The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) yesterday dismissed an application by James Ramsahoye, who was hoping to be granted special leave to appeal a decision of the Guyana Court of Appeal, which dismissed enforcement orders from a previous judgment, that he be paid damages and a monthly pension, against his former employers.
Those entities are the Linden Mining Enterprises (LME) and Bauxite Industry Development Company Limited (BIDCO) with which Ramsahoye said he worked for 26 years, before his service was terminated in 1998.
Unsuccessful at the High Court, he appealed the judgment and on 3rd March 2004, was awarded damages totaling US$174, 032.49 and a monthly pension to the tune of US$2,000.72.
During the pendency of his matter before the Court of Appeal, BIDCO’s assets were transferred to National Industrial Commercial Investments Limited, (NICIL)—which is also listed as a respondent.
Following the eventual judgment, there were a series of proceedings between the parties—aimed at either preventing the payment of, or enforcement of, the decision, which eventually resulted in Justice of Appeal B.S. Roy, making orders for the enforcement of the judgment.
Those orders were, however, dismissed by the local appellate court which held that a single sitting appellate judge did not have the authority to make orders relating to the enforcement of a judgment.
Ramsahoye (the appellant), would then seek leave from the Trinidad-based court of last resort for Guyana—the CCJ—to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal.
In considering whether to grant the leave sought by the appellant, the CCJ said it reviewed its own previous decisions regarding the grant of special leave, concluding that those decisions demonstrated the use of a two-stage test.
The first stage, the court noted, was to determine the circumstances in which the application for special leave was being made; and the second, to determine whether there was some special feature of the case, warranting the court to consider granting special leave.
Those “special features” the court highlighted, include whether there was a serious error of law or a substantial miscarriage of justice; or whether the application has a real prospect of success which would warrant the court hearing the appeal.
In Ramsahoye’s case, the CCJ found that the correct test to be applied was whether there had been an error of law, or substantial miscarriage of justice, resulting from the decision of the Court of Appeal.
Examining the orders made by Justice Roy, and the scope of the powers granted to him by the Rules of the Court of Appeal, the CCJ held that the single Justice of Appeal was incorrect in making enforcement orders “as this was outside of his legal authority.”
The court in its ruling stated that, “the learned Justice of Appeal, who no doubt may have been moved by Mr. Ramsahoye’s plight, had no jurisdiction to make those orders.”
In considering whether there was a substantial miscarriage of justice, the CCJ said it could not grant special leave, although Ramsahoye did have difficulty in receiving the payments.
Noting, however, that there is an appeal before the Guyana Court of Appeal, the CCJ said it would give parties an opportunity to examine the orders requested by the appellant. As such, the court dismissed Ramsahoye’s application for special leave.
The case was heard by CCJ President Justice Adrian Saunders, along with Justices David Hayton, Winston Anderson, Maureen Rajnauth-Lee, Denys Barrow, and Andrew Burgess by whom the court’s ruling was delivered.
Representing Ramsahoye were attorneys Chandrapratesh Satram, Roopnarine Satram and Ron Motilall.
The respondents, meanwhile, were represented by attorneys Timothy Jonas, Dennis Paul and Sandia Ramnarine.
Terminated
Ramsahoye was employed by LME and BIDCO—two state owned corporations in the nationalized bauxite industry, when in 1998, after 26 years of service his employment was terminated.
As a result, he commenced proceedings in the High Court for breach of contract but the action was dismissed and so he appealed.
The Court of Appeal delivered a judgment allowing the appeal and awarded Ramsahoye the US$174,032.49 in damages for breach of contract and monthly pension of US$2,000.72 with effect from 1 July 1998.
In its ruling, the CCJ noted that Justice Roy’s reasoning that the Court of Appeal had a jurisdiction derived from statute to make enforcement orders by virtue of section 3 of the Court of Appeal Act, “the reception provision” and section 27 of the English Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidated) Act 1925, “was plainly wrong as Order 2 Rule 28 vests the enforcement of judgments of the Court of Appeal in the court below.”
The Court of Appeal as a creature of statute, the CCJ pointed out, derives its powers and jurisdiction from its relevant statute and the rules made thereunder. In this case, the court said the Rules are those of the Court of Appeal that expressly provide that judgments of the Court of Appeal will be enforced in the court below.
Stating that there was no ambiguity in this rule, the CCJ held that Justice Roy could not rely on “received laws” to make enforcement orders in the face of the express edict in Rule 28.
The regional court went on to highlight that in any event, the powers under section 27 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidated) Act, 1925 do not devolve on a single Justice of Appeal in Chambers in exercise of the functions prescribed by Order 2 Rule 16(1), but rather on the Court of Appeal which pursuant to section 37 of the Cap 3:01 is made up of no less than three judges sitting at a time.
Accordingly, the CCJ concluded that Justice Roy had acted ultra vires the powers conferred on him under Rule 16 (1) and Rule16 (2) of the Court of Appeal Rules Cap 3:01 which gives the full bench of the Court of Appeal jurisdiction to discharge or vary orders made by a single Judge under Rule 16 (1).
In those circumstances the CCJ said that the Court of Appeal had correctly exercised its Rule 16(2) powers in discharging the orders of Justice Roy, while adding that it (the CCJ), could find no egregious or other error in the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Meanwhile, having found there to have been no miscarriage of justice, the CCJ noted that there being an appeal pending before the Court of Appeal, would give the parties an opportunity to fully ventilate some of the orders sought by Ramsahoye.
Further, the court said that, as agreed on all sides, that appeal should proceed on an expedited basis.
Consequently, it was concluded by the CCJ that Ramsahoye had failed to satisfy the requirements for the grant of special leave and so there was no question of treating the application for special leave as the appeal.
As a result, his application was dismissed with no order for costs.
