By Jorge G. Castañeda
MEXICO CITY – On January 23, 1958, a group of Venezuelan military officers overthrew the brutal dictator Marcos Pérez Jimenez, who had ruled for six years – longer than he deserved – thanks to an oil bonanza. Soon, elections were held, ushering in a 40-year period of representative democracy, underpinned by a vibrant civil society, high oil prices (for the most part), and concomitant increases in spending and corruption, with the latter being largely tolerated. It was only in the mid-1990s that lower oil prices and economic stagnation brought an end to the Punto Fijo Pact, named after the city where Venezuela’s major political parties negotiated a power-sharing arrangement and agreed to respect election results.
Given this precedent, many observers have wondered why the Venezuelan armed forces have not attempted to oust President Nicolás Maduro, who assumed power after the death of Hugo Chávez in 2013. After all, Maduro has a lot going against him. He has presided over an economic collapse, with GDP shrinking by roughly three-quarters between 2014 and 2021. Oil production has plummeted, basic goods are scarce, and nearly eight million Venezuelans – more than one-quarter of the country’s population – have fled. His 2013 election was marred by fraud allegations, and his government has been plagued by massive corruption scandals. Moreover, having never served in the military, Maduro lacks the institutional loyalty that Chávez enjoyed.
But even if Maduro managed to retain the military’s loyalty during the first decade of his rule, one can reasonably ask why the fraudulent July 28 presidential election has not triggered a repeat of the 1958 coup. International election observers and foreign governments, including the United States, the European Union, and a dozen countries in Latin America, have concluded that Maduro brazenly stole the election from opposition candidate Edmundo González, who fled to Spain after Maduro claimed victory. González has buttressed his claim that he won by a three-to-one margin with tally sheets from more than 80% of polling sites. Maduro, for his part, has been unable to produce a single document proving his purported win, despite pressure from several leftist governments in the region to do so.
Regime change of this sort is not unheard-of in Latin America. Facing similar accusations of election rigging in 2019, Evo Morales, the more popular and successful Bolivian leftist president, was ousted by his country’s army, who “suggested” that he resign. In fact, beyond the obvious explanations for Maduro’s survival – from cajoling the military to thwarting attempts by the opposition and the US to unseat him – there is one crucial but often overlooked reason why he remains in power: the Cuban contingent.
Ever since the Venezuelan military tried and failed to overthrow Chávez in 2002, Cuba has posted thousands of doctors, nurses, sports instructors, security advisers, and intelligence agents in the country, in exchange for Venezuelan oil at subsidized prices. Current estimates put the number of Cubans at around 15,000, but it has been as high as 30,000 in the past. These workers are tasked with coup-proofing Maduro, as they did for Chávez, largely by monitoring the Venezuelan army from top to bottom.
Cuban security forces are well-suited to the task. In the 1960s, they foiled numerous attempts by the US to assassinate Fidel Castro. Later, in the 1980s and 1990s, Cuba’s security apparatus unveiled a series of conspiracies – some real, others imaginary – against the communist regime. But most important is the absolute loyalty of the Cuban contingent in Venezuela – not to Maduro, but rather to the Cuban government. This underscores how unusual the situation is. One could hardly imagine the Secret Service, the FBI, or the CIA operating in a foreign country in the service of an authoritarian leader, but answering only to America.
While many Venezuelans are uncomfortable with this situation, it is invaluable for Maduro. Unlike their Venezuelan counterparts, Cuban intelligence and security personnel do not have to listen to their families complain about the lack of food, medicine, or clothing. Because they do not get sucked into Venezuelans’ anger and frustration with the regime, this arrangement has withstood an extraordinary degree of political turbulence, even as the economy collapses and people vote with their feet.
So long as the Cuban contingent is in Venezuela, it is safe to assume that the local military will not revolt against Maduro – unless, of course, the orders came from the Cuban government. That seems unlikely: Cuba’s ruthless former interior minister, Ramiro Valdés, may no longer oversee operations in Venezuela, but the government has not deviated from the principles that guided him.
The countries seeking a way out of the current Venezuelan impasse, including the US, Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil, would do well to enlist Cuban cooperation for a peaceful and democratic solution to the governance crisis. With a significant Cuban presence in the country, no one should count on the military turning against Maduro.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2024.