Taiwan volte face

Old-hand foreign policy watchers must have rubbed their eyes in disbelief when they awoke on Thursday to read that Taiwan was to set up a trade office in Guyana. And if that were not enough, the initial announcement came not from our own Foreign Ministry, but from the United States Embassy, although when asked, Minister Hugh Todd did confirm that the decision had been made. However, those same watchers would not have been altogether surprised when they read on Friday that the decision had been reversed, since it doesn’t take an expert to anticipate that the Chinese would have applied enormous pressure on the government in Georgetown to secure a U-turn.

The decision announced by the embassy first appeared on Wednesday evening, where among other things the statement said, “Closer ties with Taiwan will advance cooperation and development in Guyana on the basis of shared democratic values, transparency, and mutual respect.”

As it is, the administration opens itself to the charge that diplomatic background and skills are so attenuated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that there was no one to give the Minister and by extension, the administration, the full history and conditions of relations with China over the past half century, and the likely consequences of establishing relations with Taiwan at any level. If they were given sensible advice, they clearly ignored it. At the very least such a speedy volte face says nothing for the professionalism of our foreign service.

Given the provenance of the initial communication on the matter, one must presume that the government was persuaded by the US to accept a Taiwan trade office, and considering the new intimate relations being cultivated with Washington for security, border and other reasons, and the visits of high-level personnel here, the instinct no doubt was for accommodating this request. The United States has always emphasised Taiwan’s democratic values, and that is an argument which would have had resonance here at the present time, more particularly considering the role the State Department played in securing an adherence to democracy last year.

China regards Taiwan as a breakaway province, although that island to all intents and purposes sees itself as a sovereign state. It has never formally declared its independence, however, a move which Beijing has said would involve war. States with relations with China – which is effectively nearly everybody – accept that country’s One-China policy, and in practice that applies even to the United States despite its relations with the island at all levels, and its sales of weaponry to it. While it ensures Taiwan has adequate defence, it has no defence treaty as it has with some other Asian states. Guyana’s acceptance of the One-China policy dates back to 1972, so it is hardly a recent development in our case.

Through the One-China policy and the application of tactics of duress and/or economic inducements to smaller states, Beijing has attempted to constrict the international space in which Taiwan operates, although the island has succeeded in pursuing trade relations with a sizeable number of nations, including one or two in the Caribbean.

How successful this is in any given situation depends on the size of the state involved, how much pressure can be brought to bear in terms of trade or aid or whatever, and perhaps how much international cover that state has. For its part, Taiwan has assiduously pursued trade and investment relations wherever it can both in pursuit of its economic viability and expansion, but also with a long-term goal of recognition, and a trade office in Guyana would fall into that category. It is not a neutral occurrence. It could not be expected, therefore, that China would regard such a development with equanimity.

This has occurred at a time when there is great tension in the South China Sea, and among various other things Beijing has been asserting rights to islands to which other states have claims. In an echo of the late Hugo Chávez’s claim to Bird island, where he built artificial structures in the sea to house his troops, China has been building artificial islands and constructing air bases on some of them. It is clear that from a strategic point of view Beijing is transforming swathes of the South China Sea around the islands into part of its maritime zone, claiming sovereignty over the waters there, although the US maintains these are international waters.  It has been reported that China has been carrying out regular flights over these waters as far as the southern part of Taiwan over recent months, although they are usually undertaken by one to three reconnaissance or anti-submarine warfare aircraft, according to Taipei. However, last weekend the island authorities reported a “large incursion” of Chinese warplanes two days in a row which involved 12 fighters, two anti-submarine aircraft and a reconnaissance plane. The bombers, said the island’s defence ministry, were capable of carrying nuclear weapons. This has been perceived by some commentators as a message to the new Biden administration in terms of its relations with Taiwan, while others have said that it is testing the level of Biden’s support for Taiwan.

For its part Washington is asserting freedom of navigation in the area, Reuters reporting on Friday that it had sent a warship near the Chinese-controlled Paracel Islands, a development which China condemned. It said it had sent naval and air units to warn off the ship. The same ship had earlier transited the Taiwan Strait, which triggered the expected angry reaction from Beijing, while last month a US carrier strike group had entered the South China Sea.

According to the BBC, the official nature of the new administration’s policies with respect to Taiwan is not yet known, although a State Department spokesman has said the US would continue to deepen ties with the island and reaffirmed its “rock-solid commitment” to assist it defend itself. In other words, the signs are that Washington will reinforce its commitments to Taiwan and continue to operate on a free navigation principle in the South China Sea. In addition, of course, the US has a raft of other issues with China as is well known.

Helping Taiwan in a situation of tension in the South China Sea and ensuring its survival, can also involve assisting the island in other theatres of operation and expanding its influence there, including in South America. It is a backdoor way of extending its leverage. Convincing Georgetown to set up a trade office here at the same time confronts China’s influence locally. And as we reported on Friday, some analysts are of the view that Washington is interested in reducing Chinese influence in this part of the world.

When Minister Todd told this newspaper on Wednesday night that the trade office did not affect this country’s commitment to the One-China policy, he was being unduly naïve; the Chinese understand all too well what is involved, as do the Taiwanese. In such circumstances “compartmentalisation”, as he put it, does not exist, since either the island is a breakaway province or it is a sovereign state, although Taipei has been skilful in inserting itself trade and investment wise into all kinds of places. As noted earlier, trade is a means to an end for Taipei, although it also needs it in its own right for the purposes of economic growth and viability. In our case, however, it is not so easy for an office to be established given Beijing’s relations with our economy, not all of the details of which are in the public domain.

Exactly what kind of pressure China exerted to bring about a reversal of the decision we may never know, but clearly blindsided, the first statement came out of Beijing itself, with the Foreign Ministry there insisting that those concerned should “avoid setting up any official institutions with each other, and take practical measures to correct mistakes and eliminate negative impacts.” It indicated the importance China attached to this novel development. Within hours the government here had repudiated its earlier announcement referring enigmatically to a “miscommunication of the agreement signed.” The exact nature of that miscommunication was not explained.

As for Taiwan, it has accused China of bullying a small nation.

While the Chinese Embassy here has had nothing to say about these goings on, just to emphasise the restoration of the status quo ante, the Guyana Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a photo of Mr Todd meeting with Chargé d’Affaires of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, Chen Xilai, during which they “discussed areas of mutual interest and cooperation.” As for why the original communication emanated from the US embassy rather than Takuba Lodge, the Minister was anything but enlightening.

The Leader of the Opposition Joseph Harmon was suitably scathing about what he saw as the departure from this country’s traditional One-China policy, stating that the government had damaged our relations with Beijing. The ineptitude notwithstanding, we probably haven’t; once Beijing has secured the outcome it wants, the kind of balance it seeks to maintain will be restored. It will have been alerted to the fact, however, that in a kind of sublimated way it may be confronting the US more directly here than it has sometimes had to do in the past and that Washington’s greater vested interest in this country will introduce a new dimension to activities locally.