Guyana and the Wider World

Conclusion Today’s column concludes the discussion of the Amaila Falls Hydro Project (AFHP).

Judging by the numerous requests which I have received from readers to comment on the Hydropower Purchase Agreement (PPA) between GPL and Amaila Falls Hydropower Inc (AFH Inc) this seems to be, by far, the public’s most troubling concern about the Amaila Falls Hydropower Project (AFHP).

Part 6 Last week’s column indicated that the financing arrangements for the Amaila Falls Hydropower Project (AFHP), envisaged GPL playing a pivotal two-pronged role.

Part 5 In this week’s column and the next I shall wrap up my discussion of the financing arrangements through which the Amaila Falls Hydropower Project (AFHP) is being executed.

Project finance Last week I had indicated that this week’s column would be devoted to the further elaboration of the financing structure of the Amaila Falls Hydro Project (AFHP).

Last week’s column summarized the geo-technical features of the troubled Amaila Hydropower Project (AHP).

Introduction There has been, surprisingly, very little consistent and sustained official information flows to the public aimed at improving their awareness and understanding of the Amaila Falls Hydropower Project (AFHP).

Part 1 Introduction Last week’s column completed the discussion of Phase 2 of the management of Guyana’s public investment programme (that is, project selection and sequencing).

Scope This week I shall conclude the discussion on the selection of public projects in Guyana and their sequencing.

This week I continue my discussion of Phase 2 (project selection and sequencing) in managing Guyana’s public investment programme.

Introduction In recent Sunday columns, I have divided Guyana’s public investment management programme into four sequential phases.

Introduction In assessing Guyana’s public investment strategy I have described both the Marriott Hotel project and the presidential spectrum giveaways as “opportunistic rogue investing.”

Introduction Last week’s column argued that because the Marriott project has no discernible origins in the most recent complete and systematic indication of the government’s investment strategy (the 2011-2015 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) it is fair to assess that project as an opportunistic rogue investment.

Revealed public investment strategy Last week’s column identified source documents from which the PPP/C’s public investment strategy might be revealed, thereby providing the basis for an assessment of its management.

Introduction This week I am going to examine the PPP/C’s pubic investment strategy.

Introduction As earlier indicated I intend to merge the ongoing discussion of Guyana’s public investment management into what is, hopefully, a fruitful consideration of the National Budget, 2013.

Introduction: At the end of last week’s column I had indicated that, beginning this week, I would merge my on-going consideration of the decision-making process in regard to Guyana’s public investment projects into a wider discussion of the National Budget 2013.

Introduction In this week’s column I start with a wrap-up of the discussion on uncertainty and risk as applied to government projects and then go on to offer brief comments on the notion: time is money.

Introduction The list of troubled government projects in Guyana is long and getting longer by the day.

Introduction If, as I observed in last week’s column, removing the unrelenting glare of public scrutiny from government spending is a certain recipe for the entrenchment of waste and inefficiency, then one important corollary follows.