Introduction
Today’s column continues the discussion of establishing a domestic oil refinery (or refineries), whether private or state-owned, to process Guyana’s crude slate.
Introduction
Last week’s column briefly evaluated the perspective of private investors and their value added proposals for constructing “modular mini-refineries” utilising Guyana’s crude oil.
Introduction
In recent weeks my Sunday Stabroek columns have sought to demonstrate the reason why I have advanced the proposition that: a state-owned oil refinery makes no economic sense at this stage of Guyana’s evolving oil and gas sector and/or its economic development, more broadly.
Introduction
Today’s column expands further on the reasoning behind the Guyana’s Petroleum Road Map’s finding that there is not sound economic reasoning behind calls to establish a state-owned oil refinery to process (and thereby add value) to its crude oil production at this stage of development of the country’s coming petroleum industry.
Introduction
Today’s column addresses the tenth and final item in my non-exhaustive list of the “top-ten economic challenges”, which Guyana will have to confront as it operationalises its coming petroleum sector.
Introduction
Today’s column addresses three additional “top-10 economic challenges” in light of Guyana’s coming petroleum sector; namely: intergenerational equity, the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) budget rule, and managing public expectations.
Introduction
This week’s column continues my evaluation of what I had earlier labelled: “a non-exhaustive list of the top-10 economic challenges”, which the Government of Guyana (GoG) will have to confront with First Oil due in 2020.
Introduction
This week’s column starts consideration of what I had previously labelled as a non-exhaustive list of the “top-10 economic challenges”, which the Government of Guyana (GoG) has to confront.
Introduction
Today’s column has two principal aims: One is to wrap-up the overall discussion on spending expected windfall petroleum revenues on Government of Guyana (GoG) designated priorities.
Introduction
Today’s column wraps-up my discussion on spending petroleum revenues on long-term priorities
Of the Government of Guyana, (GoG), as represented in Guidepost 2 of Part 2 of the Guyana Petroleum Road Map.
Introduction
Last week I had raised several critical conceptual and analytical concerns related to what I labelled as “the Government of Guyana’s (GoG) well underway priority” of establishing a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF)//Natural Resources Fund (NRF).
Introduction
Discussing Guidepost 2 of Part 2, I began last week with identifying three general areas of public spending of petroleum revenues indicated by the Government of Guyana (GoG) thus far.
Introduction
A significant number of readers have asked me to clarify/expand/repeat more simply the way in which I arrived at the “back of the envelope” or “ballpark estimates” of annual Guyana Government Take, which I offered in last week’s column.
Introduction
Today’s column measures the impact of applying my values for production, price, and Government Take (indicated in Part 1 of Guyana’s Petroleum Road Map), to Rystad Energy’s analytics.
Introduction
Last Sunday’s column concluded my discussion of Guidepost 6. It also provided the indicative unit total cost range for a barrel of oil equivalent (boe) which I shall apply to the estimation of Guyana’s likely petroleum revenues, after cost, for the remainder of the Road Map, going forward.