If one was asked to name some of the more significant challenges to which Guyana will be compelled to give focused attention in the year immediately ahead, Venezuela’s longstanding and, of late, increasingly high-profile territorial claim to Guyana’s Essequibo region is certain to either head that list, or, find itself close to the top.
The portents are unmistakable. The most recent worrying dimension to Venezuela’s claim is reflected in the ‘commissioning,’ recently of a fixed bridge, over the Cuyuní River, the most definitive indicator up to this time that the Maduro administration’s policy is inexorably shifting in the direction of playing ‘hardball’ in pursuit of Venezuela’s enforcement of its claim.
Bellicose threats and sporadic physical incursions are one thing, the installation of permanent infrastructure – including a military base – that provides ready access to Guyana’s territory is (a hostile act?) an unmistakable signal of what may well be described as ‘bad intentions.’
The truth is – and it should no longer be concealed from the nation – the actions of the Maduro administration have now caused relations between Georgetown and Caracas to descend to the ‘temperature’ of a virtual ‘Arctic Winter.’ It is the government’s responsibility to have the populace, as a whole, be continually updated on the nature and scale of the challenge that we face as a nation. Up to this time that message is still to get to the populace.
That said, even local (official) reportage on unfolding events associated with Venezuela’s territorial claim (particularly the very recent developments) are, to say the least, sluggish. Nor has there been any recent clear indication in Georgetown, beyond the customary diplomatic ‘noises’ that the transgression of Guyana’s territorial integrity may now have taken Venezuela’s action to yet another level. Truth be told, Venezuela’s new bridge across the Cuyuni river – given all of its possible implications – certainly appears to be a decidedly assertive (to say the least) act.
Given what now appears to be a significant ‘upping of its game’ by Venezuela, Guyana, at this time, is limited largely to little more than a sustained robust international disclosure in circumstances where, by now, the nation ought to have received a full unvarnished briefing by a team that ought to include the President, the Foreign Minister and a few of our Foreign Policy specialists familiar with Guyana/ Venezuela relations. We should have been told long what we now know to be the (seeming) relatively close proximity between military detachments from the Guyana Defence Force and the Venezuelan military.
The relatively recent ‘turning up’ of the heat on Venezuela’s territorial claim has set Guyana’s foreign policy on a decidedly hectic assignment, (or so it seems) though the strategic significance of the country’s new-found oil wealth may win the country a measure of international attention that might spare us the worst in terms of whatever Venezuela may have in mind. The point should be made at this juncture that while the position of the Caribbean Community (on the Venezuela territorial claim) underscores a “commitment” to the territorial integrity of Guyana, and while there is no reason to suggest that this position has changed, the reality is that we almost certainly have arrived at a point where the summoning of a meeting of CARICOM Heads to address what now resembles a worrisome escalation of Venezuela’s territorial claim may have now become necessary.
Here the point should be made that while (on paper, at least) CARICOM member countries have long espoused ‘unstinting’ support for the integrity of Guyana’s “territory and maritime space”, some member countries of CARICOM including Barba-dos, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia and Grenada, among others have, over time, strengthened their respective bilateral relations with Venezuela, notably on the business and economic fronts.
This raises the issue as to whether what has long been believed to be CARICOM’s unwavering support for Guyana’s territorial integrity, up to this time, may (or may not) have become somewhat diluted on account of those business and economic ties. This raises another question as to whether, in 2025, the collective CARICOM ‘head of steam’ that had been generated some years ago around Vene-zuela’s territorial claim against Guyana may not now have lost its collective militancy diluted on account of Caracas’ fashioning business and other types of valued relationships with CARICOM countries that include the aforementioned CARICOM member countries. While this is not to say that Guyana can no longer depend on the diplomatic support of the rest of the region, in the matter of Venezuela’s territorial claim, there can be little doubt that (in cricketing parlance) the ‘wicket’ may well be ‘playin’ different these days.