(Trinidad Guardian) The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has ruled in favour of former High Court judge Marcia Ayers-Caesar, dismissing an appeal brought by Trinidad and Tobago’s Judicial and Legal Service Commission (JLSC) and upholding findings that her removal from office in April 2017 was unlawful.
In a unanimous decision delivered on March 24, 2025, the Board found that Ayers-Caesar’s resignation from the High Court was the result of coercion and that the JLSC’s actions violated her constitutional rights.
“The Commission brought about the claimant’s resignation,” the judgment stated, noting that the JLSC had effectively pressured her to step down under threat of disciplinary proceedings. “Pressurising a judge to resign by holding out the threat of disciplinary proceedings, as the Commission did in the present case, circumvents the constitutional safeguards laid down in section 137 and undermines their purpose.”
Ayers-Caesar was appointed to the High Court bench on 12 April 2017, leaving behind more than 50 part-heard matters in the Magistrates’ Court. Following public criticism and concerns from the judiciary, the Commission met in emergency session on 27 April.
It decided to give her “the option of withdrawing from the High Court bench and returning to the magistracy to discharge her professional responsibilities,” and warned that “in the event she refuses to withdraw, the Commission would consider instituting disciplinary action in accordance with section 137 of the Constitution.”
The Board found that this approach was unlawful. Under section 137, judges may only be removed for “inability… or for misbehaviour,” and only through a specific process involving a tribunal and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Commission had not followed this procedure, nor had it given Ayers-Caesar a chance to respond to the allegations.
“The claimant was not given that opportunity,” the judgment stated. “The Commission did not notify her that the question of removing her was being considered… nor did it give her any opportunity to answer [the allegations].” The Board held that this amounted to a breach of her constitutional right to the “protection of the law” under section 4(b).
While the Board disagreed with the Court of Appeal on one point—finding that the allegations, if proven, could fall within the ambit of section 137—it stressed that this did not justify the Commission’s conduct. “There was conduct on the part of the claimant which was capable of falling within the scope of section 137,” the judgment said, but emphasised that “the Commission’s decision that the information before it triggered and met the threshold for disciplinary enquiry was unlawful by reason of procedural unfairness.”
The Board concluded that Ayers-Caesar’s resignation was not freely given but was the product of unlawful pressure. “What the Chief Justice told the claimant placed her under pressure to resign,” the judgment said, adding that she was presented with the “implicit alternative of a disciplinary enquiry—‘effectively the equivalent of impeachment proceedings’… It is unsurprising that she responded by agreeing to resign.”
As a result of the ruling, Ayers-Caesar is entitled to compensation, though the exact amount and nature of that compensation will be decided by a judge of the High Court. The Privy Council noted that the Court of Appeal had already ordered an assessment of damages for the breach of her constitutional rights. While the judgment did not order reinstatement or explicitly mandate back pay, it left open the possibility that compensation could include loss of earnings, pension entitlements, or other damages based on what she would have received had she remained in office.
