Introduction
Except, perhaps for the case of my similarly long series of columns dealing with the Buxton Proposal on direct cash transfers to the poor, I have never received so many requests to re-cap a series in order to aid comprehension of the many new concepts introduced in my presentation on an individual topic, as in the case of my discussion of the treatment of the planned public auctions of oil and gas rights. For those persons with a direct interest in the topic, whether financial or skills-improvement based, I hasten to remind them that these columns are not designed to circumvent professional guidance and advice.
The public auction series began weeks ago on June 11. And in several consecutive Sunday columns I have addressed several auction issues ranging from the Stabroek Production Sharing Agreement, PSA, in place, the estimated Government Take ratio up to seeking to learn lessons from a review of public auctions theory and practice. However, this re-cap will focus on addressing four broad issues, in the sequence they are presented here. These items are namely, 1] basic auction theory and formats 2] taking stock of Guyana’s prevailing Government Take ratio, estimated recoverable resources of oil and gas; and the opportunity time-window for oil and gas exports under the ruling PSA; 3] the fiscal metrics of the PSA intended for use at the proposed public auctions; and 4] empirical review and theoretical synthesizing of public oil blocks auctions in emerging petroleum states.