Introduction
For reasons explained over the last two weeks, I believe that Guyana is at present set upon a political trajectory that is unsustainable and dangerous. I also sought to identify the reasons the country is in this position, associate them with the very ones obstructing its progress and suggested that shared executive government (SG) is the most viable way forward. Here I will briefly recap some of the issues SG must solve, say how it can solve these difficulties and briefly explain the basic structure of the SG arrangement I propose.
The issue under discussion is most important and so as to make my contribution as simple as possible, I will present it in bullet points.
Also, the web is replete with narratives about the Swiss government so, although I have chosen Switzerland as something of a model, in the interest of space, I will not elaborate on the elements I have adopted.
Recapping the issues
1. As the Charrandass Persaud episode demonstrated, politically Guyana is an extremely divided society with ‘half the country’ believing one thing and the other another. ‘Half’ listens to and supports one group of politicians and the other ‘half’ likewise another group of politicians.
2. Therefore, as is required in a properly functioning liberal democratic country, a ‘united public opinion’ – the foundation of united public action to hold politicians accountable – does not exist.
3. Our politicians may appear wicked, incompetent and even stupid, but they are simply behaving like most of us would do if we did not have to account for our actions; if regardless of what we do our ethnic group will support us.
4. Ethnic sympathies develop over long periods of time, and in the context of ethnic competition and conflict between groups, fear of the other side also develops.
5. For various reasons, in a competitive political system, some of the most clever and normal people, wanting to win votes and possibly government, exploit and reinforce these fears.
6. The result is that in Guyana today those of African ethnicity do not trust the PPP/C in government and those of Indian ethnicity feel the same about PNCR.
7. Since both groups only trust and support their own leaders, efforts by one political party to break the ethnic logjam by recruiting members of the other ethnicity have largely failed in the past and will continue to fail.
The purpose of SG
1. As important ethnic allegiances and fears develop over time in conditions of ethnic conflict, similarly such fears and allegiances can be expected to be reduced over time in the context of ethnic co-operation and good will.
2. Thus, if it is possible to organise governance in a manner wherein the representatives of the various ethnicities share government in an equitable manner in which there are no winners or losers, this should lead to less conflict over the sharing of national power and resources and gradually reduce fears of the other side, and possibly these allegiances themselves.
3. Those who share political authority will also share political responsibility and the blame for unacceptable government policy outcomes and personal behaviour.
4. Therefore, since no ethnic leadership will be able to easily hide behind its group and blame the other side, almost immediately we will see the beginnings of a ‘united public opinion’ so necessary for holding the entire government accountable.
5. Furthermore, in this context, new parties will arise to threaten the ruling groups no longer as secure in their ethnic garbs.
6. The resultant cohesive and co-operative social environment should lead to faster and more stable development and the good life.
7. I know of no practical example of shared governance arrangement growing into a dictatorship, indeed coalition collapse is closer to the norm. In any case to prevent this theoretical possibility, other process, e.g., parties below a 10% threshold remaining in the opposition, more entrenched separation of powers, etc., can be establish to attempt to prevent autocratic developments
Basic elements of the proposal
1. What is required in our type of ethnically divided society is not a governmental system in which, in the usual majoritarian construct, the ‘winner does not take all’ but one in which there are no winners or losers to make political competitions and the struggle for government a matter of near life or death.
2. The so-called ‘magic formula’ which allows the three parties receiving the largest votes at the national elections to choose two members each with the fourth largest party choosing one make up the Federal Council of seven which is federal government of Switzerland.
3. The Council is elected for a term of four years by the Federal Assembly from among members who then cease being members of the Assembly in keeping with the separation of executive and legislative power. The Assembly also annually elects, on a non-consecutive rotating basis, the president and deputy president of the country from members of the Federal Council.
4. This system is the closest I know of the kind of win-win governance arrangement Guyana requires. Not only does it destroy the overarching individual president striding the national stage and accumulating power by handing out patronage over a substantial period of time, but it can be configured to accommodate the proper representation of other ethnic groups, women and youths (see Ending ethnic political conflict. SN: 27/12/2017 for more details of how this might work).
5. In our case the National Assembly could also operate on a majoritarian basis but with special majorities for important issues such as budgets, motions relating to ethnic protection, annual elections of the president and deputy, etc,.
6. The annual elections of the president and deputy by a special majority should prevent any majority party in the Assembly from being able to act alone and will also mean that the persons chosen by the parties to be their representatives in the presidency must be sufficiently acceptable to the other side of the Assembly.
7. Guyana’s constitution allows for constituency representation but should be reformed for candidates to stand in their own names and be responsible directly to the people who elected them. However, the system should remain a proportional one in which there is proportionality between votes won by the parties and their allocation of seats in the National Assembly.
8. Switzerland is a federation in which regional autonomy is very important, and this column has argued for ‘subsidiarity’ whereby the central government should only be allowed to do what cannot be done equally well at the various non-national levels. Geographically, our people are not distributed in a fashion that will allow for the usual expressions of federalism, and this could result in increasing the struggle for power and ethnic quarrels at the local levels.
Conclusion
By my count, there are at least about 24 items that will have to be addressed in any future constitutional reform process. Other matters include, changing from a ‘closed’ to an ‘open’ top-up list system, political party organisation and financing rules, establishing a broader-based constitutional court, etc., and most of these will be utilised to bolster the SG arrangement.
It may appear contradictory to claim that leaders in this kind of context are not evil or wicked, yet time and again it takes civil war to bring them to their senses and establish some kind of consensual governance. I believe that our upbringing and the investments we necessarily made in the existing arrangement unconsciously give rise to ‘willful ignorance’. We thus make all kinds of excuses and disregard reasonable opinion, evidence and facts that run counter to our world view. Fortunately, although it usually requires extreme events like civil wars to more starkly define reality before leaders will positively react, sometimes it takes ‘the rationalist to evaluate whether the cause that’s being fought for is too urgent to spare the feelings/self-esteem of the willfully ignorant’ (https://rationalwiki. org/wiki/Willful_ignorance).
