On Tuesday we published information contained in a February 9 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies about Venezuela’s military build-up in Ankoko as well as on its Atlantic coast. The Center’s analysis was based on satellite images generated by Maxar Technologies as well as videos from the Venezuelan armed forces, the significance being that much of this had occurred this year, and certainly since the signing of the Argyle Declaration.
There was a detailed exposition of the military hardware involved, as well as the infrastructure associated with it, the specifics of which would probably have little meaning for the average layperson. In a very general sense what the images showed was a staging area across the Cuyuni opposite Ankoko where construction materials had been piled up. Three armoured vehicles which were probably amphibious personnel carriers could also be seen, while the presence of a heavy river ferry and the clearing of a new area to the north probably indicated that military engineers intended to build a Mabey Compact 200 bridge to the island.
But there were also videos from the National Guard dated January 15 and a more recent one from government and military social media accounts on January 24 and 25. The latter
showed an exercise on Ankoko commanded by General Domingo Hernández Lárez, a senior Commander in the armed forces who reports only to President Nicolás Maduro and Minister of Defence Vladimir Padrino. The videos, it was said, were accompanied by logos, music and “editorial flourishes,” with the Government of Guyana considered to be the major target audience.
CSIS said they too revealed aspects of the military escalation, including two light transport aircraft, an Mi-17 helicopter, a variety of armoured equipment including two to three types of armoured personnel carriers and two types of tanks, among other things. The report went on to refer to a video from January 19 which explained that what was being built on Ankoko was a jungle tank base to be used to train Venezuela’s armoured units. Maxar’s satellite imagery indicated the beginning of an expansion project which would suggest an increase in personnel stationed there from platoon to company or battalion size, i.e. from 50 personnel to possibly over 300. And this on Guyana’s half of an island Venezuela seized in 1966.
As the citizens of this country already know, the Venezuelans used the excuse of the visit of the HMS Trent here to deploy 5,682 military personnel and a formidable array of ships, amphibious vehicles, helicopters, fighter jets and antiaircraft missile batteries, among other things, on its Atlantic coast. Satellite imagery shows that the boats arrived last month at Guiria, opposite Trinidad, and the report’s authors suggested the intention might be to further deploy them to Point Barima, which is only 43 miles from Essequibo.
Even if the administration here does not bother to access Maxar Technologies and does not make arrangements as it should to follow the Venezuelan government and military on social media, it will undoubtedly have known what is going on. Certainly the US and UK would have told them, if not France and Brazil as well. All that has now happened, therefore, is that information previously in the hands of the authorities has now become available to the public at large. In the light of the information now generally available, all those who argued that this country was never in any danger of an invasion, should perhaps review their stance.
The CSIS position is that Venezuela’s actions supported its hypothesis of ‘compellence’, whereby Caracas was attempting to secure concessions from Guyana, not excluding the possible joint exploration of natural resources. This, it argued, involved a carrot and stick approach, with the military provocation representing the stick and Argyle the diplomatic carrot. ‘Compellence’ it was explained, was originally coined by Thomas Schelling to describe the combining of the threat of force with diplomatic incentives.
Most people have never come across the word ‘compellence’ before, but in any case Guyanese have a more appropriate term to describe our particular situation and that is ‘bullyism.’ Apart from anything else Mr Maduro has no carrot to offer. The diplomatic encounter at Argyle and subsequent meetings will not produce any result because Guyana – both government and opposition – is committed to the ICJ process to address the matter of the validity of the 1899 Award.
The Government of Guyana agreed to go to Argyle on the condition that the border would not be a subject for discussion. Mr Maduro went to St Vincent telling his public that he had managed to get Guyana to engage in bilateral discussions on border issues as he had been demanding. In other words, for him it became a means of saving face after backing down from what had been advertised as an intention to annexe Essequibo. Considering the level of funding, organisation and effort required to undertake the current level of militarisation in Ankoko, not to mention Tumeremo and the Atlantic coast, one cannot be cavalier about the possibility that he will in fact invade at some point, even if in theory he wasn’t quite ready when he went to Argyle.
But then we knew that already. Depending on what happens politically in Venezuela, he might not go the military path, but we cannot afford to take risks. Just as Guyana came under enormous diplomatic pressure to go to Argyle, so too did Venezuela. It was the heavyweight on the continent, Brazil, which made its position clear beforehand, namely that it would not support a military invasion of Guyana. President Maduro will be sensitive to pressure from Brasilia, because he depends on President Lula for his reacceptance at some level into the global community. The latter has condemned Washington’s sanctions policy with respect to Venezuela, and President Maduro is anxious to be admitted into BRICS which can only be achieved with Brazilian support. He also has ambitions to revive UNASUR under his own leadership.
As for Brazil it is taking no gambles in relation to Venezuelan intentions, and according to Reuters has tripled the number of soldiers, armoured cars and artillery it had planned to deploy in the state of Roraima which borders Guyana, in addition to creating a new regiment there. It has been made clear that Venezuela will not be allowed to invade this country through Brazil, which will seriously limit where Caracas could send its tanks, if that is indeed what it has in mind.
It is important for the government here to document Venezuela’s egregious behaviour, so it has ammunition if at the meeting in March Caracas cynically accuses this country of being in breach of Argyle with the visit of the Trent and various US security personnel.
CSIS did raise a very significant consideration, and that is that the build-up on Ankoko might have been undertaken to placate sections of the armed forces. Independently of that, it might be noted that the military has always been very hard-line on the Essequibo issue. That aside the report suggests that local commanders who are far from the centre of power might escalate matters on their own or instigate provocations which get out of control. In any case, as it says, “The Venezuelan state is not a unified actor, fragmented as it is by corruption, criminal interests, and internal jockeying for power.” And that fragmentation, it might be added, is nowhere more evident than in Bolívar state opposite Guyana, where the government’s writ runs uncertainly.
While we hope for the best, as the saying goes we should prepare for the worst. At least given what is happening on Ankoko we know the primary area of a potential invasion. While it is difficult to believe that the boats and missiles in Guiria would be used against oil platforms for various geopolitical reasons, hypothetically they could be directed against the coast. What President Maduro keeps repeating is that Essequibo is populated by mostly Indigenous people, although what he would find is that they were no more enthusiastic about becoming Venezuelan than the coastal population would. However, it seems to suggest that he has his greedy eyes on the gold in our interior which would offset his loss of oil revenue if sanctions were reinstated.
In an interview with the Financial Times Foreign Minister Hugh Todd accused Venezuela of violating international law by expanding its military presence on our border. As he well knows, President Maduro has no greater respect for international law than he does for the rule of law in his own country. More to the point, however, Mr Todd was reported as saying that Guyana was “not building any capacity to fight Venezuela,” and our defence strategy was founded on cooperating with allies including the US and UK.
He was quoted as saying, “In the democratic world, you will find that once you’re threatened by . . . a failing democracy, you will not be left alone.” Perhaps.
