Dear Editor,
I refer to the letter captioned “A glimpse into gold board operations between 2010-2019” (SN September 07) and share publicly some of the inner workings of the Guyana Gold Board (GGB) during a most turbulent time, and in so doing let the record speak for itself. First, the contexts encountered. There was the huge Rasool shadow hanging over the GGB (anti-money laundering failures); the related Royal Canadian Mint (RCM) stoppage, then stringencies; the major (I mean major) contributions of gold to the national economy; the industrial sabotage at the GGB plant operations in the compound of the GGMC; the emergency movement of GGB ops to a new location; the state of the GGB; and the state of the environment re essential needs for equipment, processes, and services in a time sensitive environment. Second, the Natural Resources staff being paid by the GGB. It is correct, and it was inherited. Then, the expenses of the board increased substantially, which is also correct, and also was inherited. Both of these items were repeatedly discussed at the board level, and because they had originated from the ministry, both were escalated repeatedly to the Permanent Secretary and ministerial levels.
For whatever it is worth, one director was serving in an expert capacity to the minister and others, which accounted for almost all of this increase. Third, employment costs did increase heavily, but I refer to the aforementioned contexts in the preceding paragraph. Part of the negotiations and arrangements finalized between the GGB and the RCM included compliance and audit staffing, so as to be better equipped to oversee the operations. For emphasis, there was no compliance to speak of, and the resident auditor never had a finding in the 10 years he was present. Additionally, the nonexistent Human Resources area had to be built from scratch. For those who think that this was too much too quickly, the reality was that gold was the biggest foreign exchange earner, and it was operating within stated parameters: enhanced risks programs and processes, enhanced compliance procedures and implementation, among others.
The RCM visited twice, if not thrice. The policing was that rigorous. There was never any further talk, not even a hint, of distancing from GGB business. In terms of employment costs, it was money well spent, for the GGB remained open and with a better reputation outside of Guyana. Fourth, under ‘Other expenses’ which spoke of the massive increase in this category from 2014-2019, but had no further details. As to what that means is anyone’s guess. Fifth, under the category of “Disposal of Non-Current Assets”, nothing was disposed of. Nothing. Written down, yes; not disposed. It may apply to the materials (new carpets at the old GGMC location) that had to leave behind. Sixth, all dealers were subject to the most intense scrutiny, to the extent that they protested. There were no procedures in 2017, but these were put in place. All had to sign: dealers, directors, General Manager. As for ‘no objection’ letters from the minister, there was no exception in any year to this standing requirement. There are records to this effect.
Seventh, reference procurement, there were discussions with the Permanent Secretary who was familiar with the urgent needs due to the exigencies under which the GGB operated.
Guidance was furnished on how to operate in what was an emergency situation. The GGB made use of the provisions of the Procurement Act 2003, Section 28 (a)(b)(c) and (d), as all applied in the exceptional circumstances lived with, especially as such pertained to the mercury abatement system and the generator and related services. Eighth, the KNA relationship/contract was finalized after all other architects and consultants said the job could not be done, given space constraints. This included Rodrigues Architects. Ninth, relative to evaluation of bids, subject to correction, the evaluation committee consisted of the GM of the GGB, a very senior officer of the Health Ministry and a very senior officer from the Ministry of Works. I would think they had very sound reasons to disqualify the bidders that failed to make the mark. Tenth, the AXIS relationship was driven by a cabinet memorandum. No vehicles were imported as at February 29, 2020. Eleventh, the Big Boss Transportation arrangement originated in the Natural Resources Ministry.
Sincerely,
GHK Lall
