In an elections year

The term ‘state capture’ alludes to a particular ‘brand’ of political corruption that allows ‘other interests’ to supersede the conventional governance mechanisms associated with shaping and implementing initiatives/undertakings that significantly impact the welfare of the country. The practice frequently manifests itself in systemic political corruption that allows for an assortment of outside/private interests to significantly influence the state’s decision-making processes to the advantage of the interlopers. This practice, not infrequently, becomes so ingrained that making a clear determination as to ‘who rules,’ not infrequently, poses enormous challenges. 

Here, in Guyana, support for and ‘loyalty’ to the political party holding office allow for access to various kinds of perks and privileges that are usually not accessible to those who fall outside the political loop. The propensity has been evident across the political spectrum. It stands to reason that the more valuable the ‘perks’ located in the gift of the holders of political office the greater the extent of the power/control that it wields. Guyana’s new-found petro-riches provide the holders of political office with a significant addition to the perks which the incumbent political office holders now has to offer. These recently acquired ‘offerings’ have the capacity to shape/reshape the political behaviour of the populace as a whole.

Here, the significance of the likely year-end general elections is that it finds the political party currently serving as the keeper of the keys in a strategic position to ‘shape’ election-time political behaviour, arguably to an extent that had not been the case previously.  It raises again the age-old question of the spending that an incumbent should be permitted in an election year.

The range of possible political ‘gifts’ that are available this time around equips the incumbent custodians of the state to make ‘offerings’ that would have been altogether unaffordable prior to the emergence of the country’s oil-driven economy. Here, one can think of a bewildering array of election-time handouts that are now entirely ‘affordable.’ These may range from ‘cushy’ jobs/contracts to other kinds of ‘offerings’ – including entrepreneurial openings, which, for the beneficiaries, may well amount to significant long term game-changers. The ‘bottom line’ political reality this time around is that occupancy of political office and the control of the state machinery which the incumbents enjoy places at its disposal a generous measure of what one might call vote-garnering ‘sweeteners.’ That these ‘sweeteners’ might impact – to one extent or another – on ballot box choices is already the subject of public chatter with the poll still quite a few months away.

A November poll is likely to witness changes in the political modus operandi of the government in office, not least, an enhanced aggressiveness in the promotion and, financing in areas that cut across conventional political constituencies. In the instance of the private sector – which is not without its own share of voter persuasion tools – the anticipated size of the public purse, by year end, is expected to allow for various forms of  influence-peddling that allow, among other things, the prerogative of assigning lucrative contracts to those deemed to have ‘earned’ such consideration.

It would be altogether unsurprising if, as 2025 progresses, sectors like low and middle-income housing, and accelerated support for small and medium-sized business assume significantly higher profiles linked to enhancing ballot box behaviour. The bottom line is that election-time political behaviour by office-holders/seekers is shaped, singularly, by vote-garnering considerations, so that such campaigning as precedes the polls assumes a saturation effect that embraces ‘offerings’ that extend beyond what are perceived as ingrained political constituencies.

It is not only the domestic dimension to the 2025 poll that is deserving of media attention. What is also likely to manifest itself in 2025 is a much higher level of external attention to the procedures and processes that comprise the overall electoral poll by audiences that now extend beyond traditional elections ‘watchers.’ Audiences, this time around, will extend into ‘other sectors’ that include a broader swathe of constituencies that now have ‘oil-rich Guyana’ directly in their ‘sights.’ To assert that the 2025 poll could well mark a signal juncture in the history of independent Guyana is by no means to indulge in exaggeration.