guard – not the army. They have been shooting pellets, not live ammunition, although the way they have been using tear gas in particular was deemed illegal by Venezuelan NGOs yesterday. One 20-year-old student, for example, was struck in the chest and killed by a tear gas canister last week. According to some accounts, the tear gas is launched from a piece of armoury which looks something like a baby tank, and which the local population has nicknamed the ‘rhino’. Instead of a gun turret, however, it carries a tear gas launcher. Since much of the government’s defence strategy depends on cutting off access to central Caracas in particular, there is also a unique machine dubbed the ‘bat’, so named because of its solid side panels behind which military or police personnel can operate, and which when extended can cut off the wide avenues of cities like Caracas. The ubiquitous water cannon is also very much in evidence.
At the time of writing the death toll for the month was around 30, with hundreds injured and well over one thousand arrested. But some of those killed and wounded were not hit by pellets or tear gas canisters; they were indeed shot by live ammunition. Those carrying guns appear to be the Colectivos, supposedly community groups who are widely regarded as private government militias, and there are in addition other assorted militia-style groups, some of whom are thought to be armed. The whole idea would appear to be to allow the government to deny any association with shooting deaths, and to blame the opposition for them.
This is not to deny that despite the fact the opposition marches are intended to be peaceful protests, there won’t be the odd hothead who uses them as a cover for more extreme action. The government has said that a woman shot in the head in Merida, for example, was killed by an opposition sniper on a roof, and this allegation has not yet been refuted.
When the action started, early reports claimed that those who reacted first and went onto the streets were the students, who, it might be said, have a long history with resistance in Venezuela. It was in the wake of their tenacity that the political opposition became involved. Whatever the case, the various opposition factions appear to have forged some kind of unity for the time being, and have taken control of the protests. It has been reported that they are trying to sustain them by introducing variety of location – on Friday marchers headed for Ramo Verde, for instance, where López is held prisoner, but were blocked by ‘bats’ – as well as form, such as sit-ins, and time. Furthermore, there is evidence that residents in a few of the barríos may have changed their political stance; if so, that will present the government with an especial challenge.
The provocation for the latest opposition action has been widely reported, and in brief resulted from the announcement that the Constitutional Chamber would assume the functions of the National Assembly. Some commentators have said that when the chavista official who is a rough equivalent of an Attorney General here, declared such an act unconstitutional, it not only galvanised the opposition which saw a split in the administration for the first time, but sent the government into a tailspin, forcing it to reverse the decision. That did not stop it subsequently barring Henrique Capriles (along with López the opposition’s most high-profile leader) from seeking political office for 15 years. It seems President Maduro wants to select his political opponents as well as the government representatives.
Buoyed by the strong international reaction against Mr Maduro’s latest moves, the opposition has set out its manifesto which includes demands for general elections, the release of political prisoners, the institution of a humanitarian channel to address food and medicine shortages and respect for the autonomy of the National Assembly.
If the government does not weaken and the protests continue, the consequence is likely to be increasing violence – unless, that is, the international community finds some way to intervene with negotiations.
It must be said, however, that all their earlier efforts have come to naught, and in any case the avenue through which it can be done is not obvious now that Caracas is at odds with most regional institutions, and is leaving the OAS. Of course, it is always possible the demonstrations will fizzle out, in which case President Maduro will move into full dictatorship mode. That, however, is not sustainable in this day and age for any length of time, and will just postpone the crisis.
The other question is whether the army would intervene if a crisis reached a certain level. Commentators are by no means certain about that, since not only did the late President Hugo Chávez purge the officer corps, but the current upper echelons of the military have benefited enormously under the current government. However, in a scenario where the senior officers supported Mr Maduro it is the lower ranks who would face protestors on the streets; so the question is would they shoot if they were required to do so? No one is sure. And if they didn’t, what would be the consequence? And if the military chose to rule out a coup and support Miraflores, what would they demand in return?
And as for Guyana, it can only watch and wait, although it would be advised to create some contingency plans for all the possible scenarios in Caracas, including a military government.
