Dr Clive Thomas

As part of the series on managing Guyana’s public investment regime, today’s column proposes a mechanism whereby our newly elected government could, at this unique democratic opening, embark on seeking bread (investible resources) and justice for Guyanese whose national wealth has been rapaciously plundered in recent years.

Introduction I was caught completely off-guard at the depth of the consternation and disbelief expressed by quite a few readers who responded to the estimates that I had provided of the amount of money Guyana loses due to three corrupt practices (public procurement fraud; illicit capital flight; and the underground economy) in last week’s column ($313billion or about US$1.5billion).

Shock and dismay   Today’s lesson (4) continues identifying the orders of magnitude of corruption-linked economic haemorrhage currently taking place in Guyana.

Introduction After some introductory material, the lessons dealt with so far in this series on the management of Guyana’s public investment regime have concentrated on: 1) the “basic steps” needed to establish an adequately functioning organization of this regime and 2) the types of failures and weaknesses displayed in public projects during the 2000s.

Introduction Today’s column concludes my examination of project failures and weaknesses revealed in public investment management in Guyana during the 2000s.

Introduction Lesson 2 in the present series of SN columns was presented in two parts over successive weeks; the main content of which was summarized in two schedules carried in last week’s column.

As promised, this week’s column provides the second of a two-part lesson on the topic: organizing the management of Guyana’s public investment regime.

Introduction   Last week I introduced the first in the present series of lessons explaining Guyana’s public investment management regime.

Introduction   Surprisingly, considering what appears to be the public’s main preoccupations today, thus far I have already received an unusual number of queries concerning the notion of “pathological altruism”, which I had introduced in recent columns that discussed the Venezuelan PetroCaribe scheme.

Introduction As I write this concluding column on PetroCaribe, global crude oil prices have resumed their decline.

Introduction Today’s column, along with next week’s will concentrate on 1) an evaluation of the role the PetroCaribe initiative has been playing in the region’s regime of crude oil importation, since its establishment in 2005, and 2) an assessment of the near-to-medium prospects of this initiative, with special reference to Guyana’s membership.

Introduction: Lifeline or noose   I shall outline the key details of the Venezuela PetroCaribe initiative in the next section of this column but upfront I wish to categorically assert that Guyana along with other members of this initiative have benefited greatly from it since its establishment in 2005 and for sure right up to the middle of 2014.

  Introduction   As indicated last week, in order to promote an intelligent appraisal of PetroCaribe and the current regime of Guyana’s oil importation, an appreciation of the trajectory of the current global crude oil price is essential.

Market price: demand and supply                Today the PetroCaribe Agreement and Guyana’s oil importation has to be contextualized against the dramatic fall in the global price of oil, which started in mid-2014.

Introduction Last week’s column revealed that in 2015, even as Guyana approaches half a century of Independence, several classical features of its colonial economic structure remain intact by global standards.

Then and now Sadly, as we approach Republic Day 2015, and after about half a century of independence, the classic description of the Guyana colonial economy as very small (even micro by global standards), poor, highly open, and exceptionally dependent on trade in primary commodities remains as broadly accurate today as it was back then.

Part4   Introduction Today’s column concludes this four-part series on the Guyana state.

So far Parts 1 & 2 of this four-part series of columns have argued that the proximate or immediately precipitating factor driving the multifaceted crises which have emerged in Guyana today, stems from the unprecedented torrent of financial lawlessness, abuses and irregularities unleashed by the minority PPP/C executive, which came into office following the November 2011 national elections.

Part2   Introduction   Last week, in Part 1 of this four-part series of columns I had argued that the proximate or immediately preceding factor driving the several ongoing crises and threatening contradictions in Guyana (starkly symbolized in the presidential prorogation of the National Assembly on November 10, 2014) has been the uncontrolled torrent of financial abuses, irregularities, and lawlessness perpetrated by the PPP/C executive since the November 2011 elections.

Part1   Introduction   There is a connecting thread to Guyana’s ongoing narrative of multiple unfolding crises, major economic contradictions, and threats of state violence against government critics.