Recognition is customarily accorded to a country’s government on the basis that it is a de facto government. It doesn’t matter whether it is incompetent, has autocratic features, eschews democratic elections, or is generally despised by decent nations; once it controls the levers of power and there are not some special circumstances attaching to its situation, such as those which possibly apply in the case of North Korea, then it can expect to be recognised by others. The reasons for this are entirely practical, and are hardly in need of any explication. Last week, however, an anomaly occurred in terms of the international protocols: Venezuela found itself in the unusual position of having two recognised governments.
The most recent crisis had its origins last year in a presidential election which was widely acknowledged not to have been free and fair. As a consequence, the Permanent Council of the Organisation of American States on January 10 this year, resolved not to recognise the legitimacy of President Nicolás Maduro’s new term which began on the same day. Guyana was one of the nineteen members which voted in favour of the resolution. This, however, is not of the same order as the recognition accorded by individual states to a country’s government, and given the fact that the OAS decision was in any case not unanimous, it probably would not on its own have caused the President too many sleepless nights, even if it did nothing to alleviate the irascibility of his mood.
It might be remembered that a 2015 election for the Venezuelan National Assembly brought that House a membership which was opposition controlled. Subsequently, three members were removed in very controversial circumstances, because otherwise the opposition would have had a two-thirds majority, which would have enabled it potentially to exercise considerable power over the executive. Miraflores solved the problem of a hostile National Assembly by various illegitimate means, and in the end, in 2017, held manipulated elections (which were boycotted by the opposition), in order to set up what was called a Constituent National Assembly. This institution had the declared objective of rewriting the 1999 Constitution of Hugo Chávez. It was, in other words, a parallel parliamentary body, and was used by the government to bypass the legitimate National Assembly.
Since Mr Maduro’s recent swearing in for another term, the original National Assembly voted for a new President – a young man, 35 years old. It is being reported outside Venezuela that Juan Guaidó is an unknown, but that should be qualified by saying that while he is not known to the international community, he is certainly not unheard of in Venezuela. He is a member of the Voluntad Popular party, which is led by the charismatic Leopoldo López, currently locked up in one of Mr Maduro’s jails. Although he is not in the front line of opposition politicians – he lacks the eloquence at the podium and when leading protests that have given others prominence – he conveys an almost conciliatory style, which may be how he landed his current post. The opposition is not a unified body; it is riven by factions, and it has been reported that Mr Guaidó was a compromise candidate.
Mr Guaidó had already informed the nation that under the terms of the 1999 Constitution, if the presidency of Venezuela became vacant, then the President of the National Assembly would fill the post ad interim, until elections – which would have to be called within 30 days − were held. He had also got the National Assembly to deem Mr Maduro a “usurper” and declare his re-election a fraud. Then on Wednesday, during mass protests by opposition supporters, he declared himself the interim president of Venezuela, and promised elections.
One presumes that he did this after some kind of negotiations with at least the Americans, if not some of the Latin American countries as well (although most of their leaders are currently in Davos), because very quickly, a number of countries led by the United States announced that they recognised him as Venezuela’s head of state.
At the time of writing that included nearly all of the Latin American nations and some of the Central American ones too, in addition to Canada. The EU and its major constituents while acknowledging the illegitimacy of Mr Maduro’s re-election and calling for elections, have stopped short of actually refusing to recognise the Caracas government. For his part, Mr Maduro has backing from the expected actors such as Russia and China – to which his country is heavily indebted – as well as nations like Cuba, Turkey and Nicaragua. Bolivia, of course, has been a longstanding friend of the Caracas regime going back to the days of Hugo Chávez, and its President, Evo Morales, was hardly likely to change course. Mexico for the moment is continuing to acknowledge Mr Maduro as the head of state and government, while Uruguay also has not come out in open support of Mr Guaidó.
