President-elect Donald Trump’s return to the White House 2025 is once again shaking the international community to its core. As with any new U.S. presidential administration, leaders are anticipating a new era of Trump policies that will redefine global trade relations and policies. While the world scrambles, Guyana has a unique opportunity to strengthen its relationship with the United States. Beyond Trump, the United States will also welcome its 119th Congress in January 2025 and the scene in Washington DC–across lobbyists, think tanks, and investment firms–is aligning with a new reality. Before Donald Trump’s inauguration, Guyana has an opportunity to capitalize on the strong relationship it has built over the past few years with the United States by crafting a new two-year strategy that can bring continued benefits to Guyana’s people and interests.
But why two-years despite a four-year presidential term? While Trump is in office for the next four years, the U.S. Congress shuffles every two years, with midterm elections expected in 2026. This means that the current make-up of the U.S. government has a short lifecycle, and Guyana should proactively engage with the United States–arguably our most important bilateral partner.
Over the past few years, U.S.-Guyana relations has ticked upward. U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s visit last year amid a stream of U.S. officials indicates strong U.S. interest in Guyana. The country has also built one of the strongest military alliances with U.S. Southern Command in the Western Hemisphere, with regular visits and capacity building exercises taking place.
But while this occurred during President Joe Biden’s administration, Guyana houses qualities that will be attractive to Trump. Guyana is increasingly eating a larger share of global oil markets at a time when OPEC+ members continue to delay lifting production cuts. Keeping gas prices in the United States low is critical for Trump, and more barrels trading on the market with a promise of increased supply will help with that. Guyana also welcomes U.S. investments at a record rate relative to the rest of the Caribbean. Countries where U.S. businesses are prospering will win favour with the Trump administration. Finally, the government’s pro-private sector approach and the growing depth of its financial sector positions Guyana as a stable bilateral partner in an increasingly unstable hemisphere.
So, what does a two-year strategy look like?
First, Guyana should create a new position dedicated to holistic engagement with the United States–a special envoy for U.S. or North America Affairs. Guyana has an ambassador and an embassy in Washington D.C. that manages the U.S. relationship, but it is a diplomatic posting that can be constrained by protocol and other important responsibilities, such as representation at the Organization of American States and maintaining engagement with the local diaspora. A special envoy can operate more freely, working closely with the ambassador and the embassy to strengthen engagement with the 535 members of Congress, think tanks and universities, U.S. firms, and U.S. media outlets. These components are the real DNA of Washington D.C. and using them effectively can move policy and streamline investments for Guyana without having to wait in bureaucratic lines alongside more than 190 other countries.
Second, right out the gate, Guyana has an opportunity to set the tone on Venezuela. Guyana is expected to have an erratic neighbour to its west, especially as traditional foreign policy hawks and nominees for National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio are likely to resume some form of maximum pressure on Venezuela. Framing Venezuela’s potential future aggression on our border as a destabilizing force in the hemisphere can be a first point of discussion. Doing so can help put in place further diplomatic and security safeguards–building off ones creating during Biden’s presidency–that protects Guyana’s national security but also de-risks investments from international firms worried about the aggressive rhetoric from Venezuela.
Third, engaging with Congress will be vital. White House attention is likely to be sparse given an ambitious U.S. domestic agenda, a potential trade war with China, and regional conflicts in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, which means policymaking toward Guyana might be redirected to the halls of the Capitol Building. As noted, there are more than 500 members of Congress with numerous caucuses and committees–like natural resources, the Caribbean, financial services, foreign affairs, and ways and means, among others–relevant to Guyana.
Here, Guyana has the benefit of appealing to both Democrats and Republicans. Guyana’s hydrocarbon resources, its investment potential, its border with Venezuela, and its emergence as a regional leader appeals to the latter. For Democrats, Guyana’s demonstration as a leader on environment and biodiversity and landmark carbon credit deals will be attractive to the most progressive Democrats. Consistent relationship building and messaging to these members can yield short but also long-term benefits for us via more Congressional Delegations, financing via legislation for energy and infrastructure projects, and pressure on the White House to prioritize Guyana.
Finally, framing will be important. Guyana can be the gateway to both the Caribbean and South America. The broader Caribbean might fall down the priority list relative to the Biden administration, but Guyana–alongside Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago–houses hydrocarbon resources and U.S. investments that can be framed as an easy entry point into the region. At this point, it’s likely that the incoming Trump administration has not defined its Western Hemisphere policy outside of Canada and Mexico. Guyana, if framed well, can help influence that policy. Further, compared to the last time Trump was in office, South American governments have moved to the left. Colombia and Brazil’s governments will create an uneasiness for Trump’s western hemisphere team, meaning that Guyana and others, like Argentina, can be the anchor for U.S. policy to the wider region.
The lifecycle of U.S. politics is short. Countries, like Guyana, that do not automatically draw attention have to be proactive with bigger players, like the United States, to reap the rewards of the bilateral relationship. Guyana has the right attributes and attitudes strengthen its partnership with the United States, but planning has to begin today.
*Wazim Mowla is the Fellow and Lead of the Atlantic Council’s Caribbean Initiative based in Washington DC. Mowla is also Vice President of the Guyana-based ACE Consulting Group.