Introduction
Thus far I have introduced two major metrics in order to illustrate my thesis that the noise and nonsense mis-informers in the social and print media have colluded and connived in generating fake misrepresentations and dated dogma (from four decades ago), in order to portray a relentlessly demoralizing, paralyzing and retrogressive economic narrative of Guyana’s coming time of oil and gas production and sale.
Introduction
As a social scientist, I have observed, in recent years the unprecedented rise at a global existential level of some of the scariest social phenomena I have ever encountered.
Introduction
After seven consecutive weeks, today’s column draws to a close my rather extended (albeit selective) excursion into this year’s National Budget and its treatment of the country’s emergent oil and gas sector.
Introduction
As indicated last week, due to limited space in that column, I start today’s with the promised presentation of a listing of the valuation criteria used by the Guyana Authorities to inform their decision about the site of the proposed natural gas power plant and related facilities at Wales.
Introduction
As indicated last week, today’s column starts with referencing the five studies on Guyana’s energy mix, which were undertaken on behalf of the previous government.
Introduction
Today’s column starts my review of the Government of Guyana’s, GoG’s, natural gas to shore proposal, as prioritized in the 2021 National Budget.
Introduction
The 2021 National Budget identifies a successful local content policy, LCP, as required for converting projected petroleum windfall revenues into sustained economic differentiation and growth; combined with economic diversification and development.
Introduction
Today’s discussion addresses the notion of Dutch Disease. This is put forward in the 2021 National Budget as the most dangerous pitfall the Authorities will have to navigate as the country pursues economic growth and development with macroeconomic balance.
Introduction – Core Objectives
As modern national budgets tend to do, Guyana’s 2021 Budget identifies upfront six core objectives, which it sets about to achieve.
Introduction
As indicated last week, starting with today’s column, I shift focus away from offering readers data and analytics rooted in instructional guidance on the political economy of Guyana’s emerging oil and gas.
Introduction
Today’s column offers a few general reflections on the experiences of the 2020 crisis and its impact on Guyana’s newly established petroleum sector, now that we are into Q2, 2021 and, temporally at least, that year is firmly in the rear-view mirror.
Introduction
Thus far I have argued that the 2020 crisis delivered a huge setback to Guyana’s forecasted 86% GDP growth rate modeled by the IMF for that year, in Q4 2019.
Introduction
Last week’s column explained the enigma of, on the one hand, repeated striking downward revisions to Guyana’s expected real GDP growth for 2020 (initially set at 85% by the IMF and Government of Guyana, GoG in Q4, 2019).
Introduction
As the above title suggests, today’s column indicates a substantive shift in focus away from the “infant state” of Guyana’s oil and gas sector (even though this still remains the case) towards its evolving profile in coming decades.
Introduction
My long-standing recommendation to establish a National Oil Company, NOC, intentionally rejects the notion of linking this policy recommendation with the establishment of a state-owned (or joint venture, state-private) downstream “oil refinery”.
Introduction
Following last week, today’s column continues to provide recommendations in regard to the three crucial key policy choices that I identify, which will be confronting the Government of Guyana, GoG, in the coming decade.
Introduction
Since Guyana’s first commercial oil discovery in 2015, I have steadfastly urged a “strongly bullish outlook” on its potential petroleum resources.
