Guyanese will throng the streets today to celebrate Mashramani. They will be doing so in the context of a world in disorder and on a day marking the third year since the invasion of Ukraine. It is not even as if our own small portion of the globe is insulated from the degeneration of the international system. Last Monday was the 59th anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Agreement, under the terms of which Guyana has gone to the World Court to establish the validity of the 1899 Award fixing the boundary with Venezuela.
In and of itself this is hardly a dramatic occasion, and as is customary nowadays the nation was treated to the usual misinformed declamations from President Nicolás Maduro and Vice President Delcy Rodríguez about what the agreement contains. These misrepresentations are echoed even in the Venezuelan opposition press, leaving one to wonder if anyone in the next-door territory actually bothers to read documents any longer.
However, this year February 17th took on a sinister aspect after a GDF boat taking supplies from Eteringbang on the Cuyuni to the Makapa Observation Post was ambushed by two sindicato vessels. They suddenly shot at the soldiers injuring six of them, although the patrol returned fire resulting in three assailants being wounded. A source in the area told this newspaper that since Matapa did not have the equipment to treat the men, the Kurutuku Toshao had gone up the Kanaima Falls to collect them and take them to the health centre in his village. They were subsequently flown to Georgetown from there.
As for the attackers, local citizens reported that the three injured were intercepted by the Venezuelan army [National Guard?] and taken to the San Martín area.
The question is, was this a state action on the part of Venezuela? The first thing to be noted is that Caracas was not even prepared to acknowledge that any of its nationals had shot members of the GDF. This was a “vile fabrication promoted by the government of Guyana … This is a false flag operation and fake news …” expostulated its Foreign Ministry.
As if that were not enough the Venezuelan Public Prosecutor’s Office announced it had initiated a criminal investigation into the events of February 18th [sic] after a group was injured as a result of “the action of the security forces of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana” in the state of ‘Guyana Esequiba’. This state, it went on, formed an integral part of Venezuela and the Office had jurisdiction to hear punishable acts committed there.
Has the Government of Guyana taken note? Will this form a spurious justification for later aggressive acts if demands are not met in relation to the soldiers?
The second thing to be noted is that this represents another stage in the incremental assault on Guyana’s sovereignty, the full catalogue of which aggression hardly needs restating here. However, there are two more recent events which might be borne in mind. The first is the ‘election’ for the fictional governor of ‘Guayana Esequiba’ slated to be held on May 25th, and the second is the two boatloads of Venezuelans who arrived at Supenaam and Parika and were repatriated by our authorities. Exactly how Caracas intends to hold a pretence ‘election’ in Essequibo is a total mystery, but could one perhaps speculate that the boatloads of Venezuelans were sent to contact migrants here in connection with that exercise?
Whether or not that is the case, the question is that after the fictitious poll has taken place and Miraflores claims that Essequibans want to be Venezuelan, then what happens? The problem is that Venezuela cannot reverse what it has done barring a change of government there, so at some point given its own sequence it will be compelled to make the final move across the Cuyuni, and possibly down the coast as well so it can assert a maritime claim. Are we therefore nearing the last act?
In relation to that question the third thing is that President Maduro is operating in an entirely different international climate from the one before February 20th. President Trump isn’t concerned about principle or democracy, merely about money for the US. He has brought Russia, a major supporter of Venezuela in from the cold, and Miraflores will have noted his attitude to the Ukraine war. The conclusion must be that Venezuela can surely do what Russia has done without consequences.
In addition, Mr Maduro has been courting the Washington administration via his meeting with Mr Grenell, and has accepted nearly 200 Venezuelans who had been sent to Guantanamo in addition to releasing six US prisoners. In exchange, the Miami Herald reported earlier this month that Chevron had been granted a six-month extension to its licence.
The paper said that one of the organizers of Mr Grenell’s meeting was a Florida tycoon, who was a major Republican donor and who had oil and asphalt businesses in the country. He joined a group of US oil businessmen who had been trying to convince Mr Trump about the benefits of an agreement with Mr Maduro.
That is oil. But the fourth point to be made is that President Maduro said recently that Venezuela is emerging as a mining power, while Vice President Rodríguez declared that the mining sector had grown by 21% in 2024. The Cuyuni, it should be noted, is the entry point to Guyana’s Mazaruni mining sector, which is the real temptation in circumstances where Caracas knows it cannot challenge ExxonMobil, although it can still hang on to its maritime claim.
The final thing to be said is that there is a connection between the sindicatos and the state. Without citing details the Center for Strategic and International Studies has reported that Mr Maduro’s regime benefits both directly and indirectly from illicit mining and the semi-official mining sector. In addition, at almost every stage of the mining process the security forces take their cut as well as controlling the supply of fuel. The army and the National Guard have set up numerous checkpoints where they extract bribes, and in our area as we know, so have the sindicatos. Some profit from the illicit gold export trade goes directly to the government “giving it the money needed to circumvent international financial pressure.”
It is not beyond belief, therefore, that the sindicatos were sponsored last Monday.
At precisely what point Venezuela will take the final step cannot be predicted, but what can be said is that we are not in a safe zone currently. We have been cavalier about control of the Cuyuni for decades, and we cannot keep turning our backs to every increasingly challenging incident, believing that intermittent statements from Takuba Lodge are all that is required in response.
The government must turn around and face the dragon. Our protection of the Cuyuni needs a whole new rethink, and we must be prepared to take the measures necessary to resume greater control of what is, after all, our own river.
If we don’t, the dragon will see it as weakness and will move first.
