Dear Editor,
Recently, the state-owned Guyana Chronicle went on a frolic of its own characterized by mischief and scandal-mongering concerning the purchase of a water cannon by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) under my stewardship. It was not the first time sections of the media have published such politically inspired diatribe. In its worst effort at defamation, the Chronicle editorial claimed that the purchase of the water cannon amounted to waste and/or theft of money and that its procurement took place in the absence of “studies done” to justify its purchase.
As the then Minister I see no need to be defensive, evasive or apologetic about the purchase of a water cannon by the MOHA for the Guyana Police Force (GPF). In any event, neither the 2011 nor 2012 Auditor General Reports found any discrepancies with respect to the purchase of the vehicle. However, since the APNU+AFC coalition administration wishes to re-invent the wheel by duplicating the role of the Auditor General, this time for political purposes, ie witch-hunting, they are free to do so but they will have to bear full responsibility for the political repercussions of their actions.
Global developments specifically in respect of modern methods for crowd control, riotous street protests/demonstrations and generally, the maintenance of public order in a modern democracy dictate that emphasis be placed on the use of non-lethal weapons and equipment by law enforcement agencies instead of lethal and/or life threatening weapons or equipment.
In modern democracies, tear gas, water cannon, tasers, truncheons or rubber bullets (as a last resort ) are some of the non-lethal weapons used solely by the police, depending on the scale and degree of the threat to public order confronting them as law enforcement officers. In the final analysis, however, it is the police, not the civilian authorities who decide which non-lethal weapon is to be used or not used to maintain public order during unruly street protests or riotous demonstrations, since such occurrences will be exclusively a police and not a civilian operation.
In the case of the water cannon, its procurement in 2012-13 occurred at a time when, at the senior level of the GPF, there was intense jockeying for promotion and a push by one or two at the top to expand their command and control of ranks within the Force. Unsuccessful attempts by a minority at senior management level to shoot down the water cannon were made to show that they were more knowledgeable on public order issues.
At the level of the MOHA, there was no indication from the then Commissioner that there was any outright opposition within the GPF for the procurement of a water cannon which fell into the category of a non-lethal vehicle and which most police forces around the world would own as part of their crowd control assets. However, it appeared at that time, that some disgruntled senior ranks of the Force, because they did not get their way on the matter began currying favour with certain elements of the then political opposition. In so doing, they pushed rejection of the water cannon as a political issue.
The few fifth columnists started dropping indiscreet and subtle hints, claiming political intrusion and the creation of political secret police within the Force. To this they added the procurement of the water cannon, endeavouring to make it a controversial matter. Thus the muted opposition to the water cannon had its genesis within the crevices of the GPF. This was eventually picked up by the political opposition and sections of the media, making it a political football.
In so far as the identification and procurement of new assets or their replenishment for the Force is concerned, it is primarily the police first, at the preparatory stage, who would determine their needs. The next stage would be for them to sit with the Permanent Secretary of their subject ministry to hammer out and cost those needs with a view to including them in the Force’s draft budget. It is certainly not unusual for the Commissioner of Police and his subject Minister to consult on the new, if any, features of the Force’s budget prior to the formulation of the final draft. It is that final draft budget that would be presented to the Minister of Home Affairs so that he may acquaint himself with its many elements in preparation for the two-stage conventional parliamentary process.
Whatever the shape or cost of that final draft budget, it is the Ministry of Finance that will ultimately determine the amount of money that will be allocated to its current and capital components.
The decision to procure a water cannon for the GPF at a cost of approximately $37 million passed through all those stages without any objection, as was the case with many other new assets jointly agreed upon for inclusion in the 2010 budget between the administration of the MOHA and senior management of the GPF.
All things being equal, since no single individual whether at the MOHA or Force headquarters can arbitrarily include any item, water cannon or no water cannon, under the current or capital components of the GPF’s budget, it goes without saying that a police budget is watertight by the time it reaches the National Assembly. Answers pertaining to the water cannon were provided to all the questions raised by the now deceased MP Backer while considering the 2010 estimates in the Committee of Supply, under programme 512- Guyana Police Force. Mrs Backer concluded her line of questioning by making the snide remark that the water cannon “will be a white elephant.”
Because of the nature of public safety and security and perhaps national security and their operational aspects, to look for, or to ask for ‘studies’ justifying the procurement of assets for law enforcement agencies, in many instances, is tantamount to looking for a needle in a haystack.
In so far as the actual procurement of the water cannon is concerned I was advised by the then PS that it was done in accordance with long established procurement and financial procedures.
I had no reason to doubt her. Those procedures are followed closely by the office of the Permanent Secretary and the staff at the finance departments of the MOHA and the GPF respectively.
If the political audit and police investigations can prove beyond reasonable doubt that there were blatant lapses and the fraudulent conversion of government funds, then the perpetrators who are still around ought to be arrested and hauled before the court to answer to the charges. However, due process must prevail.
The media-driven allegation will be debunked in the same way a previous allegation with respect to non- payment of funds to a certain Assistant Commissioner for electoral purposes was debunked ultimately revealing, as was done in the previous case, that no money associated with the procurement of the water cannon ever flowed into Rohee’s pocket.
Yours faithfully,
Clement J Rohee
Former Minister of Home Affairs