Commander Dion Moore with responsibility for Region Seven said on the GPF’s online programme last week that Guyanese vessels were being attacked by Sindicato and other guerrilla gangs along the Cuyuni River. He told his audience that the police had received reports of gang members intercepting Guyanese vessels, demanding payments and even sometimes making threats. They were armed with both rifles and handguns, he said.
This will come as no news to Guyanese; it is just another example of what has been going on in the area for years. As recently as September of last year a joint patrol comprising ranks of both the GDF and the police had come under fire from the Venezuelan bank of the river. The presumption was that the perpetrators were Sindicato members, and the patrol duly returned fire. No one was injured. Following that the army announced that the security forces had intensified their “aggressive” joint patrols in the Cuyuni, but there was no subsequent feedback about what, if anything these achieved.
In the years prior to that Guyanese miners and dredge-owners had periodically complained to the authorities about the predatory activities of the Sindicatos, and in 2018, for example, they had called on the military and the government to provide them with protection. On the basis of what Commander Moore had to say it is difficult to know whether the situation has deteriorated even further, although what can be said is that the various gangs are probably now operating entirely out of the control of the Venezuelan state which is not in a position to rein them in.
The Cuyuni up to the median line in the Wenamu River is Guyanese territory under the 1899 Award, but since Caracas clings irrationally to the fanciful claim that Essequibo is theirs, they have been no respecters of Guyana’s sovereignty in that waterway at any time. It is not to be forgotten that they have been in illegal occupation of our half of the island of Ankoko since as far back as 1966, and their National Guard and military always conducted themselves on the river as if they owned it. Then too there were the periodic incursions on land in one form or another.
What is happening now may be a reflection of a development affecting the Venezuelan state as a whole. Earlier this year in the border region of Apure Venezuelan troops fought Colombian rebels for weeks in a confrontation which displaced thousands of civilians. The Colombians comprising breakaway factions of groups like FARC had been in that part of Venezuela for years engaged in drug-trafficking, and there had been persistent allegations that the Venezuelan military were also involved.
The explanation of Reuters news agency for what triggered the fighting was that the Colombians were meting out justice in the area, which would indicate that governmental authorities were not in control. In other parts of the interior too, according to the agency, gangs control territory and set laws.
A development which received considerable international coverage partly because it occurred in Caracas itself, was the gun battles between the police and gangs in a number of barrios in the south-west of the city. It seems that the shooting by police of a gang boss allied to a major leader colloquially referred to as ‘El Koki’ was one of the factors which triggered the conflict. The underlying problem, however, originated in ‘Peace Zones’ negotiated by former Vice-Minister of Justice Vicente Rangel in 2013 with 280 gangs. Under the agreement the police and security forces would not enter 80 of the most violent municipalities, while the criminals could stay there if they abandoned their activities. Over the years some of the gangs coalesced to form what have been called ‘mega gangs’.
The government said that 26 people died in the operation in the capital, although the Caracas Chronicles reported an NGO as maintaining there were 37 documented deaths, including four officers and 22 alleged non-gang members killed by stray bullets. If that was not enough, residents said that the police ransacked their homes, stealing food and household items. However, they detained no main gang leaders.
Reuters said that this fighting was another sign that President Maduro was losing control over parts of Venezuela, and it quoted Alexander Campos, a politics and violence researcher at the Central University of Venezuela as saying: “It is becoming more evident that Maduro is losing control in and out of Caracas … The capacity and ambition of criminal groups from gangs to guerrillas is growing.”
Two years ago the Caracas Chronicles reported a police source as identifying 113 gangs and criminal outfits operating across Venezuela, most of which had automatic weapons and hand grenades. Some of the major ones were listed, including that of El Koki in Caracas, and Los Guajiros de Guayana in Bolívar state, which abuts Guyana. The website reported a security analyst as saying that the reason for their survival was their firepower, which was greater than that of most law enforcement institutions. Some, he said, appeared to have the support of the regime such as those which control a number of the Bolívar state mines. “These gangs can’t be touched, not even with silk gloves,” he was quoted as saying, “and no one knows why.”
However, the US government that same year did not have any doubt about what the reason was. The Treasury Department sanctioned the state-run mining company Minerven and its chairman for “illicit gold operations that continued to prop up the illegitimate regime of former President Nicolás Maduro.” Minerven was in reality a front for gold-extracting criminal gangs which used methods employed in Venezuelan prisons against innocent citizens and miners. According to the Caracas Chronicles five government plans to control national gold production had failed, which is why in 2015 Mr Maduro created the ‘Orinoco Mining Arc’ whereby the government recruited criminal gangs to exploit the territory. The military does not challenge the gangs because they too benefit from them and assist them.
In any case, as mentioned above it is likely that at this stage the gangs are sufficiently well entrenched and possess the kind of firepower to make it impossible for the government to deal with them. What it does appear is that there may be more gangs than just the Sindicatos terrorising the Cuyuni River area. In other parts of Venezuela large gangs have sometimes teamed up with smaller local ones to extend their reach and augment their manpower, so perhaps that has happened in Bolívar state too.
A disintegration of state power in some parts of Venezuela is not good news for this country. Whatever else we would like to avoid it is surely chaos next door; that would have all kinds of serious implications for us. It is particularly not good news when the Venezuelan state authorities have no control of the area right on our border. If we want a cessation of the terror tactics which are being employed against our citizens in our territory, that will not come through negotiation; after all, there is no one with whom we can negotiate.
Commander Moore said on the programme that patrols in the district had increased and comprised members of both the GDF and the police. They were patrolling the Cuyuni between Eteringbang and Mokepai, among other areas, he said. One can only hope that both organisations have been provided with sufficient manpower and resources to have patrols along the river which are indeed very frequent. The authorities here need to afford meaningful protection to Guyanese on the Region Seven frontier, and as far as possible discourage the criminals of Bolívar state from launching their vessels onto our waters.
If we do not have a presence on the Cuyuni which is backed by force, instances of the blackmail, violence and savagery which are so much a characteristic of the gangs will be more frequent, and they will in due course become emboldened to penetrate further inland. The authorities have to address the problem now when it is still possible to get it under control. After all, they are not confronting state actors, but criminals.
