A great deal continues to be written and said about the Guyana Police Force [GPF], much of which is critical of the extent to which the Force executes its duties to the general satisfaction of the citizenry, insofar as its ‘Service and Protection’ obligations are concerned. Indeed, the reportage by the media on the performance of the Force, all too frequently, drops broad hints associated with a wider insinuation that the overall quality of policing appears to serve, to a considerable extent, and in some senses, more of a hindrance than a help in pursuit of the realization of an upgraded law enforcement regime.
Here it has to be said that while the Force’s frequently unflattering Report Card must be deeply frustrating to those officers and ranks who execute their responsibilities with diligence and fervour, the overall responsibility in the context of its ‘Service and Protection’ is far too critical to the well-being of the country as a whole to neglect to express concerns as and when they arise. The bottom line here is that the objectives of ‘Service and Protection’, which are the Force’s core responsibilities, continue to not be realized to a level that optimizes public confidence in the Force. That is what the Force should be aiming for.
The problems afflicting the GPF are manifold, complex and cannot all be ‘fixed’ in one fell swoop. What is required, in the first instance, is a combination of committed leadership, ranks altogether dedicated to the optimum realization of the ‘Service and Protection’ motto and a Force possessed of all the tools, not least a generous measure of public support, and the unwavering commitment by the wider governance process to providing the Force with the backing without which its ‘Service and Protection’ motto will be nothing more than a pipe dream.
There are those who would argue, with considerable justification, that insofar as the realization of an enhanced level of law enforcement is concerned, the ‘dots’ remain considerably disconnected. Beyond that, a considerable body of public opinion appears to be of the view that the fault is a historical, institutional one that has to do with standards-setting and the failure to zealously protect the rules that govern policing from the kinds of compromises and concessions that are at the root of the challenges confronting the Force. However much we may ‘twist and turn’ on the issue, evidence of a political role in the running of the Force is hard to refute.
Some of the more blatant instances of ‘looseness’ in our law enforcement (which have been publicly pronounced upon from time to time) continue to be manifested in what, these days, are a studied indifference to glaring and serious occurrences of law and order transgression. Here it also has to be said that we may well have become victims of the ‘capture’ of law enforcement by individuals and ‘institutions’ that are no part of the formal policing framework, but seek, if they can, to make generous use of the facility of law enforcement for their own ends. Here, we can extract no comfort from the propensity of the Force to inflict unflattering glitches on itself today and expect that, come tomorrow, it can simply decorate itself in its ‘Service and Protection’ motto and ‘move on.’
There can be no question (for example) that the quality of the Force’s administration of the challenges associated with traffic management (which has now become one of the more demanding policing challenges in our changing society) has brought the Force, as a whole, into disrepute. Here, the fact of the matter is that the woeful compromising of aspects of law enforcement (traffic management comes readily to mind) has left the Force covered with an array of ‘boils and sores’ resulting from a deep and now seemingly firmly embedded descent into an array of corrupt practices.
To return to traffic management for a moment, we can hardly deny that, over time, the Force (or elements therein) have effected a radical departure from the rules that ought to be applied and that departure persists on account of the convivial platform that it provides for infecting the entire traffic management regime with a formidable layer of corruption-driven practices that are extortionist in nature. What has become the considerable departure from the laid down orthodoxies of traffic administration is one of the more glaring examples of radical divergence from the orthodoxies of policing in Guyana. Here – as in some other aspects of policing – the nature of law enforcement, and the latitude allowed enforcers in its execution, affords ‘discretionary powers’ that functionaries can exercise to their personal gain. The best-known and most popular of these is the waiving of sanctions that ought correctly to be applied in instances of traffic transgressions, in exchanges for what one might call ‘considerations’ in favour of the officiating traffic ranks.
‘Twists and bends’ (prejudices) in law enforcement are widely believed to rank high on the list of inherent flaws that are embedded in the wider governance practices in our society, some of these practices seemingly placing the beneficiaries beyond the law itself. In those circumstances, policing must fashion itself to take account of those ‘compromises’ which can only be accommodated at the expense of law enforcement. Increasingly, in matters of law enforcement, we have come to accept – or at least believe – that here in Guyana, sanctions exist as a facility to be applied in what one might call a ‘discretionary manner’ that places the exempted above/beyond the law, a circumstance that places limits on law enforcement thus compromising its effectiveness. This, to a considerable extent, is what drives aspects of traffic management in Guyana.
At the lower end of the ‘food chain,’ the flaws in law enforcement are widely believed to be run by a regime that denies policemen overseeing traffic administration the prerogative of actual enforcement. Here, the understanding is that, in instances of some types of traffic transgressions, sanctions (or otherwise) are preceded by expeditious cellphone calls involving vehicle users, traffic ranks and in-station officers, arising out of which the matter is resolved. Nor does the disturbing anomaly ends there.
We have ‘graduated’ to a point where individuals confronted with road use and other types of sanctions openly parade their credentials and contacts, including with named officers. Here, the postures of the transgressors sometimes extend into thinly veiled threats to have the traffic ranks seeking to apply ‘the full force of the law’ (or perhaps merely to extend a discretionary warning) sanctioned by their seniors. When, as so often appears to be the case, responsibility of the assignment of diligently enforcing the law – be it in the area of traffic or any other sphere of law enforcement – becomes ‘polluted’ by informalities, effective law enforcement or traffic management, as well as other less important aspects of policing, becomes increasingly imperilled by absurd compromises.
