Dear Editor,
I have argued before and still insist that our Integrity Commission is both badly mis-purposed (as most of its statutory functions are redundant and unnecessary) and a crass violator of privacy and comfort rights of public officials and their families. The Integrity Commission Act identifies three broad functions for the commission: (i) monitor the wealth of specified public officials, (ii) enforce a code of conduct for public officials, particularly with regards to conflicts of interest, and (iii) serve as a complaint authority against public officials for acts ranging from corruption to politically-biased and inefficient service – judging from the twenty-five criteria on the commission’s complaint form.
In terms of monitoring wealth, most countries use national revenue authorities as opposed to integrity commissions for good reason. For instance, the larger database of our GRA, its more integrated systems, and its greater legal powers make it far more capable of detecting undeclared and illegitimate wealth. The GRA can, by efficiently capturing and cross-referencing a person’s declared income, expenditure, assets, and transactions, more capably perform this function than the docile Integrity Commission.
In terms of serving as a complaints authority, the Integrity Commission is also redundant and unnecessary as there are several such authorities already in existence, such as the Ombudsman, the Ethnic Relations Commission, the Public Pro-curement Commission, and the Police Complaints Authority. For instance, Arti-cle 192 (1) of the constitution empowers the Ombudsman to “investigate any action taken by any department of Government or by any other authority to which this article applies, or by the President, Minis-ters, officers or members of such a department or authority, being action taken in exercise of the administrative functions of that department or authority.” One may argue for a more effective and activist Ombudsman, but giving the Integrity Commission the same mandate is an exercise in futility. Has the commission received any complaints and, if so, what has it done with them?
Lastly, the question of privacy and comfort rights of those public servants who fall under the act and how to balance those rights against the need to fight public corruption. Our integrity commission is authorized by law to seek information on the total lifelong wealth of a public official and his or her close family. This is a crass invasion of privacy, as the exercise reaches back into the life of the official prior to his or her job appointment. It is also unnecessary because annual declarations of assets and incomes from the date of one’s appointment can alone detect any suspicious richness without the need for declaring one’s entire personal and family wealth.
Indeed, a public officer under the act could declare his or her wealth on the first day on the job as zero. The integrity commission then should only focus on the wealth that person accumulates going forward. Why should I declare my yacht – or be penalized for not doing so – if I purchased it several years before I was appointed to a top government job? It is unconstitutional for the commission or any such authority to invade one’s right to privacy over and above that necessary to fulfil its statutory functions. A less intrusive and burdensome demand for information may also encourage prompt and full compliance by officials. It would be more useful for the commission to focus exclusively on detecting and preventing conflicts of interest in the public service. No other agency in Guyana has this mandate.
Sincerely,
Sherwood Lowe
