Maybe before, but certainly after my article last week, it must have become obvious to all who read it why the struggle for control of the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) is so heated. This week I wanted to concentrate on ‘How to stop elections rigging’, but a diversion has become necessary because, for the life of me, I cannot understand how, given the historical explications of their operational framework – Carter Formula/universal arbitration – the political parties still cannot order their business to come to an amicable conclusion over the appointment of a chairperson for GECOM.
If I had to cast blame, I would put it at the feet of Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Bharrat Jagdeo, who approached the constitutional task assigned to him in an instrumentalist fashion devoid of an historical context and intended to favour his party. As a result, he facilitated the process of choosing the chairperson of the GECOM being institutionally transformed to his disadvantage (‘Smart-man’ and disruptive politics. SN: 18/01/2017)! Indeed, I have suggested before in this column, that historically in choosing the chairperson under the Carter Formula, it is the government of the day that has usually been given a slight advantage (SN: 14/06/2017).
The historical lesson for the leader of the opposition is quite obvious: he has to present President David Granger with a name or two with which he (Granger) is about 80% comfortable, even if he (Jagdeo) is not that contented. One cannot do this level of politics from an idealistic aspirational paradise: hopefully one day but we are not yet ‘one people, one nation with one destiny’, and so this means that the one or two names that are presented must firstly be those of people of African descent.
I showed that former President Desmond Hoyte ‘only had one occasion to choose the chairperson of the elections commission based upon the Carter formula, and of the two Africans on the list presented to him (by the PPP/C), he chose former ambassador Mr. Rudy Collins, who would hardly have reached ambassadorial level, particularly in a sensitive posting like Venezuela, if he did not have the total confidence of (Forbes Burnham), the PNC and Desmond Hoyte. … From 1995 to the present, the PNC has had three occasions on which to submit names for chair of the elections commission, and on each occasion the late President Desmond Hoyte submitted five largely non-partisan Africans and one Indian, and on each occasion the PPP chose the Indian’ (Ibid).
Secondly, the nature of the process changed from the moment the decision was taken to present more than one list. Therefore, it is nonsense to now claim that the president cannot suggest names: the leader of the opposition presenting six names is now nothing but a formality made more so by the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) ruling that a consensus must be reached by consultations.
The Carter Formula is now being brought back to earth: it was no more than a kind of mutation of the classical arbitration process that trade unionists in Guyana have been successfully using for decades. The two sides choose equal numbers and then co-operate in finding a chairperson with which both sides are comfortable.
For instance, the collective bargaining agreement for the Guyana Public Service Union and thus the famous – or infamous depending which side you are on – Armstrong arbitration proceedings between the PPP/C government and the GPSU in 1999 was based on ‘An arbitration tribunal consisting of one member selected by the government, one person selected by the union and ‘a Chairperson agreed upon jointly by the parties.’ After days of trying to find a chairperson agreeable to both the union, represented by Mr. Patrick Yarde, and the government, whose point person was Dr. Roger Luncheon, it was the late Miles Fitzpatrick who called me as then minister of labour and suggested Dr. Aubrey Armstrong. As I had done throughout the process with the other names that the parties had rejected, I put forward the name of Dr. Armstrong and received approval.
Thirdly, negotiations 101 would recommend that these kinds of controversial haggling do not take place in public, and the Carter Formula may have been organised the way it is because it largely precludes the publicity associated with other forms of political negotiations, the dangers of which we are now witnessing. Considering the developments that were taking place in the process, I long ago pointed out that ‘…this kind of negotiation will be more open and the media can be depended upon to find ways to keep the public informed about agreements, disagreements and heaven forbid, a deadlock. The pressure will be on the opposition so: how will it deal with this public perception? Can Mr. Jagdeo withdraw and continue to send lists of names of persons who have already been rejected or are no better than those who have been rejected? Can there not develop such a condition of obvious deadlock that diminishes the credibility of the process to a point where the opposition would at best have to tactically capitulate and at worst allow the president to make a unilateral decision’ (SN: 21/06/2017)?
There is absolutely nothing wrong with the president and his aides presenting names, but how in heavens name can anyone expect the president or the opposition leader, who have constituencies that they need to be able to placate, to choose someone traditionally aligned to the other side and whose name has baldly been thrown into the public domain. Whosoever raises a name must firstly be able to explain to the other side why this choice will constitute a win-win situation for both sides. Although I have doubts given what is at stake, in this kind of a context it may even be possible for the parties to ignore the ethnic dimension in their choice. Mr. Jagdeo once stated that in negotiations he does not care what the other side wants. He had better start caring now! No side should leave a serious negotiation happily laughing.
