Dear Editor,
We have always known that our constitution was not to be amended by tweaking single articles along the way as the need arose. Instead, the approach is to overhaul it in one holistic concerted effort. A few have advised that this approach robs the document of its sacredness and stabilizing influence. But we apparently expect a greater national good in running the entire document through a mill, called a constitution reform process.
If complete overhaul is the modus operandi, then we must be systematic. For starters, we must ask what we want to achieve. Is there any new philosophy, any new framework, to enshrine? Or are we going to play it by ear by waiting to see the output of public consultations and other discussions? To decide, we need to stocktake. And here the priority question is where are we in achieving the core objective of the previous reform process in 1999/2000, that of guaranteeing that our race or political affiliation would not disadvantage us with regards our human rights and our access to government resources and benefits. Does this objective remain similarly critical today? Absolutely yes, in my view. Guaranteeing racial security and political accord must be the central focus of any future constitution reform.
A recap is useful here. To address the core issue before the 1999/2000 project, two competing schools of thought emerged. One argued that without a power-sharing government, nothing else would work. The other advocated that good governance alone (with emphasis on inclusiveness) could guarantee racial security and political accommodation. As we know, the latter approach prevailed. Accordingly, purpose-built measures were introduced. They included new constitutional commissions (with the accent on the Ethnic Relations Commission (ERC) and the Public Procurement Commission (PPC)), parliamentary oversight committees, and lofty aspirational language on participatory and inclusionary democracy.
Two decades later, has the good governance approach delivered? As no one has methodically analyzed the effectiveness of the 1999/2000 reforms, an impact evaluation is obligatory. It should confront one question: have the good governance measures healed racial insecurity and political disharmony? Sub-questions must include: (1) to what extent have all the 1999/2000 proposals been implemented? For instance, how has Article 13 (establishment of an inclusionary democracy) moved beyond words? (2) To what extent have implemented measures fulfilled their design objectives? For instance, how effective has been the Ethnic Relations Commission? (3) To what extent do people still feel disadvantaged, disrespected, and fearful because of their race and politics?
An impact evaluation of the 1999/2000 good governance measures is valuable for three key reasons. First, to move forward we must know where we are. Second, even under a power-sharing regime, good governance must be optimized. Third, as power sharing in the near to medium future is likely out of reach, the country’s political salvation rests mainly with good governance.
The third reason is pivotal, as it speaks to the country’s most likely political future. It sees no chance for power sharing, as the idea is perceived now to be less needed. The close results of the 2011 and 2015 elections have increased confidence in the main parties that, should any of them lose an election, regaining government is only one or two elections away. Exclusion from power is now seen as a temporary setback that could be overcome by garnering a few thousand additional votes in the next election. Therefore, permanent minority or marginalized status, the driver of many a demand for power sharing worldwide, has lost potency in Guyana. Expect then no calls from any major opposition party for a unity government, such as those made by Jagan in the 1970s, Hoyte in the 2002, and Corbin in 2010. The possibility of power sharing now depends on pure statesmanship within the main political parties, a far weaker driving force.
Can good governance in tandem with oil-based economic prosperity, however, extinguish racial insecurity and political discord? Our various racial identities may still undermine the best of efforts. Such identity issues, for instance, still fuel the separatist passions of Quebecers in Canada and Catalans in Spain despite these regions having a large middle class, exceptional governance, and much local political power. In the Guyana context, would (or should) any racial group be comfortable should the government be dominated by another race, even with quality governance and economic
prosperity? Would the “we pon top” mentality still inflame racial rivalry? Racial identity and pride being what they are, the answer is likely yes. Power-sharing best solves this problem but in its likely long-term absence, can alternative approaches work effectively?
On the political front, then, more than anything else we need a systematic evaluation of 1999/2000 reforms. Such an evaluation must include impact assessments and performance audits of the specially-designed agencies and mechanisms and, most definitely, must include satisfaction and perception surveys of the population. This is a massive undertaking and must be well designed and funded and expertly conducted. Without this knowledge, any fresh round of constitution reforms would be somewhat sightless and abstract. More than that, an evaluation would provide a better sense of the extent to which alternatives to power-sharing can actually fix our core problems.
Yours faithfully,
Sherwood Lowe
