Guyana and the Wider World

PR exercise Last week I pointed out that official US stress-testing of its biggest banks seemed to have ‘worked’ because a large measure of confidence has been restored in the banking system.

Introduction For most persons as time passes their memories fade, albeit to varying degrees.

Introduction Although routinely portrayed as the ‘provision of climate aid to poor rainforest countries,’ all the agreements I have seen between rich countries and poor rainforest ones, including the Guyana-Norway Agreement, are in essence the export sale of global environmental services by the latter in exchange for climate payments from the former.

Introduction I had indicated in last week’s column that I would treat with three particular aspects of global climate funding (aid) as I wrap up for now, my analysis of the LCDS, the Guyana – Norway Agreement and associated arrangements, as well as several environmental topics related to global warming and climate change.

In Retrospect Eight months ago, on November 29, 2009 and the eve of the Copenhagen Climate Summit (COP15) I began in this column what I projected then would be an extended series of analyses and commentary on the LCDS; the Agreement between the Government of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway; the accompanying Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Joint Concept Note; and, related matters pertaining to the problems created by global warming and climate change.

Introduction This week I shall conclude my discussion of the global carbon market and the hopes many place on it for helping to provide a solution to the problems of global warming and climate change.

Introduction On reflection, several readers have communicated to me over the past few weeks, in different ways, the grave difficulty they were having in trying to fathom the interconnections between the global carbon market, the LCDS, and the resolution of the global climate problem.

Introduction Despite its relative infancy, the global carbon market is plagued with a virtual deluge of corrupt and illegal transactions.

A widely shared view among operatives on the global climate exchanges as well as most governments of rich countries is that, from a global perspective, forest carbon capture by poor rainforest countries constitutes ‘low-hanging fruit’ available for cheap harvesting through market-based efforts to combat global warming and climate change.

Last week’s column noted that the unprecedented and spectacular growth of the global carbon market in the space of a few years makes it one of the most dazzling symbols of the awesome power of market expansion contained in globalization.

Scale and scope The global carbon market is the most recent and perhaps the most glamorous ‘poster-child’ of globalization ever.

As we shall see in greater detail later, despite the fact that it has only recently been established, trading on various climate exchanges around the world has reached a stage where it can be confidently classified as a truly great commodity market.

So far I have addressed several basic features of carbon-trading markets.

In this week’s column I continue my evaluation of the global carbon-trading market as a key element in strategies to combat atmospheric pollution, global warming and climate change.

Three key observations Last week I started to assess what I termed the “mysteries and mystifications of global carbon-trading.”

Introduction Make no bones about it: the basic trajectory of the LCDS is to generate carbon credits/offsets, derived from the avoided deforestation of Guyana’s forests, for commercial sale on global carbon trading markets.

Shift in focus Following on this coverage, this week’s column begins a shift to a new area of focus.

Wrap up This week I wrap up that part of my assessment of the LCDS that focuses on the several misstatements and computational errors found in the draft text and related official documents, especially as they pertain to such basic data as the area under forest and estimated rates of deforestation for Guyana.

Recap In last week’s column I made a digression to deal with a few issues raised by Ambassador Brattskar, head of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative and the lead negotiator for the Norwegian government as they were reported in the Stabroek News, (March 21, 2010).

Digression In this week’s column I shall temporarily digress from my originally intended topic, which was to continue the discussion centred on the fuzziness in the LCDS and other related official documents about the size of the total forest area that is being pledged under the strategy, as well as that found in the publication of recent data on Guyana’s deforestation.