It was on January 7th this year that President Nicolás Maduro issued a decree purporting to establish a new maritime territory designated ‘Territory for the development of the Atlantic Façade’ incorporating our territorial waters, EEZ, continental shelf and land west of the Essequibo River into Venezuela. While it was no doubt a reaction to the ICJ ruling of December 18th last year, when the international court declared its jurisdiction to hear the case relating to the validity of the 1899 Arbitral Award, it nevertheless also appeared to reflect a new dimension in the Venezuelan approach, more especially given the rhetoric with which it was accompanied.
It was not, of course, the first time that such a decree had been issued; there was one as recently as 2015, but there were no consistent actions over an extended time-frame that followed from this, although in December 2018, the Venezuelan navy did attempt to land a military helicopter on the Ramform Tethys, which was engaged in seismic work for ExxonMobil in Guyana waters at the time. It might be noted that five years earlier Venezuela’s navy had seized the Teknik Perdana, an exploratory vessel contracted to the US oil company Anadarko in this country’s maritime space. This year, however, the signals were altogether of a more relentless character. Colonel Julius Skeete of the GDF said on Friday that from the time the decree had been issued up until February 3rd, the army had not seen that level of activity in Guyana’s EEZ by the Venezuelan military before. The critical act of aggression on the part of our neighbour was the seizure of two Guyanese fishing vessels, the Lady Nayera and the Sea Wolf, off the coast of Waini Point in Guyana waters on January 21st.
They were intercepted by the Venezuelan naval vessel the Commandante Hugo Chávez GC 24, and accompanied to the port of Güiria. President Maduro arrogantly and falsely asserted that the boats were in Venezuelan “undisputed territorial waters.” On February 3rd, however, they were released.
The seizure of the vessels invited a chorus of condemnation from international organizations and states such as the US, the two critical bodies where this region is concerned being Caricom and the OAS. What is significant in terms of the Permanent Council meeting of the latter, was the fact that self-styled interim President Juan Guaidó had sent a representative, Mr Gustavo Tarre Briceño, who defended the Venezuelan navy’s action. “The actions taken by the usurper Maduro, giving rise to this discussion, I don’t think that anyone, despite that, would deny a country’s legitimate exercise of its sovereignty; as long as it doesn’t affect other states … we should recognise, under international law, Venezuela’s right to protect its communal territory for the maritime region,” he was quoted as saying. In other words on this issue Miraflores had the backing, no less shrill in tone, from an otherwise hostile opposition.
There was no shortage of hypotheses about the seizures, Foreign Minister Hugh Todd at first being quoted as saying, “We think it is an attempt to go back to the Good Officer’s Process. But no! That is not our position and we [are] committed to the ICJ process.” On the face of it, at least, it seems difficult to believe that Caracas could seriously think that with Guyana’s international backing it could bully Georgetown to relinquish the ICJ route at this stage, although it is always conceivable that it has not yet adjusted its traditional mode of analysis and behaviour to a novel situation and a more confident neighbour.
Whatever the case in this regard the Miami Herald reported Caribbean observers and others as regarding the aggression not only as an attempt by the Maduro government to arouse nationalist sentiment at home, but to register its displeasure with the increasing presence of the US in Guyana. As recently as last month Vice President Delcy Rodriguez was demanding that ExxonMobil cease drilling. It can only be remarked that even if this is a response to the American presence, it will know very well it has no leverage against what Washington does in terms of this country – although potentially that conceivably might be subject to amendment should Miraflores indicate a willingness to come to terms with American oil companies – especially ExxonMobil – which were effectively evicted by Hugo Chávez.
The paper also quoted Mr José Cardenas who lobbies in the US on behalf of the Guyana government as saying the visit of a US Admiral to this country “was a signal that Maduro obviously was not impressed with.” Certainly according to the Caracas Chronicles on Friday, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza has been attacking the US for two days.
Takuba Lodge, of course, will not be insensitive to the fact that the Venezuelan economy is in dire straits, and a drive directed against Guyana would bring on board a somewhat weakened opposition which has lost a measure of credibility owing to its current amorphous position, its ineffectualness and scrutiny over a lack of transparency in the management of its funds. On that front, at least, Miraflores would calculate it had nothing to lose and everything to gain.
Whatever the trigger, there is the question of the aims of the decree and the related seizure of the fishing vessels. We have long experience of Venezuelan actions within our jurisdiction and it can only be said that this had the hallmarks of the beginning of a long-term attempt to change the reality on the ground. In the maritime zone Caracas cannot challenge the US directly, so it went for soft targets in the form of fishing vessels which unlike the oil companies would not be subject to direct American protection.
Then there is the land boundary in Regions Seven and One, where there have been difficult problems for a long time, particularly in the case of the former. For the time being Caracas appeared prepared to tolerate Guyana’s domination of the international reaction, as it has always done in the past, but it may have thought that over an extended period it could alter the international perception of the narrative with consistent intrusive measures.
Whatever Venezuela had in mind in the longer term, at the beginning of this month it abruptly changed direction and released the fishing vessels. What was particularly interesting was what Colonel Skeete had to say on the sidelines of the GDF officers’ conference: “[W]hat we do know though is that when the vessels returned, the escort — because they were escorted by the Venezuela naval vessel — they stopped at the line that we are saying is the demarcation of our western extreme of our exclusive economic zone.” In other words any plans for encroachment have at least been put on hold, hopefully, indefinitely, although given the history of Venezuelan activity, Guyana can hardly afford to assume that that will be the case.
In a statement from Takuba Lodge it was said that Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza had confirmed to Minister Todd that all legal proceedings had been discontinued against the fishermen at the request of President Nicolás Maduro. So the question arises as to why the head of state intervened, and what changed his perception of events. Or was it a question that it was thought a different tactic at this point might be more in Caracas’ interest? Minister Todd brightly remarked that the release was an indication Venezuela was “willing to play by international rules.” Surely he doesn’t believe that. When asked whether he has been assured of an end to Venezuela’s intrusions, the Minister responded, “I am comfortable.” He shouldn’t be. As said earlier, no one knows when Caracas will again resuscitate its aggressive stance.
President Irfaan Ali for his part thanked all the organisations and countries which had supported Guyana. It is always possible that the immediacy and intensity of the response to Venezuela’s action might have persuaded Miraflores that at this stage it was not going to make much impact on the international narrative, even with Mr Guaidó’s backing, and to continue along this path in the immediate term might produce the opposite result from the one Caracas was seeking. If so, then that would mean it had not abandoned the strategy in principle, simply postponed it to what would be considered a more propitious time.
The President was asked whether Venezuelan authorities had given any assurances of non-interference, and he replied, “We have made it very clear that we are not asking for these assurances; this is out right. We will continue to facilitate the economic activity in our area.” The truth is, of course, he wouldn’t be given any such assurance even if he requested it, and if he were, he could take it with a tablespoon of salt.
Then there is the matter of the US. Despite all the ranting against Washington, and despite the fact that the new Biden administration has, like its predecessor, recognised Mr Guaidó as the interim president of Venezuela, Mr Maduro might be hoping for a greater elasticity in relations with the Americans than obtained under former president Donald Trump. If so, now would not be the time to confront the United States in a Guyana context. The sanctions are a major issue for Miraflores, although US Ambassador to Venezuela James Story is on record as saying that Washington will only lift them if there’s a clear path for free and fair elections.
According to the BBC, in 2019 the US warned “bankers, brokers, traders and facilitators” not to deal in “gold, oil, or other Venezuelan commodities …” although it has been selling its gold to Iran. However, its international reserves have now reached a 30-year low. It may be looking for some relief on that front especially.
