Introduction
Beginning with this brief introduction, in coming weeks I explore the linkage between initiatives to recover stolen public assets in Guyana and financing for its development.
Introduction
Today’s column follows-up on 1) my earlier estimation of the value of potentially recoverable stolen public assets and 2) the ticking time-bombs that threaten the survival of sugar and rice.
Introduction
Perhaps a window on public sentiment is reflected in the surprising number of persons that responded to last Sunday’s column, which linked the recovery of stolen public assets initiative to not so discreet intimations of destabilization of the sugar and rice industries.
Political economy fragility
Today’s column elaborates on organizational elements, briefly portrayed last week, which are needed for establishing Guyana’s stolen public assets recovery initiative.
As part of the series on managing Guyana’s public investment regime, today’s column proposes a mechanism whereby our newly elected government could, at this unique democratic opening, embark on seeking bread (investible resources) and justice for Guyanese whose national wealth has been rapaciously plundered in recent years.
Introduction
I was caught completely off-guard at the depth of the consternation and disbelief expressed by quite a few readers who responded to the estimates that I had provided of the amount of money Guyana loses due to three corrupt practices (public procurement fraud; illicit capital flight; and the underground economy) in last week’s column ($313billion or about US$1.5billion).
Shock and dismay
Today’s lesson (4) continues identifying the orders of magnitude of corruption-linked economic haemorrhage currently taking place in Guyana.
Introduction
After some introductory material, the lessons dealt with so far in this series on the management of Guyana’s public investment regime have concentrated on: 1) the “basic steps” needed to establish an adequately functioning organization of this regime and 2) the types of failures and weaknesses displayed in public projects during the 2000s.
Introduction
Today’s column concludes my examination of project failures and weaknesses revealed in public investment management in Guyana during the 2000s.
Introduction
Lesson 2 in the present series of SN columns was presented in two parts over successive weeks; the main content of which was summarized in two schedules carried in last week’s column.
Introduction
Surprisingly, considering what appears to be the public’s main preoccupations today, thus far I have already received an unusual number of queries concerning the notion of “pathological altruism”, which I had introduced in recent columns that discussed the Venezuelan PetroCaribe scheme.
Introduction
Today’s column, along with next week’s will concentrate on 1) an evaluation of the role the PetroCaribe initiative has been playing in the region’s regime of crude oil importation, since its establishment in 2005, and 2) an assessment of the near-to-medium prospects of this initiative, with special reference to Guyana’s membership.
Introduction: Lifeline or noose
I shall outline the key details of the Venezuela PetroCaribe initiative in the next section of this column but upfront I wish to categorically assert that Guyana along with other members of this initiative have benefited greatly from it since its establishment in 2005 and for sure right up to the middle of 2014.
Introduction
As indicated last week, in order to promote an intelligent appraisal of PetroCaribe and the current regime of Guyana’s oil importation, an appreciation of the trajectory of the current global crude oil price is essential.
Market price: demand and supply
Today the PetroCaribe Agreement and Guyana’s oil importation has to be contextualized against the dramatic fall in the global price of oil, which started in mid-2014.
Introduction
Last week’s column revealed that in 2015, even as Guyana approaches half a century of Independence, several classical features of its colonial economic structure remain intact by global standards.
Then and now
Sadly, as we approach Republic Day 2015, and after about half a century of independence, the classic description of the Guyana colonial economy as very small (even micro by global standards), poor, highly open, and exceptionally dependent on trade in primary commodities remains as broadly accurate today as it was back then.