Chief Justice (ag), Roxane George SC, yesterday dismissed the legal proceedings filed by Catherine Hughes on 12th December 2023, seeking a number of declarations regarding the establishment of the Human Rights Commission, according to Attorney General Anil Nandlall SC.
Hughes, Nandlall said, was seeking a declaration that the State’s alleged failure to operationalise the Human Rights Commission breached her rights under Article 154A of the Constitution, and a declaration that a certain statement made by Vice President Bharrat Jagdeo was in breach of her entitlement to equality before the law (Article 149D) and 149F of the Constitution (equality for women).
In her submissions to the Court, Nandlall said that Hughes argued, among other things, that the said statement made by Jagdeo at a press conference held on the 23rd November 2023, at which he referred to Hughes as a “low-life”, amounted to discrimination against her as a female African member of the National Assembly.
Nandlall said Hughes also argued that the non-establishment of the Human Rights Commission violated her constitutional rights under Article 154A of the Constitution and breached her legitimate expectation that the Commission would be established.
Nandlall said that the Chief Justice in dismissing the case brought by Hughes, held that she had not sufficiently established a case of discrimination under the provisions of the Constitution, or at all, and that her claim of discrimination on the basis of sex and race, in this context, cannot succeed.
According to Nandlall, the Court further said that the utterance by the Vice President, without more, could neither amount to a breach of any of Hughes’ fundamental rights, nor could the non-establishment of the Human Rights Commission, by that fact itself, amount to a breach of the Constitution. Additionally, he said that the Court found no evidence that the Vice President’s statement was an official statement of the Government, as Hughes alleged.
Nandlall said that the Court further stated that Hughes provided no evidence explaining why she failed to approach the Women and Gender Equality Commission, which is a functioning constitutional body whose mandate includes initiating investigations into alleged violations of women’s rights and monitoring compliance with international instruments.
The Court therefore held that Mrs. Hughes’ claim was wholly misconceived and without merit. The Court indicated that a full written judgment would later be made available.
The Attorney General and the Leader of the Opposition were named Respondents in the proceedings by Hughes. The Chief Justice dismissed the part of the claim against the Leader of the Opposition and commented that it is “more than passing strange” that the Applicant would sue her Parliamentary opposition colleague, the Leader of the Opposition.
The State was represented by Nandlall, Shoshanna V. Lall – Deputy Solicitor General, Saabira Ali-Hydarali, Laurel Dundas and Pierre Squires while Hughes was represented by Nigel Hughes and Kiswana Jefford.
Nandlall said that he argued in court that Hughes failed to make out a case for discrimination under Articles 149, 149D and 149F of the Constitution, and that in any event, Article 154A of the Constitution which provides access to certain international treaties enshrined in the Constitution, could not be invoked. In support of this submission, Nandlall said that he relied on Article 154A(2) of the Constitution which states that: “154A(2). The rights referred to in paragraph (1) do not include any fundamental right under the Constitution”
The Attorney General argued that once a right is protected under the fundamental rights regime (such as the rights Hughes claims in discrimination under Articles 149, 149D and 149F), she is not entitled to seek additional relief in Article 154A of the Constitution in relation to the same rights.
The Attorney General further argued that there was absolutely no evidence of discrimination in the Vice President’s utterance, as he was speaking only of Hughes, and that where discrimination is alleged, on the prescribed ground of race or gender, an inference of discrimination cannot be drawn, unless there is a true comparator, that is, where the circumstances are equal and the only difference is that of race or gender. In this case, he said that not only was there no comparator” – there was no “true comparator”.