As is again demonstrated by the current debacle over the timing of the next elections, like those of the same ilk in the international system – Fiji, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka – who have so far been unable to settle upon an appropriate constitutional management arrangement that is in tandem with their ethnic nature, Guyana’s political system is highly dysfunctional. Instead of an intensive national effort to properly manage the oil fortune sent its way, everyone is focused upon politics as that resource is draining away. In this quite disturbing context, about two weeks ago a confab of small parties met at the Critchlow Labour College to attempt to establish a big-tent coalition to fight the next elections, and the question immediately arose as to what they can contribute to ending the current political impairment if they succeed in combination or singly.
Here, in the contextual potpourri given below, I consider the following two major difficulties that Guyana must solve if it is to cease being a dysfunctional political state. Firstly, neither conceptually nor actually do the two large ethnic groups want to be managed by any other persons or parties than those chosen by them. Secondly, any political management arrangement that does not accommodate both of the larger ethnicities will, as noted above, lead to massive alienation, weakened national focus and extremely suboptimal political management.
Guyana has a population of 783,424 persons of which about 40% are classed as Indians, 30% Africans, 20% mixed and 10.5% Amerindians. In the 2015 elections there were 585,727 registered voters: a 71.02% turnout and 99.49% – 50.30% and 49.19% – voted for APNU+AFC and the PPP/C respectively. Guyana’s mixed presidential/parliamentary system provides that the party that wins over 50% of the votes gains both the executive/presidency and the parliament, but that failing this the party that gains the largest number of votes wins the presidency and thus must find support in the legislature if it hopes to make laws and effectively rule.
The PPP/C and the PNCR (the larger part of the APNU+AFC coalition) are ethnic parties representing largely Indians and Africans respectively. While the PPP/C has substantial support among Amerindians the vast majority of the mixed group is ethnically African and supports the PNCR. As a result, the two parties have dominated the modern political scene. However, given this ethnicised political context it is thought – and to a degree history supports this contention – that a political party focusing on the indigenous peoples, the poorest ethnic group in Guyana, will do well, and I supported its formation (SN: 11/09/2009). Also, as in all countries of its type, there is thought to be a not insubstantial proportion of the voting population – say about 15% – rooted in the some 30% who currently do not vote and those who abhor the existing ethnic politics who are prepared to seek alternative political pathways.
It must be recognised that if the smaller parties do not singly or collectively win sufficient votes to prevent one of the larger parties from taking both the legislature and the executive, whether they join the government or not they will at best be mere ineffective moralizing members of the political establishment! However, I believe that it is generally agreed that given the small margin (less than 5,000 votes) that now exists between winning and losing, the smaller parties could garner sufficient votes to prevent either of the large parties from gaining an overall majority and taking both the executive and legislature.
In this context, if they coalesce with one of the larger parties to give it a working parliamentary majority, this will be leaving out one of the larger ethnic groups, much as is happening today with similar if not worse consequences. This is why while generally better in normal conditions, a post-elections coalition in Guyana can only work adequately if it contains the two larger ethnic parties. Another option is to work with one of the parties on an informal basis; not taking any government or quasi-governmental positions but making deals with the government hoping to hold it accountable based upon the capacity to bring it down. Thus, neither approach could solve the foundational difficulties of ‘who rules’ and ‘ethnic alienation’!
Nevertheless, the political virtue that is usually touted by smaller parties is their supposed capacity to hold the government accountable if they win sufficient seats. Even if they are successful in doing so this will not solve the basic problems but I doubt that we have a common meaning and/or even understand what it takes to adequately hold people accountable. Indeed, I am willing to wager that nowhere in the public (perhaps not even in the private) sector in Guyana are there established managerial processes to properly hold the various levels of operatives accountable. The Harvard Business Review points to five elements, each of which must be properly implemented if an individual is to be held accountable. The first is to be crystal clear about the objective. The second is to determine and acquire the necessary skills and other resources to meet the objectives. Third is the establishment of clear measurements and agreement on periodic milestones. Fourthly, a culture of honest, open and ongoing feedback is critical. And finally, there must be clear consequences for meeting or not meeting targets. ‘The magic is in the way they work together as a system. If you miss any one, accountability will fall through that gap.’ (https://hbr.org/2016/01/the-right-way-to-hold-people-accountable).
The official task of parliamentarians is to hold government accountable without violating the separation of powers between executive and legislature. Applied to the work of parliament, the accountability framework is relevant although it is applied somewhat differently. Parliament’s work is to consider and question the policies of the government and investigate and make recommendation as to whether or not those policies are being properly implemented and how the situation can be improved. The task of holding MPs and the government accountable is not merely kicking-up a verbal storm but also having the capacity to remove the incumbent by carrying a no-confidence vote. In my view, which will be elaborated upon elsewhere, small parties agreeing to give parliamentary support to a government and hoping to hold it accountable in any substantial manner in this complex policy context will, as usual, prove ineffective.
The normal approaches of small parties in relation to the basic difficulties of who rules and ethnic alienation are unhelpful and even their capacity to hold the government more stringently accountability is extremely questionable. I argued two weeks ago that unless Guyana wishes to remain in its present dysfunctional state some form of shared governance is necessary and small parties would best utilise their power and become disrupting agents in favour of radical constitutional reform. That is, if they win sufficient seats to hold a parliamentary balance they should be immediately disruptive and seek to bring about a revolution in the way Guyana is governed. Support any party that wins the presidency only if it agrees to immediate constitutional change to introduce shared governance, and if an agreement cannot be reached return to the electorate where there is a growing body of voters who are fed up with the present status quo and are prepared to try something new.
