You face a deplorable injustice: A crisis you have done next to nothing to create is wrecking economies, ruining lives, and threatening your very existence. Together, you have fought tooth and nail for the global commitment to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees. This year, countries must deliver new national climate action plans, ahead of COP 30, that align with that goal, with the G20 – the big polluters – leading the way. This is a chance for the world to get a grip on emissions. And it is also a chance for the Caribbean to seize the benefits of clean power… To tap your vast renewables potential… And to turn your back on costly fossil fuel imports.
UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres
In last week’s article, we discussed the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) compiled by Transparency International. We stated that countries that share a deep concern for good governance, transparency and accountability view the index as an important measure in their fight against corruption. An improvement in a country’s CPI score as well as its ranking is considered an indicator of a reduction in the level of corruption. The first step must therefore be the acknowledgement of the existence of corruption and the extent to which it is perceived to exist. The failure to do so will only serve to embolden those who are bent on indulging in corrupt behaviour that enriches the few at the expense of the vast majority of the citizens.
We pointed out that corruption tends to flourish where any of the following exists. This list is of course not exhaustive.
(a) Weak institutional and governance frameworks.
(b) Vague, archaic and cumbersome rules.
(c) High bureaucratic discretion.
(d) Lack of transparency, especially as regards the award of contracts as well as entering into agreements with other parties.
(e) Lack of timely and proper accountability for the use of public resources.
(f) Political interference in the decision-making of key agencies.
(g) Restricted flow of information on government programmes and activities.
(h) Nepotism and favouritism.
(i) Appointments to key positions based on considerations other than those relating to professional and technical competence.
(j) Weak political accountability.
We noted that for the English-speaking Caribbean, Barbados and the Bahamas continue to top the list with scores of 68 and 65, respectively, with Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago jostling once again for the bottom place, scoring 39 and 40, respectively. Guyana has been at the bottom of the table for the last four consecutive years.
In today’s article, we discuss ways in which Guyana can improve its score and standing on the CPI.
Implement a system of shared governance
Since the mid-1950s, Guyana’s two major ethnic groups have been vying for political power. This, coupled with the fact that the two major political parties derive their support overwhelmingly from these two groups, has resulted in citizens electing governments every five years almost exclusively on the basis of ethnic considerations rather than based on a careful analysis and pertinent arguments in support of issues affecting their daily lives, the communities in which they live and the country as a whole. Added to this is the practice of selecting Cabinet members from within the political party which has won the elections. In such a situation, the other major political party feels left out in the administration of the affairs of the State, while some of its members and supporters also feel marginalized. Is it any wonder that every five years there have been tensions in the Guyanese society in the run-up to national and regional elections, the most recent being the 2020 elections?
The solution to the problem is some form of shared governance so that citizens from both sides of the ethnic divide feel confident that there are able to be involved in national decision-making. Such an arrangement is likely to bring about the much-needed stability in the country so vitally necessary for the country to progress in a much more meaningful way. For example, the political party that obtains the second highest number of votes in the elections should be allowed to select the Prime Minister, with ministerial portfolios shared among the political parties based on their standing in the polls.
Appoint substantively the Chancellor and the Chief Justice
Since 2005, Guyana has been without the services of a substantively appointed Chancellor of the Judiciary and a Chief Justice. There have been persistent calls for such appointments to be made, including calls from successive presidents of the Caribbean Court of Justice. As recent as last month, the President of the Guyana Bar renewed calls for Justices Yonette Cummings and Roxanne George-Wiltshire, who for several years have been acting in the positions of Chancellor and Chief Justice, respectively, to be appointed substantively. Suffice it to state that prolonged acting appointments, especially for holders of constitutional offices, tend to undermine the independence of those offices from the Executive and can adversely affect public confidence in their work.
By Article 127(1) of the Constitution, the President is required to appoint the Chancellor and the Chief Justice after obtaining the agreement of the Leader of the Opposition. In May 2022, the Leader of the Opposition wrote to the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs and Governance indicating his agreement to the substantive appointment of Justices Cummings and George-Wiltshire. However, there was no response from the President prompting the opposition to seek judicial review. In April 2023, the judge ruled that, while the President did not breach the Constitution in view of the absence of a time limit for making the appointments, he must act expeditiously in engaging the Leader of the Opposition. In bemoaning the current state of affairs, the judge stated that:
For too long, Guyana has been without substantive office holders for the two top positions in the judicial arm of the state, a situation which continues to be untenable and unacceptable to the citizenry and inimical to the independence of the judiciary that the supreme law of the land provides for. Any further delay in commencing this process should be eschewed so that this significant blot on the otherwise impressive Guyanese legal and judicial landscape is not perpetuated further.
Cease the Cabinet’s involvement in the procurement process
Section 54 of the Procurement Act gives the Cabinet the right to review all procurements the value of which exceeds G$15 million, based on a streamlined tender evaluation report. The Cabinet may object to the award of a procurement contract if it determines that the procuring entity failed to comply with applicable procurement procedures. However, there are credible reports of major contracts being awarded to entities in breach of the Act, especially as regards the qualifications and experience of suppliers and contractors as well as not meeting the requirement of the lowest evaluated bid. A typical example is the award of the Tepui contract for the construction of a sluice and pump station at Belle View, West Bank Demerara, of which much has been written.
That apart, with input from the Public Procurement Commission (PPC), the above-mentioned threshold is to be reviewed annually, with the objective of increasing it over time so as to promote the goal of progressively phasing out the Cabinet’s involvement and decentralising the procurement process. Additionally, the Cabinet’s involvement in the procurement process is to cease upon the constitution of the PPC except for pending matters.
The PPC was established by the constitutional amendment of 2001 but was not made operational until 2016, mainly due to the Cabinet’s reluctance to surrender its role in the procurement process. Both the Cabinet and the Commission should therefore take appropriate measures to adhere to the above requirements of the Procurement Act.
Change the procedure for appointing members of the PPC
Article 212 X of the Constitution provides for the PPC to comprise five members with expertise and experience in procurement, legal, financial and administrative matters; and for the President to make the appointments after nominations by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and approval by not less than two-thirds of the elected members of the National Assembly.
For the two Commissions that were appointed so far, the PAC took the least line of resistance by requesting the two major political parties to submit the names of candidates – three from the Government’s side and two from the Opposition – in order to obtain the Assembly’s approval. This practice has resulted in the appointment of some Commissioners mainly based on political considerations and without regard for the qualification requirements set out above. Is it any wonder that the effectiveness of the work of the Commission is yet to be felt?
Considering the importance of the PPC in the monitoring of public procurement and the related procedures to ensure that goods, services and the execution of works are conducted in a fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective manner, one would have thought that the PAC would have been involved in a rigorous process to identify the best candidates for appointment to the Commission. This would have involved advertising publicly for eligible individuals to serve on the Commission as well as shortlisting and interviewing candidates.
To be continued –
