Guyana and the Wider World

Introduction Last week’s column, sought to reinforce the critical importance of two features of the fiscal regime embedded in Guyana’s 2016 Production Sharing Agreement (PSA).

Introduction Last Sunday’s column introduced two far-reaching observations concerning Guyana’s 2016, Production Sharing Agreement (PSA).

Introduction The observation was made much earlier in the series and repeated for emphasis last week: Guyana’s present petroleum fiscal regime encompasses both 1) its basic constitutional, economic, financial, and accounting legislation, as well as 2) the specific terms and conditions enshrined in the 2016 Production Sharing Agreement (PSA).

Introduction Last week’s column identified several of the ‘known unknowns’, as these are termed in strategic management.

Introduction As far as I can determine, a standard formulation of Guyana’s fiscal regime for its petroleum sector would describe this as ‘The Terms and Conditions that are applied to both the Owner (State) and Contractor (Exxon and its partners) for conducting their business within an integrated framework; from exploration activities, right through the production chain (upstream to downstream), as well as trading’.

Introduction Last week’s column established that the mechanism of ring-fencing for determining recoverable cost is not, unambiguously, to Guyana’s benefit.

Introduction In the absence of the explicit ring-fencing of costs, the Guyana 2016 Production Sharing Agreement (2016) has provoked unqualified and perhaps even one-sided condemnation.

Introduction Following on several readers’ queries, perhaps I should indicate that I am by no means singular when treating cost recovery as a central component of the fiscal regime of petroleum producing countries.

Introduction: Catalogue The catalogue of desirable features energy economists promote for effective PSAs are that 1) ownership of the petroleum wealth should remain within the domain of the country in which it is discovered; 2) the State/Principal should maintain managerial control of this wealth, but 3) the Contractor/Agent (in Guyana’s case Exxon and its Partners) should maintain operational control of contract-assigned petroleum activities.

Introduction Last Sunday’s column introduced a simple basic ‘Setting’ (as energy analysts label it) or more commonly, analytical framework drawn from energy economics, under which the Guyana 2016 Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) will be appraised in coming columns.

Introduction Last week’s column highlighted my conviction that, even though there are model petroleum contracts, there are no perfect ones.

Despite last week’s publication of the Guyana 2016 Production Sharing Agreement (PSA/PSC); today’s column wraps up my evaluation of model PSAs/PSCs.

  Introduction From their very inception, oil agreements/contracts have embodied dynamic processes between states, as sovereign owners or guarantors/regulators of rights to a country’s petroleum wealth, and individuals/oil-companies that contract to develop this wealth.

Introduction Production sharing agreements or contracts (PSAs), have been, from the time of their earliest introduction to the oil and gas sector, subjected to in-depth critical analyses and/or evaluations from economic, legal, and institutional perspectives.

Introduction At the time of writing this column media reports indicate that a signature bonus of US$18 million has been paid to the Government of Guyana (GoG) by Exxon and its partners.

Introduction Last week’s column welcomed the coming release of Guyana’s petroleum contracts.

Introduction Last week’s column argued that, the best use of Guyana’s oil wealth would be strategic spending on, and through, a dedicated Ministry of Renewable Energy.

Introduction Last week’s column had raised an outside-the-box consideration, which is that Guyana’s best use of its coming petroleum benefits/revenues might well lie in their utilization as strategic spending on renewable energy.

Introduction As indicated last week, today’s column is designed principally to pronounce on Decision Rule 4.

Decision Rule 3 Last week’s column continued the exploration of Guyana’s natural gas prospects, both “associated with/and not associated with” its recent substantial petroleum finds.