Dr Bertrand Ramcharan is not one to shy away from controversy. In his column carried by this newspaper last week he proposed that Guyana should have a Ministry of Defence, an idea, perhaps, which might not elicit the unanimous chorus of approval from the political community he might hope for. He took as his starting point an article in Foreign Affairs titled ‘The Return of Total War’ by Mara Karlin, a former US Assistant Secretary of Defense.
She was quoted as saying that “countries need to rethink how fighting happens today and how they should prepare for war going forward,” further observing that “traditional approaches to deterrence have regained relevance.” On the basis of this Dr Ramcharan asked whether Guyana had the capacity for deterrence or whether it was “a sitting duck?”
He went on to argue that the risk of aggression by Venezuela against Guyana should not be minimised. His feeling was that owing to the fact Guyana’s hydrocarbon resources were of “strategic importance” to the US, the authorities here were relying on that nation for defence. For a variety of reasons derived from Karlin, which he spelt out, he seemed to have justifiable reservations about the US being willing to entertain the defence of Guyana in the event of a Venezuelan attack.
Dr Ramcharan looked too at “regional coalition building,” but noted the varying “nuances” in Caricom since some nations were “sympathetic” to Venezuela. As for Brazil, it was by no means clear, he said, whether in a miliary sense Brazil would be ready to come to this country’s aid.
His main argument in relation to the need for a Ministry of Defence concerned deterrence capabilities. Citing Karlin, he wrote, “artificial intelligence has enabled the proliferation and utility of uncrewed systems both in the air and under water. Drones have transformed battlefields, and the need for counter-drome capacity has skyrocketed. And, in Ukraine, ‘robot dogs’ are patrolling the ground and autonomous drones have been launching missiles from the sky.”
Should Guyana not have AI capacity which could give it military assets to counter aggression from Venezuela? Dr Ramcharan asked. He went on to suggest there should be a Ministry of Defence incorporating the National Defence Institute preparing policy papers for consideration by Parliament or a Select Committee of Parliament. “Should such issues be left to the attention of an already burdened Presidency?” he asked.
There are two different concerns to be disentwined here. The first is a policy question of what our defence in a military sense should be, and the second is the bureaucratic framework within which such a policy decision should be taken. It does not follow that because we should include AI in our military capabilities we need a Ministry of Defence to handle this. Conversely there might be a case for a Ministry of Defence even without a decision to upgrade the GDF so it becomes conversant in a practical sense with the revolution in modern warfare.
That aside, no doubt unintentionally, Dr Ramcharan has nevertheless drawn attention in an indirect way to bureaucratic untidiness in relation to who has responsibility for what, where Venezuela and our border issues are concerned. In the early days of independence the situation was much simpler, but then so was the world in which we operated. Apart from the GDF which has dutifully now for decades been reciting that diplomacy was our first line of defence, there was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the AG’s office. The early AGs in particular (both pre and post-independence) had extensive knowledge in the field, beginning with Fenton Ramsahoye and after him Shridath Ramphal, who was also Foreign Minister, as well as Mohamed Shahabuddeen, who together with Donald Jackson had sat on the Mixed Commission.
After 1992 the Venezuela issue went through periods of dormancy, but we are in
greater danger now than we have ever been, for reasons which will not be argued out here. Of the traditional agencies which dealt with border matters, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been gutted over the decades, and can no longer bring to bear the understanding and diplomatic skills it once did, while the AG’s office lacks the background in the field characteristic of the early days.
One can only speculate that the contribution these two institutions make to border/defence policy may be minimal, although one must presume that the extent of the influence of the GDF, perhaps through the Defence Board, is much greater. There is at UG, of course, the Institute of Human Resiliency, Strategic Security and the Future, although since that technically lies outside the structure of government it presumably does not have a direct input into policy.
However, what we have now in addition to the above-mentioned government agencies is first of all the murky National Intelligence and Security Agency, which whatever its real purpose has a section which allows it to exercise functions in relation to the defence and foreign policies of the state, and secondly, the National Defence Institute. The latter is a most valuable institution which despite its very short life has already demonstrated its worth after its Assistant Director, Dr Seon Levius, gave an exposé on Venezuela’s “orchestrated cyber operations targeting Guyana.”
Whatever its legal functions, the President should instruct NISA to leave all defence and related foreign policy matters to the Defence Institute. Apart from the fact that duplication always causes problems, it is unlikely the former institution has the expertise at its disposal which will be available to the NDI. If we have a Defence Institute, therefore, do we really need a Ministry of Defence as Dr Ramcharan suggested? His proposal was that the Institute should fall under the new Ministry.
It may be that since the Institute has a very broad mandate covering far more than border defence matters as well as encompassing the region, that a more specific body is required in this regard. What Dr Ramcharan envisaged was a Ministry of Defence with a competent minister reporting to Parliament and/or a Select Committee. In the first place ministerial appointments are political in nature, and given the paucity of talent among our politicians, it is an open question as to whether competence would determine the appointment.
In the second place, Parliament simply doesn’t function as it should, and it is unusual for there to be meaningful debate on anything. And in the third place, Select Committees are constitutional creations, and there is no appropriate committee at the moment. The nearest would be the Foreign Affairs Select Committee chaired by Minister Hugh Todd, which rarely meets. The government has had the opportunity to bring border policy matters to the House all along, but generally speaking has chosen not to do so. Why would the introduction of a Defence Ministry cause it to change its customary approach?
It may be, however, there is an argument for a co-ordinating body on border defence matters alone, such as, for instance, a Department of Defence within the Office of the President. It would not have to be headed by a politician, and apart from co-ordinating with the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the NDI, the GDF/Defence Board, UG, etc, and collecting information from elsewhere, it could work with these agencies to look at strategies.