Compromise and consensus

It is not possible to read a newspaper, listen to the news on the radio or watch a  televised newscast without being inundated on the latest conflict, or ensuing turmoil, for which there appears to be no form of resolution in the near future. More often than not in these disputes, neither party is willing to offer concessions since this act might be perceived as “losing face”, according to the old Chinese adage, or showing signs of weakness, thus prompting the idea that compromise and consensus are fast becoming theories of the past.

In political theory, the subjects of compromise and consensus, with their inherent complexities, have spawned a vast array of literature which is characterised by significant differences. (This column is not the forum for an examination of these complexities.) However, compromise can be simply defined as a form of agreement which accommodates conflicting opinions or claims. Whereas, when two parties arrive at a consensus it means that they have changed their stance on the controversial issue and consider the final agreement to be at least as good as, or in some instances, even better than their initial position. Whereas, in a compromise, the parties in disagreement hold on to their opposing views, or in the words of Daniel Wienstock (2013), “ it does not count as a compromise when you change your mind.” Whilst the differing parties agree to concede some of their claims to the opposing parties’ demands, they do not agree with their rivals’ demands.

Arriving at a resolution is very often a difficult endeavour, especially when longstanding principles are involved. However, if opposing parties are really desirous of moving forward, negotiations, and ultimately, concessions are compulsory. A relatively simple example of such an outcome is the 1977 Gleneagles Agreement. In South Africa, then under an apartheid system of government, all sport was segregated, with separate clubs and organising bodies. Although South Africa had been expelled from the Olympic movement by the IOC in 1970, it was indirectly responsible for the African-led boycott – which Guyana joined – of  the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal when it hosted a New Zealand Rugby Union team tour which coincided with the summer event. At the June 1977 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, at Lancaster House, London, England, then Commonwealth Secretary General (1975 – 90) Guyanese Shridath Ramphal was determined that the Commonwealth should transform its rhetoric on apartheid into practical action.

At the weekend’s informal retreat at the Gleneagles Hotel, in the Highlands of Perthshire, Scotland, Ramphal was busy with his “first excursion into quiet diplomacy.” The Secretary General assembled a small gathering of nation heads, including New Zealand’s Prime Minister Robert Muldoon (who had endorsed the rugby tour) under the leadership of Jamaica’s Prime Minister Michael Manley to resolve the matter. Two significant concessions were made: first, the agreement drew “a curtain across the past”, and second, “inadequate intergovernmental consultations” explained past understandings and difficulties. The draft reaffirmed the Commonwealth’s position on racism embodied in the Singapore Declaration of Common-wealth Principles (1971) and urged the Common-wealth leaders to take “every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals” with those who practice apartheid. The paper acknowledged that each government retained the right to implement the agreement in accordance with their country’s laws. On the Sunday evening, the draft had been circulated to all the Heads of Government. On Monday, 13th June, the Gleneagles Agreement was unanimously ratified in formal session.

Today, we live in a society where every major decision is politically transactional by nature, with secondary decisions – such as who controls which social organisation or sporting body – rapidly pursuing a similar direction. The populace who have remained – others, reading the writing on the wall, opted to exit the scene – having been unable to compromise their myopic values and put aside petty differences (over what are really frivolous minutiae) and arrive at a consensus for nation building, have now found themselves in a hopeless plight. The powers that be will continue to manipulate, or, rather toy, with this society as long as we cannot arrive at a consensus. The time has arrived for us to take a page out of the Gleneagles Agreement.