Sentenced back in 2017 to 65 years for the murder of his brother-in-law, Lakeraj Fredericks filed an appeal against his conviction and sentence arguing among other things that the trial judge did not properly put his defence to the jury, and that the sentence imposed is severe.
Fredericks (the now-appellant) had been convicted by a jury for shooting and killing Clifton Bonus sometime between June 1st and June 8th of 2011 at a farm in Linden.
When the matter came up for hearing yesterday morning before the Guyana Court of Appeal, Fredericks’ attorney Rachael Bakker argued that the judge did not sufficiently guard against imputations of fact by the jury regarding evidence introduced in the trial by some witnesses, nor was he “careful to properly assess, advice and caution” the jury concerning the nature of certain evidence.
Bakker said that instead, the “imposition” of the judge’s opinion regarding evidence presented by the state, and the assessment of his evidence was unbalanced.
According to Bakker, the “erroneous, dangerous” conclusions drawn by the judge in regard to evidence presented were prejudicial to her client as it sought to, and effectively substantiated the veracity of the prosecution’s claim that a caution statement revealed a true and correct account of the murder.
The lawyer is of the view that this is a non-direction and in fact amounted to a misdirection and that the judge ought to have left these issues to be determined by the jury.
During the virtual hearing, counsel for the state—Diana Kaulesar-O’Brien, however, refuted the arguments advanced by the appellant.
The Prosecutor said that contrary to Bakker’s contentions, there was no imposition of the opinion by the judge, but rather that he was merely pointing out that the prosecution was relying on the caution statement and circumstantial evidence and so the sequence of directions was that that statement would be dealt with first.
Kaulesar-O’Brien said that the prosecution is entitled to look at its evidence as a whole and to ask the jury to draw inferences based on any or all of the facts, once the jury finds the facts to be true from which the inferences are to be drawn.
Regarding the appellant’s contention that the judge ought to have left the issues of the fact for the jury’s consideration, the prosecutor submitted that the trial judge has a duty to draw to the attention of the jury, inferences which may be drawn on the facts. This she said, does not amount to a usurpation of the function of the jury, but that rather it is part of the function of the judge.
According to the prosecutor, apart from the denial of the caution statement by the appellant, there appears to be no other defence raised by him, neither was there any arising on the evidence. On this point she said that the judge did put to the jury, the contentions of the appellant raised in the evidence, and in his defence.
Kaulesar-O’Brien contended that the judge did adequately and properly put to the jury, the case for both the defence and prosecution; even as she asked for the appeal to be dismissed.
On the issue of the severity of sentence, counsel for the appellant argued that not only is it severe, but that it was not in conformity either with modern sentencing guidelines.
On this point Bakker argued that the judge did not consider mitigating factors, nor did he provide any justification for arriving at the base number—60, before the additional five years were added for the use of a firearm.
Referencing Section 100A (1) (b) of the Criminal Law (Offences) Act, however, Kaulesar-O’Brien argued that having been convicted of the capital offence, it was within the discretion of the trial judge to fix the sentence.
But she noted, also, that the trial judge did consider mitigating factors which had been presented by Fredericks’ attorney prior to sentencing and that the Court was asked to balance the need for deterrence with the prisoner demonstrating positive changes towards reformation and being reintroduced into society.
Kaulesar-O’Brien then went on to point out that the prosecution advanced the aggravating factors which it asked the court to also consider in finding its balance in sentencing.
On this point the prosecution had pointed out that Bonus was merely 21 years old at the time of his death, the fact that a firearm was used in the commission of the offence, the attack was unprovoked, the fact that the appellant was known to the deceased and the need for a strong message of deterrence to be sent to society by imposing a firm penalty.
Another ground on which Fredericks’ appeal rested, was that the judge erred in admitting the caution statement into evidence in what his lawyer described as the “weighty suspicion” surrounding the manner in which it had been obtained.
With hearings having been completed, the appellate court has said that it will inform when its decision will be rendered.
The appeal was heard by acting Chancellor Yonette Cummings-Edwards and Justices of Appeal Rishi Persaud and Dawn Gregory.
According to a caution statement which was admitted in evidence, Fredericks told the police that after an argument on a farm where he planted marijuana, a person whose name he gave as “Ronald,” handed him a gun to shoot Bonus, and he did, but he did not die.
The statement detailed that Fredericks then handed the gun back to “Ronald,” who in turn shot Bonus to the head, killing him. “Ronald” and the convict then dug a 2½ ft. shallow grave at the back of the old airstrip at Linden and buried Bonus.
Before handing down his sentence, trial judge, Justice Navindra Singh noted that Fredericks continued to refuse to accept responsibility for his actions, even in the face of the evidence presented against him, and the jury’s pronouncement that he was guilty.
Justice Singh commenced the sentence at a base of 60 years. He then added five years for the fact that the offence was carried out using a gun.
The court ordered that the prison make the deductions from the sentence, for the years the convict would have spent on remand.