So now we have a situation whereby Mr Maduro has expelled US diplomats, but Mr Guaidó has contradicted him and told them they can stay. Who really is in charge, people will want to know? The truth of the matter is that it is Mr Maduro who at the moment has his hands on all the levers of power, and Mr Guaidó and the National Assembly have no means of enforcing the implementation of any legislation they may pass, or of any decrees. So what, one wonders, is going on? Are the Americans, Brazilians and Colombians, who after all are the most hard line of Mr Guaidó’s international backers, going to sit back and watch him being arrested, for example, or the National Assembly crushed, or their diplomats forcibly evicted from Caracas? Do they have some Plan B, or do they know something which the rest of us don’t? If they don’t, it all sounds as if a dangerous situation has the potential to develop, one which could hardly give Guyana a sense of confidence.
Mr Guaidó has at least recognised that without the support of the military, his dream of free elections, etc, will be going nowhere. Mr Maduro understands that very well too, and had his Defence Minister (who is an army officer) give an address last week in which he pledged the armed forces’ allegiance to the government centred in Miraflores. Since Chávez’s day, the military has been bought off by allowing them to take over business ventures, and by tolerating the allegedly criminal activities of some of them, including drug smuggling. Will they be prepared to give this up, and will they fear the consequences if they do?
Mr Guaidó is aware of that, and has promised an amnesty for those acting “in favour of the restitution of democracy in Venezuela” including the military. There was also a mention of some kind of exemption for Mr Maduro himself, which could be negotiated, although it is unlikely he would risk taking that seriously at this stage.
There have been reports that recently, forces sent out on the streets to deal with a protest in one town, turned their backs when the protestors appeared. On the basis of this, the assumption has been made that there may be a hiatus between the officer class which has benefited since 1999, and the ordinary soldiers who now are suffering like the ordinary people and may not be prepared to confront them. However, a distinction has to be drawn between the National Guard, which was the force involved in this particular incident, and the formal military. It also has to be emphasised that to date, during all the protests, the military has never been sent out onto the streets; it has always been the National Guard. It might be added that there is no love lost between the regular armed forces and the National Guard. That aside, the question still has to be asked, are the lower ranks of the military also disaffected, and what would happen if they were finally sent onto the streets?
There is another armed contingent which cannot be ignored in an unstable Venezuela, and that is the militias and civilians armed first by Chávez and then by Mr Maduro. Some estimates have put the figures for these at over a million and a half, but even if that is an exaggeration, what can be said is that the country is awash with guns, not a few of them being in the hands of criminals. The latter is something even Guyana is aware of, given that the sindicatos appear to be in control of our western neighbour’s border, and that they have been attacking Guyanese mining operations. It is a bad sign when a state does not hold sway in territory along its boundaries.
What it all means is that if Mr Guaidó does not get control fairly quickly, Mr Maduro could reassert full control which will invite sanctions in the first instance from his international backers. These, in turn, could conceivably escalate and lead down an unpredictable road, not just in Venezuela but internationally as well. Conversely, Mr Maduro might begin to lose his grip on the population, but the military as a coherent unit still does not give its support to Mr Guaidó. Under such circumstances, one would have to hypothesise that a coup would come within the boundaries of possibility, although there are many other hypotheses which could be considered, which would have unforeseeable consequences.
There are many theoretical scenarios which could be contemplated, but some of them, at least could end with Venezuela imploding in chaos. What is interesting is that last Wednesday’s protest was supported by significant elements from the Caracas barríos who traditionally have always backed Chávez and his successor. Do Washington and its allies believe that Mr Maduro is now susceptible to pressure because he has lost the support of his base? In what may be a move presaging a change of direction, last week too, some residents of Puerto Ordaz broke up a statue of Hugo Chávez, and suspended a piece of it over a bridge.
Be all that as it may, in the meantime what should Guyana’s approach be? The government was right to vote as it did on the OAS resolution, and it is right to keep silent now. It should wait and see how events develop.
