Dr Clive Thomas

Introduction For the convenience of several enquiring readers, I begin today’s column with a brief recap.

Introduction Today’s column continues to elaborate on the meaning I am intending to attach to the three key concepts referred to in last week’s column; namely, extractivism, petrostate and happenstance.

Introduction Last week’s column wrapped-up my effort to overcome the failure after seven consecutive years of weekly assessment of Guyana’s emerging oil and gas sector to devote even a single column each to Hess Corporation or CNOOC Nexen Petroleum Limited, which share a working interest of 30 percent and 25 percent respectively in the Exxon Mobil-led Consortium operating under the Stabroek Block’s PSA, the only crude oil producing exporting entity to date.

Introduction Today I consider the Consortium’s third member, CNOOC Nexen Petroleum Limited; a subsidiary of the CNOOC group and its subsidiary Nexen. 

Introduction Over this week’s and the column to follow I shall provide a summary overview of ExxonMobil’s two consortium partners in crude oil and gas exploration, appraisal and production in Guyana, largely confined so far to the bountiful Stabroek block.

Introduction As promised last week, today’s column and the next two are devoted to an overdue  discussion of the notion of “working interest” as this is freely applied when referring to the grouping or consortium of the three oil companies leading the exploration and production of Guyana’s hydrocarbons in the prolific Stabroek Block.

Introduction In today’s column I wrap-up my revisit of previous calls to build an oil refinery; whether 1] state-owned and or operated 2] as a Joint Venture, JV, or 3] privately owned and operated.

Introduction               For the purposes of today’s column, I shall be revisiting my much earlier evaluation of development analysis and policy, along with my assessment of concrete proposals and studies by the Authorities aimed at evaluating the need for constructing a state-run or joint venture, JV, oil refinery that is designed to contribute value added to Guyana’s crude oil exportation.

Introduction In today’s column I expand on the reasoning I gave last week as to why I am urging that, there is no sound economic theorizing in calls for Guyana to establish a state-owned oil refinery to process (and thereby add value) to its crude oil production, at this stage of development of the country’s emerging oil and gas sector.

Introduction As I advanced last week, clearly my proposal for the authorities to establish a national oil company, NOC, based on NRGI precepts, does not ipso facto constitute a recommendation favouring the creation of a state-owned and or joint venture, JV, oil refinery. 

Introduction In last week ‘s column I had referenced the circumstance whereby, following sporadic social media and press reports ascribing to the Authorities an intent to build modular oil refineries, I have been encouraged by readers to pursue two  separate but linked tasks.

Introduction Last week’s column, the first in 2023, was also the last in an extended 14-part series that focused on my re-visiting Guyana Government Take and its officially pronounced hydrocarbon resources.

Introduction Today’s column concludes this 14-part series devoted to re-visiting Guyana Government’s Take ratio and estimates of its of recoverable hydrocarbons.

Introduction Today’s column serves three main objectives. First, to address Guyana’s creaming curve, which dramatizes its remarkable exploration successes in locating Guyana’s hydrocarbons resources, found largely offshore to date.

Introduction In today’s column I shall address, respectively, the second [USGS Assessment] and third lines [bullish expert opinions] which underpin my own “strongly bullish stance” on Guyana’s likely recoverable petroleum resources that I have assumed to hold over the long run.

Introduction While the fiscal rules of Guyana’s PSA indicate the sources of its oil revenues yield,  the finds/discoveries indicate the quantity, quality and trend in petroleum reserves accumulation and its reporting.

Introduction Thus far, this revisit of the ten individual published estimates of the Guyana Government Take ratios conducted by five separate bodies have highlighted four factors that immediately stand out.

Introduction As part of the revisit of my  previous evaluation of publicized modelled calculations of Guyana Government Take ratios, I had observed last  week that, just over two years ago [August 2020] the Inter-American Development Bank, IADB, and also much more recently, in August of this year, 2022,  Rystad Energy, published modelled calculations of Guyana Government Take along with projections of Guyana Government revenue flows and related operational and investment matters,  over a decade and more going forward to 2025-7 and beyond into the 2030s.

Introduction Today’s column begins the wrap up of my presentation related to Guyana Government Take.

Introduction In today’s column I report on the results of modeled projections of the Guyana Government Take ratio.