Dr Clive Thomas

Introduction Today’s column wraps-up my rather extended assessment of the impact of the 2020 general crisis (as I have previously defined this phenomenon) on Guyana’s infant oil and gas sector.

Introduction As indicated last week, today’s column will continue my summing up of a few remaining concerns, which I have identified and have been evaluating in recent columns.

Introduction Today’s column starts the wrap-up of my on-going evaluation of several remaining concerns still of great importance to Guyana’s emergent oil and gas sector, in the closing days of the “2020 general crisis,” as I have earlier defined this phenomenon.

Introduction Today’s column considers issues related to the breakeven price for Guyana‘s fledgling hydrocarbons sector.

Introduction The global competitiveness of Guyana’s infant crude oil and gas sector and therefore foreseeable national economic growth, development and poverty reduction are over-determined by two basic economic variables and how they perform.

Introduction Today’s column reviews estimated Government of Guyana (GoG) revenue and related benefits arising from its International Oil Companies (IOCs)-led oil and gas sector. 

Introduction In a forthcoming edited volume on the Caribbean Economy, (Routledge, November 2020) I have a Chapter entitled, “Guyana and the Advent of World-class Petroleum Finds”.

Introduction Last week’s column ended with an observation that is so revealing I repeat it as the title for today’s column.

Introduction Today’s column continues my extended assessment of the cost of delay encountered at the Payara project, as modelled and reported on by Rystad Energy back in July this year.

Introduction Today’s column continues the discussion on Rystad Energy’s recent modeling of the “cost of delay of the Payara project”.  

Introduction Today’s column continues consideration of Rystad Energy’s modelling of the cost of delay in the Payara Project, incurred from the delayed approval of ExxonMobil and partners’ final investment decision (FID), which had been submitted to the Government of Guyana (GoG) last year.

Introduction Today’s column offers a summary evaluation of results from Rystad Energy’s modelling of the cost of delay (COD) of the Payara project, as revealed in last week’s column.

Introduction As promised last week, today’s column starts my review of Rystad Energy’s widely circulated results obtained from its modelling of the cost of delay for the Payara project.

Introduction The primary concern of last week’s column was to get a handle on the extent to which lagging output in Guyana’s infant oil and gas sector, combined with expected price declines for Guyana’s crude exports provide a proxy indication of the shortfalls in Guyana’s export earnings, Government revenues and ultimately its GDP.

Introduction Last week’s column continued my examination of the likely impact of the 2020 global general crisis on crude oil prices in world markets this year; and, following that, on the price obtained for Guyana’s Liza crude, as reflected in the price received for Government of Guyana, GoG, petroleum lifts, earned through its Production Sharing Agreement, PSA, with ExxonMobil and its partners.

Introduction Today’s column continues “counting the cost” of the continued economic setbacks/reverses facing Guyana’s infant oil and gas sector, as a consequence of the 2020 general crisis, as I have portrayed this crisis previously, in some detail.

Introduction Last week’s column had advanced the proposition that downward revisions to the IMF, Q4, 2019 forecasted growth rate, provide a rough proxy indicator of the economic cost of the setbacks and reverses which will occur during this year, as the 2020 general crisis unfolds.

Introduction Last week’s column introduced my proposed approach to the appraisal of the likely impacts of the 2020 global general crisis on Guyana’s infant oil and gas sector.

Introduction Today’s column continues my appraisal of the likely impacts of the 2020 global general crisis on Guyana’s infant oil and gas sector.

Introduction In recommending the establishment of a National Oil Company (NOC) in Guyana by the next decade, I am also explicitly rejecting any notion of twinning this policy recommendation with the establishment of a state-owned (or joint venture, state-private) downstream “oil” refinery.